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ABSTRACT

A VAST AND VARIED OPPOSITION: THE SHIFTING WAR DEMOCRAT –
PEACE DEMOCRAT CONTINUUM IN CIVIL WAR PENNSYLVANIA

By
Jonathan D. Neu
May 2010

Thesis supervised by Perry K. Blatz, Ph.D.
This thesis identifies the Democratic party in Civil War Pennsylvania as existing
along a shifting political continuum. This continuum ranged from the War Democrats,
whose support for the Union war effort aided the Republican administration of Abraham
Lincoln, to the Peace Democrats, whose obstructionist principles aimed to derail the
North‟s commitment to win the war. This work argues that different segments of the
Democratic continuum controlled state politics at different times throughout the war,
dependent upon changes in the Democracy‟s perception of political, military, economic,
and social events that the war wrought. Furthermore, this thesis contends that the
ideologies along this Democratic continuum were too varied to promote unity among
Pennsylvania‟s party leaders, contributing to the Democracy‟s ultimate failure to compete
successfully against their Republican opponents in wartime state politics.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the generous
assistance of a number of individuals. Dr. John Dwyer guided my work on a seminar
paper which formed the core of this thesis. With his encouragement, I endeavored to
develop that paper to the form it takes today. Dr. Joseph Rishel willingly assented to
review a draft of this thesis and provided prompt and useful recommendations on short
notice. I reserve my greatest thanks to Dr. Perry Blatz whose patience and insights are
truly unmatched. Without his careful edits, thoughtful interpretations, and always
cheerful encouragement, this work would be left woefully wanting. I owe tremendous
gratitude to the History Department of the McAnulty College and Graduate School of
Liberal Arts for the financial support received throughout my time at Duquesne
University. Lastly, I would like to thank my family and friends for their love and
unconditional support, which more than anything, made this work possible.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Abstract.............................................................................................................................. iv
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................. v
Introduction......................................................................................................................... 1
Literature Review................................................................................................................ 7
1. The Democratic Proto-Continuum, 1850s – Spring 1861.......................................... 21
2. The War Democrats Ascendant, Spring 1861 – Spring 1862..................................... 50
3. The Peace Democracy Revealed, Spring 1862 – Summer 1863................................ 71
4. The Peace Democracy Rebuffed, Summer 1863 – Spring 1864................................ 99
5. The War Democracy‟s Final Campaign, Spring 1864 – Spring 1865...................... 130
Conclusion...................................................................................................................... 156
Bibliography................................................................................................................... 165

vi

Introduction
Three years after the end of the Civil War, newspaperman Horace Greeley labeled
the postwar Democratic party “a myth, a reminiscence, a voice from the tomb, an ancient
and fishlike smell.”1 Indeed, the Democracy had suffered considerable damage through
the course of the war, particularly in Pennsylvania. During the antebellum years, the
Commonwealth had been a bastion of Jeffersonian-Jacksonian Democratic tradition.
After the war, however, Pennsylvania had emerged as one of the strongholds of
Republicanism. This political conversion came as a result of the Democracy‟s inability
to cope with the transformative change the Civil War engendered. Although the party
embodied a series of unifying principles that nearly all Democrats shared, the war
presented new challenges that party adherents reacted to with disparate responses.
Pennsylvania‟s Civil War Democrats may be theoretically placed along a party
continuum. On one end were the War Democrats who were firmly committed to a war to
preserve the Union. On the other were the Peace Democrats, whose most radical
members advocated the peaceable separation of the Union and even the secession of
Pennsylvania. Between these extremes were a host of individuals with a diverse range of
principles and fluctuating commitments to the war and its demands. This study will
examine the War – Peace continuum that the Pennsylvania Democracy operated under
during Civil War. The ideology of Democrats shifted along this continuum through the
progression of the crisis as developing Republican war policies and Union military
fortunes constantly altered perceptions on how the war was being waged. Although
Democrats of all political stripes shared some common principles, the breadth of the

1

New York Tribune, April 3, 1868, quoted in Joel H. Silbey, A Respectable Minority: The Democratic
Party in the Civil War Era, 1860 – 1868 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1977), x.
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Democratic continuum proved too vast for the party to compete effectively against the
Republicans for control of the state. Consequently, Pennsylvania Democrats were
ultimately unable to counteract the sweeping political and social changes that the war
wrought and that they so feared.
To understand the ideology of Pennsylvania‟s Civil War Democracy one must
begin with that era‟s notions of conservatism. Chief among those principles was a
Democratic faith in the doctrine of white supremacy. Although slavery was nonexistent
within Pennsylvania‟s borders at the time of the Civil War, antipathy toward AfricanAmericans remained. Hostility toward blacks stemmed from racist fears of
miscegenation and resentment of job competition with an allegedly “inferior” race.
Although few Pennsylvania Democrats openly lauded Southern slavery, even fewer
spoke out against it. Whereas Whigs and Republicans often expressed their personal
loathing of slavery, “similar sentiments are virtually impossible to discover among
Democrat[s].”2 When the Civil War unleashed the question of emancipation, Democrats
were faced with the largest threat to their notions of tradition and conservative status quo.
Although commitment to white supremacy was the Pennsylvania Democracy‟s most
unifying trait, other conservative principles brought unity among the vast majority of
Democrats. These principles included dedication to states‟ rights, strict adherence to the
Constitution, a decentralized federal government, and utilization of hard money. All
these conservative values would be challenged during the course of the war.
To examine Pennsylvania‟s shifting Democratic continuum, this study divides the
Civil War years into five sections and examines the role of War Democrats, Peace

2

John Gerring, “A Chapter in the History of American Party Ideology: The Nineteenth-Century
Democratic Party (1828 – 1892)” Polity 26:4 (Summer 1994): 734.
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Democrats, and Moderate Democrats within those periods. The first chapter surveys the
Pennsylvania Democracy from its steady decline during the 1850s to the eve of war in
Spring 1861. Although hostilities had not yet begun, a proto-continuum developed
during this time that separated party members along three major divisions ahead of the
transformative 1860 presidential election. Supporters of Stephen A. Douglas, the favorite
among many Northern Democrats, are termed “Douglas Democrats” in this study and
most closely represent the precursors to the War Democrats. Advocates of Southern
Democrat John C. Breckinridge are divided two ways. Those who gave in to Southern
demands to suppress abolitionism and expand slaveholders‟ rights, but maintained a
greater resolve to preserve the Union are labeled “Breckinridge Moderates.” After Fort
Sumter, these Democrats would largely compose the Moderate Democrats. Those
Democrats with greater Southern sympathies and even desires for Pennsylvania to secede
with the South are termed “Breckinridge Conservatives.” During the war, many of these
Breckinridge Conservatives would become Peace Democrats (commonly referred to as
Copperheads). During the secession winter of 1860 – 1861, the Breckinridge Moderates
controlled state party politics because of the influence and patronage of Pennsylvaniaborn President James Buchanan. By navigating a middle course, these Democrats were
best able to present themselves as the defenders of constitutionalism and conciliation and
the enemies of extremist Northern abolitionism and Southern secessionism.
Chapter two examines the Pennsylvania Democracy from the firing on Fort
Sumter to Spring 1862. During this period, the Southern attack on federal property
galvanized support for war among most Democrats. Peace Democrats were compelled to
silence their opposition to the military subjugation of the South out of fear of mob attack
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or arrest by the Lincoln administration. Moderates meanwhile were forced from their
temporizing role and induced to join either the War or Peace wings of the continuum.
The War Democrats wrested control of the party machinery and were lauded for their
cooperation with the federal government in prosecuting the war. Lincoln also recognized
the prudence of installing War Democrats to positions of power in the military, a number
of whom hailed from Pennsylvania.
The third chapter examines the most drastic shift among Pennsylvania‟s
Democracy during the entire war. Between Spring 1862 and Summer 1863, Republican
war aims were broadened to include emancipation of Southern slaves. War Democrats,
who had received praise for their commitment to preserve the Union, balked at the
thought of a war to free the slave. Some of these Democrats shifted to a Moderate
ideology and pestered the Lincoln administration to return to limited war aims. Peace
Democrats, meanwhile, reemerged as obstructionists of Republican war policy and
gained credibility when military defeats signaled an ill omen for the Union armies.
Moderate Democrats who had once allied with the War Democrats shifted toward the
Peace end of the continuum. They began to agitate for conciliation with the South and
aimed to invite them back into the Union with slavery guarantees.
Chapter four deals with the Peace Democracy‟s high-water mark peaking during
Summer 1863 and subsequently declining through Spring 1864. During this time,
Republican preoccupation with emancipation engendered enough Democratic rancor to
permit Copperheads to run one of their own, George W. Woodward, as the party‟s
gubernatorial candidate. Moderates increasingly worked with Copperhead leaders to
rouse enthusiasm for an armistice and a convention of the states to bring about a reunion

4

solely on the basis of the Constitution, not on emancipation. Only timely Union military
victories impeded the peace movement‟s momentum and helped Republicans retain the
governor‟s seat.
The fifth chapter covers the final year of the war and the last shift of the
Democratic continuum. With Peace Democrats unable to lead the party to victory in the
polls, War Democrats reemerged at a time when Union victory at last seemed near. The
1864 presidential campaign dominated state and national politics as Pennsylvania-born
general and War Democrat George B. McClellan was widely viewed as the party‟s
frontrunner to challenge Lincoln‟s bid for a second term in office. Peace Democrats,
however, were still numerous enough to demand concessions for their cooperation and
managed to secure the vice presidential spot on the ticket for one of their own. Although
the nation voted overwhelmingly in favor of Lincoln, Pennsylvania nearly gave its
electoral votes to McClellan, indicating the continued strength of the Democracy in the
state. After the election, War and Moderate Democrats could do little else but acquiesce
to Republican control for the remainder of the war. Peace Democrats continued their
agitation to end the war immediately, though looked increasingly foolish in doing so as
Union victory became certain.
This study will examine some of Pennsylvania‟s chief Democratic leaders and
determine how they were situated along their party‟s continuum at various times
throughout the war. The Commonwealth‟s Democracy provides a good microhistory
from which to draw conclusions about the national party structure. As one of the most
prominent states in the Union during the Civil War, Pennsylvania had a wide range of
War, Peace, and Moderate Democrats in political office or in important positions to
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disseminate conservative views. Among these leading Democrats are newspaper editors,
military officers, state legislators and senators, congressmen, cabinet officials, and a
former president of the United States. This diverse range of party leaders necessarily
translates to a wide variety of political views within the conservative tradition that
magnify the existence of a Democratic continuum and its relevance to the political
history of the Civil War-era.
As historian Joel H. Silbey explains, the Democracy was “after 1860, the
opposition party in a situation of national danger, a badly divided minority party trying to
regain its place and dominance.”3 Indeed, Democratic conservatism was not uniform
among party adherents and permitted sects to form within the party structure. Each
Democratic sect maintained a collection of principles that changed over time as the
political, military, and social events of the war unfolded. Through the course of the war,
a Democrat might remain ensconced within one sect or could transcend the fluid
boundaries between them to adapt to experiences during wartime. Examination of
Pennsylvania‟s shifting War Democrat – Peace Democrat continuum ultimately will shed
light on the complexities of Civil War-era conservatism and the transformations it
underwent as the conflict simultaneously threatened the Union and the antebellum
traditions that Democrats so zealously guarded.

3

Silbey, A Respectable Minority, ix.
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Literature Review
A proper examination of the scholarship on the Northern Democracy is a
frustrating enterprise. Just as the wartime Democrats were wracked with internal schism
and dissent, so too is the ongoing historiographical conversation. A complete picture is
further complicated by the interpretive primacy that the Peace Democracy assumed for at
least a century after Appomattox. The contentiousness of the Copperheads dominated
academic circles for so long that an appropriate understanding of a War Democrat –
Peace Democrat continuum has been obscured until the revisionist school of thought
finally brought a more complete understanding of the party‟s function during the Civil
War. Indeed, it was not until the 1970s that divisions within the wartime Democracy
were adequately defined and the War Democrats received their own systematic study. To
this day, there still has not been a study of the Northern Democracy that effectively
synthesizes the shifting ideologies of the War, Peace, and Moderate Democrats. Such an
undertaking would indeed be a voluminous feat of scholarship and this study makes no
pretensions to satisfy the need for a careful interpretation of the Northern Democracy‟s
vast and shifting continuum. Instead, this work will more modestly examine that
continuum within Pennsylvania‟s Democracy, a good place to start given the state‟s
strong Democratic tradition up to the Civil War along with the abundance and ideological
diversity of its conservative political leaders.
Historians were quick to interpret the behavior of the wartime Democracy in the
postwar years and have since produced varied interpretations of Lincoln‟s opposition.
Five major schools of thought have evolved throughout the historiography of the
Northern Democracy: the early traditionalists, the late traditionalists, the revisionists, the
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post-revisionists, and the neo-traditionalists. The early traditionalists (1865 – 1930)
experienced the war and its divisiveness firsthand, worshipped the memory of the
martyred Lincoln, and denigrated his opponents, particularly Copperheads, as worse
traitors than the Confederates. The late traditionalists (1930 – 1960) asserted in a
nationalistic vein that Lincoln‟s wartime policies were the mark of a political genius and
his opponents were subversive dissidents whose ideological intransigence nearly wrecked
the Union. Revisionists (1960 – 1980) emerged to vindicate the Democracy, even the
Peace wing, as commendable defenders of the Constitution and loyal, albeit conservative
Unionists. Importantly, the revisionists finally acknowledged the boundaries between
War, Peace, and Moderate Democrats and opened up scholarship to the examination of
these individual segments of the broad party continuum. The post-revisionists (1980 –
1995) balanced the two previous schools of thought and determined that Lincoln, despite
a few faults, navigated the American crisis skillfully, and that his opponents were a loyal
but obstructionist faction. Neo-traditionalists (1995 – present) resurrected the principles
of the traditionalists and buttressed the interpretation with new sources and
methodologies. All these schools reached consensus on a few important tenets:


Abraham Lincoln was the preeminent politician to prosecute the war successfully
and preserve the Union.



Democrats were strict constitutional constructionists of the JeffersonianJacksonian traditions whose primary concern was resistance to radical social
change, particularly relating to race relations.



Despite losing a majority of the wartime elections, Democrats were a fully
functional and capable political entity.

8

*

*

*

*

The apotheosis of President Abraham Lincoln began almost in tandem with his
violent death. The completeness of Lincoln‟s victory over the Confederacy and his tragic
demise at the pinnacle of his success characterized an American drama bordering on the
theatric. A nation bereft and in mourning soon turned to revenge. Demand for reprisal
required identification of those who had ever doubted the slain commander-in-chief, who
had sacrificed his life to perpetuate the American union and democracy. Those
particularly in the crosshairs were the Peace Democrats. A strongly partisan literature,
embodying the early traditionalist interpretation, developed in the generation after the
Civil War that often vilified the Copperheads and sent them into hiding and obscurity.1
Lincoln‟s unflinchingly loyal personal secretaries, John Hay and John G. Nicolay, led the
assault against Peace Democrats twenty-five years after the war. “Opposition to the
Government,” they concluded, “formed throughout the country secret associations for the
purpose of resisting the laws, of embarrassing in every way the action of the Government,
of communicating information to the rebels in arms, and in many cases of inflicting
serious damage on the lives and property of the Unionists.”2 As they delineated and
censured the subversive activities of the Copperheads, these early partisan historians
played a significant role in influencing later generations. Incidentally, these historians of
the early traditionalist school failed to acknowledge the divisions within the Democratic
continuum and failed to recognize the existence of War Democrats who had a hand in

1

After the Civil War, countless Copperhead politicians and leaders destroyed personal letters and papers
en masse in an effort to distance themselves from the indignant barbs directed their way. For modern-day
historians, this has left an unfortunate gap in the analysis of this wing of the Democratic continuum, which
has only intensified the disagreements among historians of various schools of thought.
2
John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History, vol. 8 (New York: The Century
Company, 1890), 1.
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buttressing Republican war policy. In the postwar era of “bloody shirt” politics,
Democrats were still the opposition and it was more politically expedient to highlight the
less admirable actions of members of the party.
The late traditionalist school of thought solidified during another national crisis,
the Second World War. During that war effort, Americans once again turned to brilliant
leaders of the past for guidance and inspiration. During the uncertain early days of the
country‟s involvement in World War II, a pair of historians reexamined Lincoln and his
Democratic dissenters, and drew moralistic conclusions applicable to this new threat to
liberty. George Fort Milton‟s Abraham Lincoln and the Fifth Column (1942) maintained
a glowing interpretation of Lincoln‟s leadership and castigated the cowardice of Peace
Democratic figures.3 Lincoln was a most effective war leader according to Milton
because he was “peculiarly equipped with a sympathetic understanding of the people‟s
hearts and minds and souls” and took on a symbolic role as the nation‟s “poet and
prophet of the people.”4 Echoing the vituperative criticisms of Copperheads common in
the immediate postwar years, Milton witnessed the same “common denominators” in his
contemporary wartime society, embracing the “patriots and traitors…appeasers, agitators
of revolution, and counter-revolutionaries too.”5 Ultimately, Milton considered the
Copperheads to be dangerous subversives, intent on creating seditious secret societies,
encouraging Union army desertion and draft dodging, and winning elections to hasten a
potentially dishonorable peace with the rebellious South. The Fifth Column was the first
3

The term “fifth column” refers to any group of subversives with secret sympathies to an enemy of the
state. It is derived from a 1936 statement made during the Spanish Civil War. During the war, four
columns of insurgents were converging on Madrid, while the “fifth column” referred to the Francisco
Franco sympathizers already in the city.
4
George Fort Milton, Abraham Lincoln and the Fifth Column (New York: Vanguard Press, 1942), 18,
334.
5
Ibid.
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work of scholarship to bring together various government records and postwar
biographies into a coherent study of Copperhead dissent. These sources were largely
gleaned from collections pertaining to Lincoln, his cabinet, and his political supporters.
Glaringly absent are newspaper sources and sufficient documents related to the
Copperhead leaders themselves. Ultimately, this generated a work inferior to Milton‟s
traditionalist compatriot, Wood Gray.
Gray‟s The Hidden Civil War (1942) appeared in print almost simultaneously
with Milton‟s work. Consequently, Gray‟s scholarship reflects the nationalism exhibited
by The Fifth Column, but draws fewer instructive parallels between dissent during the
Civil War and in World War II-era America. The Hidden Civil War argued that the
Copperheads were a “defeatist” segment of Northern society whose opposition stemmed
from dissatisfaction with Lincoln‟s handling of the war, outrage at his suspension of civil
liberties, and fear of freed blacks glutting the American workforce with unskilled
laborers.6 Gray identified the Midwestern states as the main sector of dangerous
Copperhead subversion and was perhaps the first scholar to classify Ohio‟s Clement L.
Vallandigham as the most menacing Peace Democrat to the Lincoln administration.7
More scholarly than Milton, Gray made better use of the extant primary source material.
Midwestern Democratic and Republican newspapers received greater consideration in the
book and a heftier accumulation of manuscript materials provided better substance for
this traditionalist analysis. Ultimately, Gray‟s outlook on the Copperheads matched
Milton‟s views in that they were too willing “to sacrifice the Union rather than permit the

6

Wood Gray, The Hidden Civil War: The Story of the Copperheads (New York: The Viking Press,
1942), 14, 100.
7
Clement Laird Vallandigham (1820 – 1871) was an Ohio Congressman and is credited as the most
outspoken of the antiwar Copperhead faction.
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carrying out of a policy that had been adopted against their wishes.”8 Largely absent
from Milton‟s and Gray‟s works was acknowledgement of other facets of the Democracy.
The disgrace that had accompanied postwar interpretation of the Peace Democrats caused
historians to neglect the activities of War Democrats and Moderates during the war.
Their eagerness to demarcate Republicans as good and Democrats as evil in the story of
the Civil War precluded dissecting the Democracy‟s divergent ideologies. The
traditionalist school of thought enjoyed a nearly two decade-long supremacy over
interpretation of the Northern Democrats.
In 1960, a scholar out of the University of Wisconsin published an explosive
study that may have done more to shift the historiography of Copperheadism (though still
not the Democracy as a whole) than any other work. Frank L. Klement‟s The
Copperheads in the Middle West emerged as a canonical work of what would become the
school of revisionist thought. In his attempt to refute the charge that the Copperheads
were men “whose hearts were black, whose blood was yellow, and whose minds were
blank,” Klement boldly asserted that the Copperheads had long been victims of a
senseless witch-hunt.9 On the heels of the destructive years of the age of McCarthyism,
Klement‟s study aimed to vindicate the tarnished reputations of men as innocent as the
“Reds” who had been persecuted in his own time. Far from the callous traitors they had
been branded as, Klement painted Copperheads as peaceable conservatives whose
dissatisfaction came from the radical social changes which the war was inaugurating.
These conservative Democrats, according to this interpretation, operated under the banner
“The Constitution as it is, the Union as it was” and wished to restore the unity of the
8

Gray, Hidden Civil War, 224.
Frank L. Klement, The Copperheads in the Middle West (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1960), vii.
9
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nation without bloodshed and with slavery left intact to appease the seceded South.
Although he agreed with Wood Gray that the Midwest was the region of the nation most
disaffected, Klement believed that “the intensification of nationalism” during the 1940s
had had an adverse effect on Civil War historical writing.10 The Copperheads employed
Democratic manuscript collections much more intensively and included various
campaign propaganda used by both Democrats and Republicans during the wartime
congressional, gubernatorial, and presidential elections.11
Quickly established as the leading Copperhead defender, Klement produced two
other significant works, The Limits of Dissent (1970) and Dark Lanterns (1984). These
works emerged at a time when continued distrust in the government shook the academic
world as a result of America‟s involvement in the Vietnam War and the Watergate
scandal. In the former study, Klement narrowed his focus to reinterpret the life of
Clement L. Vallandigham. Where Wood Gray blasted Vallandigham as “an epitome of
arrogant political egoism,” Klement maintained that he was a conservative champion who
simply “believed changes should be evolutionary and not revolutionary.”12 In Dark
Lanterns, Klement examined the history of the secret, Copperhead political societies that
had formed during the Civil War that had been labeled as dangerous and subversive by
Milton and Gray.13 Klement refuted the contentions of the traditionalists and claimed
that these societies were ineffectual, ill-conceived, and too weak to pose any threat to the
10

Ibid.
Because the Clement Vallandigham papers were destroyed by flood in 1913, Klement relied heavily
on manuscript collections of Vallandigham‟s disciples and associates, like Thomas O. Lowe of Ohio and
Charles Mason of Iowa. Klement was the first Copperhead scholar to use the Lafayette C. Baker Papers
which were opened in 1953. Baker was one of Lincoln‟s leading wartime investigators and his papers
include information concerning the government‟s investigation of subversive activities.
12
Gray, Hidden Civil War, 224; Frank L. Klement, The Limits of Dissent: Clement L. Vallandigham and
the Civil War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970), 315.
13
These Dark Lantern Societies included the Knights of the Golden Circle, the Order of American
Knights, and the Sons of Liberty.
11
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Lincoln administration. Again, it was the nationalism imbedded in World War II-era
scholarship, in Klement‟s mind, that had made the dark lantern societies the stuff of
“myths and legends.”14 It did not take long for Klement‟s influential and well-researched
scholarship to gain credence among others in the academic community. More
importantly to this study, Klement‟s interpretation allowed other historians to delve
deeper into the Democracy as a whole and recognize that the party consisted of more than
just ultraconservatives like Vallandigham.
Among these groundbreaking historians was Christopher Dell, whose Lincoln and
the War Democrats (1975) finally treated the opposite end of the Democratic spectrum
that heretofore had been relegated to a marginal role in the historiography. Dell
acknowledged the difficulty in reconciling the pro-war sentiments of the War Democrats
with party ideology as a whole. He blamed his predecessors for “seeking shortcuts and
easy explanations” that “chose to emphasize not the War Democrats but their opponents,
the Peace Democrats, who professed to represent more accurately the Democratic
faith.”15 In Dell‟s view, Lincoln was “the Pied Piper of Civil War politics” who “with
Conservative phraseology and Radical intent” lured War Democrats away from the
conservative roots of their party to support war measures that brought the political and
social changes that the Democracy had long resisted.16 Significant to this study, Dell
identified boundaries between three sects of the party – the War Democrats, the
Conditional War Democrats, and the Peace Democrats – and contributed to the notion
that these boundaries were fluid and shifting, depending upon the progress of the war.
14

Frank L. Klement, Dark Lanterns: Secret Political Societies, Conspiracies, and Treason Trials in the
Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984), 6.
15
Christopher Dell, Lincoln and the War Democrats: The Grand Erosion of Conservative Tradition
(Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1975), 11.
16
Ibid, 9.

14

Ultimately, the work argues that between Lincoln and the War Democrats, there was “a
compulsory, nervous, neurotic partnership” that nonetheless persisted thanks to pro-war
conservatives‟ consent “to fight against [their] own instincts and prejudices, at the
expense of men and theories and principles [they] had been worshipping for many
years.”17 Other revisionist historians looked beyond the Copperheads to uncover the
complexities of the wartime Democracy.
Among Klement‟s adherents was Joel H. Silbey whose A Respectable Minority
(1977) advanced his belief that the Democratic party during the Civil War was a
reputable and loyal political party that lost credibility when tainted with “the brush of
treason” by the Republican party then in power.18 Silbey cast a disparaging light on some
of the actions of Lincoln‟s own party. The Republican party, Silbey claimed, “utilized
every weapon and trick, fair and foul, to counter any surge to the Democrats” in an effort
to “delegitimize the Democratic opposition.”19 A Respectable Minority underpinned the
assertion that the Democratic party during the Civil War never gave in to radically
subversive sentiments and remained a competitive political party throughout the war.
Like Dell, Silbey recognized three divisions within the party – the War Democrats,
“Legitimists” (comparable to Dell‟s Conditional Moderates), and “Purists” (Peace
Democrats). With Dell‟s and Silbey‟s studies, a Democratic continuum was gaining
greater credibility and scholarly inquiry.
Arnold M. Shankman‟s The Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement (1980) retained the
crux of the revisionist interpretation but shifted the sphere of interest from the Midwest to
the Keystone State. Shankman‟s book affirmed that Pennsylvania had its own significant
17

Ibid, 9, 10.
Silbey, A Respectable Minority, xi.
19
Ibid, 166.
18
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element of Peace Democrats consisting of Philadelphia elites, yeoman farmers,
immigrants, and common laborers. However, he candidly admitted that he “join[ed] the
ranks of those revisionist historians who reject „the traditional stereotype of the
Copperhead as traitor.‟”20 In a similar vein to Klement, Shankman argued that
Pennsylvania‟s opponents of the Lincoln administration were simply social
conservatives, not traitors. The Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement also employs the idea
of three distinct sects working within the Democracy as a whole. The War Democrats,
who fall outside the subject of the book, were “more tolerant of arbitrary arrests,
newspaper suppressions, and conscription laws than peace men, [and] they thought it
unwise to call for an armistice.”21 Shankman divides the antiwar Democrats into two
groups. First were the radical “peace at any price” men who demanded an end to the war
even if it meant separation of the Union. Second were the moderate antiwar Democrats
who remained Unionists at heart but opposed war measures such as civil liberty
suppression, conscription, and emancipation. Although Shankman‟s work remains the
most complete study of Pennsylvania‟s wartime Democracy, it has at least two major
shortcomings that hinder a full understanding of the party‟s function. First, Shankman‟s
focus on antiwar Democrats necessarily excludes the relevance of the Commonwealth‟s
vigorous War Democratic faction. Second, the book does not go deeply enough into
explaining how political actions in Harrisburg and Washington and military actions on
the battlefield affected party members and contributed to ideological shifts as the war
progressed. These are two goals of the present study.

20

Arnold M. Shankman, The Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement, 1861 – 1865 (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh
Dickinson University Press, 1980), 15.
21
Ibid, 17.
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For two decades, the revisionists, under the tutelage of Frank L. Klement, had
dominated the scholarship on Civil War Democrats. However, the healthy debate over
the true motives of the Democracy continued with the advent of the post-revisionists.
After the Vietnam War and Watergate crises of the 1970s, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed
a return to relative peace and stability in America. In turn, scholarship on the Northern
Democracy, particularly the Copperheads, took on a more reasoned and moderate tone.
James M. McPherson published his lengthy, hugely popular, Pulitzer Prize-winning
Battle Cry of Freedom (1988), which has often been credited as the most definitive onevolume study of the Civil War. McPherson returned Lincoln and his Republican
supporters to their accustomed role as superior leaders and savvy politicians. Refusing to
buy in to the revisionist assertion that the Copperheads were benign and harmless
political figures, McPherson turned his attention to the gubernatorial contests of 1863 in
Ohio and Pennsylvania. Clement L. Vallandigham and George W. Woodward were the
Democratic candidates from the respective states, and McPherson recognized the threat
they posed to the successful prosecution of the war. “The election of either
[Vallandigham or Woodward],” he averred, “would revive sagging Confederate morale
and might depress the northern will to win.”22 Furthermore, McPherson commented on
the revisionist forebears, charging Frank L. Klement with “protest[ing] too much in his
attempt to exonerate the copperheads from all such calumnies [of disloyalty]”23 Another
Pulitzer Prize-winning study, Mark E. Neely, Jr.‟s The Fate of Liberty (1992), aimed to
resolve some of the slanders leveled against the Lincoln administration by revisionists
like Joel H. Silbey. Neely recognized that the administration‟s suspension of certain civil
22
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liberties during the war, “threaten[ed] to undermine Lincoln‟s reputation.”24 Ultimately,
Neely maintained Lincoln‟s celebrated statesmanship by asserting that the successful
prosecution of the war temporarily precluded unadulterated deference to civil liberties.
Furthermore, Lincoln‟s policies were not enacted to silence the Democratic opposition
but simply to preserve the Union. The prudent, middle-of-the-road scholarly style
practiced by McPherson and Neely soon gave way to a new breed of academic rancor
against Lincoln‟s detractors, particularly Peace Democrats.
A neo-traditionalist school of thought emerged in the mid-1990s and was
commenced in part by David E. Long‟s The Jewel of Liberty (1994). Long‟s work
focused on the presidential election of 1864 between Lincoln, the Republican incumbent,
and George B. McClellan, a Democrat, popular military commander, and rabid Lincoln
antagonist. The author promotes a proud, nationalistic image of Lincoln, applauding his
willingness to carry out the presidential election despite the extraordinary crisis. Lincoln
could have suspended the election because of the dangers involved with a potential
Democratic victory, which may have guaranteed Confederate independence. To Long,
Lincoln‟s “behavior remains the American model for the world, especially today when
executives suspend constitutional guarantees at whim, much less during civil war.”25
Long delineates various traitorous activities that Copperhead figures engaged in
throughout the war. Treasonous Peace Democrats furtively planned assassination
attempts on Lincoln, plotted the release of Confederate prisoners of war, and engaged in
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espionage activities with Confederate agents. To strengthen his arguments, Long
uncovered manuscript collections, memoirs, and diaries of Copperhead figures, some of
whom associated with Southern operatives sent North to kindle insurrection in the loyal
states.
Jennifer L. Weber‟s Copperheads (2006) refocused the centrality of the Peace
Democrats‟ behavior as a principal threat to the Lincoln administration‟s prosecution of
the war. Dismissing Frank L. Klement‟s thesis that Copperhead disloyalty was the result
of Republican “lies, conjecture, and political malignancy,” Weber returned to the sixty
year-old assertions of Milton and Gray to profess that “the danger to the Northern war
effort posed by Copperhead political activities was far more than a figment of Republican
imagination.”26 The Democratic peace movement, Weber argued, was so pervasive by
the 1864 presidential election that it nearly took over the party‟s platform planks and
resulted in a victory over Lincoln and the Republicans. The Peace Democrats became
“blinkered by ideology” and had become “obstructionists, doing little more than laying
into Lincoln and his policies.”27 Weber‟s veneration of Lincoln‟s political ability and
animosity toward the Copperhead threat hearkened back to the traditionalist school of
thought. She contributed important new insights, however, by focusing on wartime
events largely ignored by her academic antecedents. For example, Weber convincingly
interpreted the July 1863 New York City draft riots as a dangerous threat instigated by
Peace Democrats that compelled the Lincoln administration to siphon troops from the
front lines to deal with a figurative “fire in the rear.”28 The works of neo-traditionalists
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like Long and Weber have, for the time being, brought Copperhead scholarship full
circle, preparing the ground for future rounds of scrutiny and reinterpretation of Lincoln‟s
dissenters.
There is much yet to be uncovered concerning the relationship between War,
Peace, and Moderate Democrats, particularly on the state level. This study will seek to
bring together all three sects of the Democratic continuum and relate their actions in
Pennsylvania politics during the Civil War years. It will be most convenient to employ
Christopher Dell‟s labels of “War Democrat,” “Peace Democrat,” and “Conditional
Moderate” or just “Moderate” in the pages to follow. The term “Copperhead” will also
equate with “Peace Democrat” in this study, as it has become commonplace in Civil War
scholarship to use either term without implying that one so-named was necessarily a
traitor or Southern sympathizer, unless specifically noted. Additionally, this study will
endeavor to incorporate important political and military events and examine how they
contributed to shifts in Democratic ideological commitments as the war unfolded. An
assessment of the Northern Democracy is vital to a fuller understanding of Civil War
politics and the complexities involved in preserving the Union.

20

Chapter 1: The Democratic Proto-Continuum, 1850s – Spring 1861
In the days after the tumultuous presidential election of November 6, 1860,
Pennsylvania‟s Democratic newspapers reported the particulars of the official returns,
accompanied with predictable lamentations. “That once great and powerful [Democratic]
party is overwhelmed by a total, an inglorious defeat,” bewailed the Huntingdon Globe.
“Sectionalism has torn down the flag of conservatism which waved over our council
halls, and internal strife and discord menace the nation. What a change in the short space
of four years! How bright and hopeful everything looked then; how gloomy and
foreboding is the picture now!”1 Republican Abraham Lincoln had decisively carried the
Commonwealth with a 95,000 vote majority over the Democratic fusion ticket, which had
gone to Vice President John C. Breckinridge. As a result of an ideological split within
the Democratic faithful between adherents of Breckinridge and those of Illinois Senator
Stephen A. Douglas, the party had made impossible any chance to compete with the
surging Republicans, whose presidential election victory signaled the final blow to the
South‟s willingness to remain in a Union it deemed hostile to its interests. Lincoln‟s
victory also marked the end of Democratic dominance in Pennsylvania and forced the
party to reassess its principles in the face of sectionalism and the mounting prospect of
civil war. This would not be a simple task, given the divide between the Breckinridge
and Douglas devotees. Between the election of Abraham Lincoln and the firing on Fort
Sumter, the rift created between Pennsylvania‟s Breckinridge and Douglas supporters
established an embryonic Democratic spectrum that foreshadowed the better-known
Peace Democrat-War Democrat continuum after the start of hostilities in April 1861.
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Democrats had reasons to be distraught. Since the days of Andrew Jackson the
Democracy had dominated Pennsylvania politics and had consistently delivered the
state‟s electorate to those candidates sharing an affinity for white male egalitarianism, a
weak federal government, and a strict interpretation of the Constitution. As historian
John Gerring explains, this antebellum Democratic ideology also encompassed a “general
distrust of power, defense of property rights, praise for the virtues of tolerance and a
pluralistic society, [a] proto-Marxist critique of capitalism, [and an] embrace of the
interests of agriculture.”2 From Jackson‟s presidential victory in 1828 until the
fragmentation of the Democratic party in early 1860, Pennsylvania had given its electoral
vote to the Democratic candidate in six out of eight instances. Furthermore, the state‟s
electorate had selected a Democratic governor eight out of eleven times. In the
Commonwealth, “[t]he Democrats were usually able to maintain their supremacy, and
only opposition coalitions, particularism, or party schism could unseat them.”3 Even
after the sectionalizing years of the 1850s, Pennsylvania retained its conservative,
Democratic tendencies. In 1855, the Democratic-leaning state legislature chose former
governor William Bigler as U.S. Senator. The following year, voters delivered native son
James Buchanan to the White House. In 1857, the state selected conservative William F.
Packer to serve as governor. Nonetheless, the Democratic dominance that had marked
the preceding decades began to show signs of wear that would ultimately be
overwhelmed by burgeoning Republicanism.
The disintegration of the Pennsylvania Democracy in 1860 was rooted in the
sectionalizing events of the previous decade. Passage of the divisive Kansas-Nebraska
2
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Act in 1854 opened up the first fissures. In that year, Illinois Senator Stephen A. Douglas
sought to appease Southern Democrats and unite them with their increasingly disaffected
Northern counterparts. Through introduction of the doctrine of popular sovereignty,
Douglas proposed to admit Kansas and Nebraska as territories with the contentious slave
question left up to the vote of their future inhabitants. Because slavery was barred there
by the 1820 Missouri Compromise, Douglas notoriously advised the repeal of the longstanding legislation. Although the bill passed, many Northerners seethed at the prospect
of opening the archaic institution of slavery to all territories. As in other areas of the
North, antagonized Pennsylvania voters sought ways to resist the legislation, which
coalesced former Whigs, free-soil Democrats, and other groups into the new Republican
party. By the 1856 presidential election, many Northern states threw their support behind
the free-soil, Republican candidate John C. Frémont. However, Pennsylvania‟s persistent
conservatism and the candidacy of Buchanan ensured the Democracy victory both within
the state and nationally.
James Buchanan had had a long and distinguished political career even before his
presidency. His service in Washington stretched back to the 1820s, during which time he
consistently exhibited an ideology “in keeping with the views of his Southern friends,
[because] he adamantly opposed such government programs as homesteads, river and
harbor improvements, and land grants for schools; and despite the tariff needs of his own
state, he even lost any taste he might have ever had for this form of protection.”4
Furthermore, his views on slavery garnered him support from his Southern colleagues.
4

Elbert B. Smith, The Presidency of James Buchanan (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press,
1975), 14. Buchanan began his political career in 1814 as a Federalist in Pennsylvania‟s House of
Representatives. He served in the U.S. Congress from 1821 to 1831, switching his political allegiance to
the Democrats in 1828. After a vacancy opened in the U.S. Senate in 1834, he was elected to fill the seat
and was reelected to that body in 1837 and 1843.

23

Although he at times “expressed regret” at the existence of slavery in the republic, “there
is no evidence that he ever felt any moral indignation against it or sympathy for the
slaves.”5 He later served as Secretary of State in the James K. Polk administration (1845
– 1849) and was awarded the ambassadorship to London by Franklin Pierce in 1853. In
the latter capacity, Buchanan again demonstrated his empathy for Southern interests by
helping draft the Ostend Manifesto, which proposed the seizure of slaveholding Cuba
from Spain. Although this proposal failed and the political fallout negatively affected the
Pierce administration, Buchanan still benefited from his service as minister to England.
His absence from domestic politics during the Kansas-Nebraska contretemps ensured that
he was untainted by either side of the debate. Thanks in part to the support of his native
state, Buchanan received a comfortable plurality of the vote over Fremont and KnowNothing candidate Millard Fillmore.6
Buchanan was almost immediately faced with two major crises in 1857 that
discredited his administration and engendered the decline of the Pennsylvania
Democracy‟s potency. First, a string of bank and business failures during the summer
intensified a mild recession that had begun late in the previous year. Falling grain prices
and the collapse of land speculation contributed to the Panic of 1857 and allowed
Republicans to brand the Democrats‟ low tariff policies as ineffectual. Buchanan,
responding in a vein reminiscent of Jackson, justified his party‟s anti-protectionism and
blamed the “existing misfortunes” not on the low tariff, but rather on “our extravagant
and vicious system of paper currency and book credits, exciting the people to wild
speculation and gambling in stocks. These revulsions must continue to recur at
5
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successive intervals so long as the amount of the paper currency…of the country shall be
left to the discretion of…banking institutions, which from the very law of their nature
will consult the interest of their stockholders rather than the public welfare.”7 Many
Pennsylvanians were not convinced. From one of the nation‟s chief industrial and
manufacturing centers, the state‟s business leaders clamored for greater tariff protection.
Even Governor Packer was forced to stray from traditional Democratic economic
principle and espouse the virtues of protectionism. “The present condition of the
revenues of the General Government,” reported Packer in his 1859 annual message,
“demonstrates the urgent necessity of increased duties upon foreign importations. The
people of Pennsylvania have ever taken a lively interest in the proper adjustment of a
tariff; and they have…favored such an assessment of duties, as would not only produce
revenue, but furnish the largest incidental protection to the great mineral, manufacturing,
and industrial interests of the country.”8 Although Democratic protectionism began to
gain traction within the state, pro-tariff advocates saw greater promise in the burgeoning
Republican movement.
The second factor contributing to the decline of the Pennsylvania Democracy
during Buchanan‟s term dealt with the reemergence of the Kansas conflict. At the time
of Buchanan‟s inauguration, two territorial governments existed simultaneously. The
pro-slavery government at Lecompton was supported by Washington even though a
minority of Kansans backed it. The free-soil government at Topeka was illegally formed
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but heavily supported within the territory, which was increasingly populated by
Northerners. In 1857, a constitutional convention was organized by the mostly proslavery territorial legislature, to draft the infamous Lecompton Constitution.9 This
constitution was placed before the people of the territory for a referendum vote. The
referendum was boycotted by free-soilers, enabling the pro-slavery advocates to score a
resounding triumph. Siding with Southern Democrats, Buchanan endorsed the
Lecompton Constitution and disregarded the free-soil boycotters whose “refusal to avail
themselves of their right could in no manner affect the legality of the [constitutional]
convention.”10 Douglas, with the support of many Northern Democrats, refused to back
the Lecompton Constitution. His defection formed a fatal rift in the party between proadministration and anti-Lecompton Democrats. Ultimately, the Lecompton Constitution
was defeated by both a territorial referendum in January 1858 and by the U.S. House of
Representatives later that year. Because of the Panic of 1857 and the Kansas conflict, the
Pennsylvania Democracy and the national party were left reeling.
The split among Democrats was accompanied by a fusion among all the party‟s
adversaries. In Pennsylvania “[a]n opposition was at work building an organization into
which all souls, desirous of driving the Democracy from power, could enter.”11 Not only
did this opposition consist of Republicans, but also Know-Nothings, and most startlingly,
disaffected Democrats. To accommodate this loose alliance of motley political
ideologies, opposition leaders adopted the term “People‟s party.” By eschewing the word
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“Republican,” the opposition leaders encouraged voters to join “without loss of face, and
also it was hoped that a few promising Democrats…who had broken with Buchanan,
would actively assist the new party.”12 During the campaign of 1858, Pennsylvania‟s
People‟s party effectively attacked the pro-administration Democrats‟ unpopular stand on
Kansas and aversion to tariffs. In the fall elections, Democrats suffered an ignominious
defeat. The party maintained a majority of only one in the state senate and elected just
thirty-two legislators in the House.13 Buchanan, disgruntled by the election results, wrote
his niece, Harriet Lane. “Well! we have met the enemy in Pennsylvania & we are
theirs,” he lamented. “This I have anticipated for three months & was not taken by
surprise except as to the extent of our defeat.”14 The Democracy‟s situation deteriorated
further the following year. On March 16, the Democratic State Convention convened to
express their confidence in President Buchanan but withheld endorsement for Governor
Packer.15 The following month, ninety-nine party bolters, led by Philadelphia Press
editor and former Buchanan supporter John W. Forney, convened separately at Altoona.
There they endorsed Packer‟s policies, criticized the Buchanan administration, and
lauded the efforts of Senator Douglas, further exacerbating the growing rift between “Old
Buck” and the “Little Giant.” Although Forney and his followers failed to nominate an
anti-administration ticket for the 1859 elections, the damage had been done and People‟s
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party candidates again swept the state legislature.16 On the eve of the transformative
1860 election, the Keystone Democracy had reached a nadir.
The fragmentation of the Democratic National Convention at Charleston, South
Carolina in April 1860 and the nominations of both Douglas and Breckinridge at
conventions separately assembled in Baltimore two months later are well-known events
in the hopeless schism of the Democracy leading up to the presidential election. The
Pennsylvania Democracy endured a similar rupture that ensured their defeat in the
October and November elections and widened the continuum between the conservative
and moderate wings of the party. The Democratic State Convention delegates convened
in Reading on February 29 to select a gubernatorial candidate, choose delegates for the
Charleston convention, and endorse a presidential candidate. Democrats amicably
completed their first assignment, unanimously naming Henry D. Foster of Westmoreland
County as their choice for the governor‟s chair. A cousin of John C. Breckinridge, Foster
had served in both the state and U.S. House and was deemed by many as a good choice
because of his pro-tariff inclinations. Democratic journals were predictably delighted by
the apparent unity exhibited at the convention. “We hail it as a good omen,” the Erie
Observer celebrated, “a cheering indication that the Democracy of Pennsylvania are
united, confident, and determined on victory!”17 The Lancaster Intelligencer reported
that “[t]he Democratic party of Pennsylvania is „itself again‟….A spirit of conciliation
and compromise was inculcated by everybody and the result is a united, hopeful and
jubilant party from one end of the Commonwealth to the other.”18 However, this

16

After the October 1859 elections, the People‟s party controlled sixty-seven of one hundred House
seats and twenty-one of thirty-three in the Senate.
17
Erie Observer, March 3, 1860, 2.
18
Lancaster Intelligencer, March 6, 1860, 2.

28

assumed harmony belied the divisions that still wracked the party. Although the state
convention delegates had rallied around a single gubernatorial candidate, they refrained
from endorsing a presidential candidate. Furthermore, Douglas adherents felt miffed that
few from their number were selected to attend the Charleston National Convention. The
Breckinridge-Douglas split would only intensify as the campaign season continued.
At the national convention in April, Pennsylvania‟s pro-Breckinridge delegates
played a major role in withholding votes that otherwise would have secured the
nomination for Douglas. When the delegates adjourned and reconvened in Baltimore in
June, Breckinridge supporters bolted the convention, allowing devotees of both
candidates to nominate their champions separately. The rift proved especially taxing to
Pennsylvania‟s Democracy because of “the near equal strength of the opposing Douglas
and Buchanan-Breckinridge factions.”19 On July 2, the Democratic State Central
Committee assembled in Philadelphia intent to unify. All delegates agreed to work in
harmony towards the election of Foster for the governorship, but accord was more
difficult to achieve over the presidential question. Ultimately, a compromise was reached
among the majority of the Democratic delegates that stipulated that the candidate who
received the greater number of popular votes in the November election would receive the
entirety of Pennsylvania‟s twenty-seven electoral votes.20 Nonetheless, a small group of
anti-Breckinridge dissidents led by Forney and Harrisburg Patriot and Union editor
Richard J. Haldeman bolted to organize a Douglas ticket in September. The split proved
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fatal. On October 9, 1860, Henry D. Foster was defeated by People‟s party candidate
Andrew G. Curtin by a majority of more than 32,000.21 Even though the Democracy
acted with a “surface unity” for the gubernatorial campaign, the party divisions
“hampered local leaders and delayed their efforts to organize the state campaign.”22 The
Breckinridge-Douglas rift proved more embarrassing in the presidential election the
following month. Lincoln defeated the combined votes of the Democratic Fusion and
Douglas straight ticket by a margin of more than 72,000.23 The Keystone Democracy
remained too obstinate to deal with the widening chasm between pro-administration and
anti-Lecompton adherents and forestalled any chance to compete with the People‟s party.
*

*

*

*

Three major groups splintered within the Democratic party prior to the election of
1860, all of which would form a segment of the wartime continuum after April 1861.
The first group comprised the Douglas Democrats who threw their support behind the
Little Giant during the presidential campaign. Among the rank and file of this wing of
the party were many of the immigrants, laborers, and farmers who had long supported the
Democracy and those members of the party faithful who opposed slavery expansion in
the territories.24 Douglas Democrats were particularly prevalent in northern and western
Pennsylvania where anti-slavery sentiment was stronger and the need for amicable
Southern trade relations less important. This is not to say that these individuals were of
the same moral character as Republicans when it came to racial tolerance. In a senate
21
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speech delivered in February 1860, Douglas likely spoke for most of his followers when
he articulated his views on race and government:
[I]n my opinion, this government was made by white men for the benefit of white
men and their posterity for ever, and should be administered by white men, and by
none other whatsoever….I am in favor of throwing the Territories open to all the
white men, and all the negroes, too, that choose to go, and then allow the white
men to govern the Territory. I would not let one of the negroes, free or slave,
either vote or hold office anywhere, where I had the right, under the Constitution,
to prevent it.25
Nonetheless, Douglas Democrats were appalled by the Buchanan administration‟s heavyhanded support for the Lecompton Constitution and the Supreme Court‟s Dred Scott
decision, which eliminated Douglas‟s doctrine of popular sovereignty. Furthermore,
these Democrats were less apt to tolerate Southern radicalism and were more likely to
support coercion to maintain the integrity of the Union. As historian Irwin F. Greenberg
explains, “Douglas‟ followers were willing to grant some concessions on the slavery
question, but would support the use of force to uphold the authority of the Federal
Government.”26
The unequivocal leader of this sect in Pennsylvania was Philadelphia Press editor
John W. Forney. Forney had broken with the president in 1857 when Buchanan failed to
reward him with a patronage office or control of the administration‟s Washington organ.
From this rebuff, Forney turned to the Douglas Democrats who helped secure for him,
with the help of a handful of Republicans, the position of clerk in the House of
Representatives. Perhaps out of opportunism, Forney became a Republican disciple after
the 1860 election and converted his Press into one of the most pro-Lincoln newspapers in
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the state. Apparently, his pro-Republican sympathies were present even when he led the
movement for a Douglas straight ticket in September 1860. “I had done my utmost to
elect him [Lincoln] President of the United States by the only way in my power,” asserted
Forney in his 1881 memoirs, “and that was by supporting the straight Douglas electoral
ticket in Pennsylvania.”27 Other Douglas Democrats included former Philadelphia mayor
Richard Vaux; Philadelphia ward boss Lewis Cassidy; anti-Lecompton Congressman
John Hickman; and Harrisburg Patriot and Union editor Richard J. Haldeman. These
political leaders and their followers would compose the War Democratic wing of the
party‟s continuum after hostilities began. Some, including Forney and Hickman, would
concede to outright conversion to the Republican party when they found Democratic
urgings for conciliation with wayward Southerners too submissive.
The second major group within the Democratic schism was the Breckinridge
Moderates. Breckinridge supporters held two distinct advantages in the state. First, they
controlled the Democratic State Committee, which shaped the party‟s policies and
selected its candidates for various state and local offices. Second, the most experienced
of Pennsylvania‟s politicians were almost unanimously in favor of Breckinridge‟s
election in the 1860 presidential campaign.28 This sentiment stemmed from the enduring
power of the Buchanan machine. Although Buchanan never ingratiated himself with an
overwhelming majority of Pennsylvania‟s Democratic rank-and-file voters, the power of
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patronage and the prospect of future political plums under a Breckinridge administration
ensured that most of the state‟s political leaders remained loyal to the President. By
maintaining fidelity to Buchanan, these veteran officeholders were guaranteed job
security so long as their campaigning efforts brought victory to the President‟s preferred
successor.29 Breckinridge adherents were invariably hostile to the disruptive actions of
Forney and the Douglas Democrats. Many felt (perhaps rightly so, considering Forney‟s
conversion to Republicanism) that leaders of the Douglas Democrats were surreptitiously
guiding their supporters into the ranks of the Republican party in return for political
favors. The pro-Breckinridge Philadelphia Pennsylvanian charged that the Douglas
Democratic sect had been maneuvering toward the rival party since the start of the 1860
campaigning:
From the moment it took its position in the late canvass, it has been gravitating
with constant…approaches to Black Republicanism. It hoped, by adroit
management, to draw its partisans on with it, imperceptibly to themselves, and at
the lucky moment to betray them all into the hands of the enemy. How many it
has succeeded in debauching and selling we have no means of knowing – enough
perhaps to fill its contract and to entitle it to its reward from the Abolitionists.30
On questions of slavery, Breckinridge Moderates were more likely to concede
Southerners‟ rights to bring their slaves into the territories and less likely to advocate “the
use of force against the seceded states.”31 Nonetheless, most Democrats of this sect were
loath to witness the secession of the Southern states, preferred to maintain the integrity of
the Union, and opposed the radical tendencies of both Northern abolitionists and
Southern fire-eaters. Because of their moderate views, these Democrats were the most
likely to vacillate between the War and Peace wings of the party once the Civil War
29
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commenced, depending upon the successes or failures of the war effort and the policies
of the Lincoln administration.
The leaders of Pennsylvania‟s Breckinridge Moderates were the most numerous
and powerful of the three segments of the continuum. Before and during the war,
Pennsylvania‟s Moderates occupied some of the most important offices in the nation.
Besides President James Buchanan, Jeremiah S. Black of Dauphin County served as U.S.
Attorney General from March 1857 to December 1860 and as Secretary of State from
December 1860 to March 1861. Former governor William Bigler of Cumberland County
was one of the state‟s senators from January 1856 to March 1861. Charles Buckalew,
who was rewarded by President Buchanan with a diplomatic post to Ecuador from 1858
to 1861, was considered to serve as the running mate to Breckinridge in 1860, and later
became U.S. senator from March 1863 to March 1869.32 Charles John Biddle rose to the
rank of colonel in a Pennsylvania regiment early in the war and in October 1861 was
elected to the Thirty-seventh Congress, serving in that capacity until 1863. In the days
after the 1860 presidential election, Breckinridge Moderates exhibited a characteristic
aversion to abolitionism, willingness to grant the South guarantees on slavery expansion,
and tacit acknowledgement of the right to secede tempered with a genuine preference to
maintain the integrity of the Union. While serving as Attorney General, Jeremiah S.
Black conceded to a friend that “a few hardened, wicked ribbald [sic] infidels” were
pressing abolitionism too far but asserted that the real threat that the abolitionists posed to
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the Union was “overstate[d] somewhat.”33 Black ultimately lamented that the Southern
states‟ intransigence would likely lead “[t]his great country…to be dismembered. The
constitution that Washington gave his approbation to is to be broken up and destroyed.”34
Bigler expressed similar views in a speech delivered on December 11, 1860 in the Senate.
Willing to “offer up” any “sacrifice in the cause of the Union,” Bigler recommended that
“if needs be…let the territory be divided from ocean to ocean; north of which slavery
shall not go, south of which it shall not be disturbed. Let us have a deep gulf or a high
wall between the North and South on this subject.35 Although unwilling to refute the
right of secession, Bigler appealed to his Southern colleagues to reconsider such a
disastrous course. “[E]ven if [secession] be a right,” Bigler reasoned, “is it just to the
other States to resort to that remedy until redress has been sought and denied at the very
fountain of political power and authority, and through the precise channels in which this
Confederacy was formed? I think not.”36 Although these Breckinridge Moderates often
folded under the pressures of Southern demands to suppress abolitionist sentiment and
expand slavery rights, they demonstrated a degree of resolve to maintain the Union.
The final group within the Democratic spectrum, the Breckinridge Conservatives,
exhibited less resolve when it came to the Union‟s preservation. The leaders of the
Conservatives generally were of the social elite, hailed from Philadelphia, and did not
hold many important public offices. However, they made their views known through
speeches and pamphlets that indicated their status as the vocal minority of the
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Democratic party. These individuals “were tied closely to the South both socially and
economically and shared Southern attitudes on the issues of race and slavery.”37 In
general, the Breckinridge Conservatives had a stake in maintaining good relations with
the South. Some were manufacturers in Philadelphia, the city which led the nation in
selling finished goods to the Southern states. Others were born in the South or had
married women from Dixie. Still others held land and even slaves in the South and
preferred to keep their investments intact. Of course, these Conservative leaders had a
loyal following of working-class supporters. In Philadelphia alone, 100,000 laborers
worked in the city‟s factories and feared unemployment should ties with Southern trade
be severed.38 Because few Breckinridge Conservatives held notable public offices, their
support for Buchanan‟s preferred successor was given out of more genuine support for
his Democratic traditionalism and pro-Southern sympathies. Conservatives were
vehemently anti-abolitionist and believed that the South had a manifest right to slavery
protections and expansion rights. Before the war began, these individuals often
expressed their belief that Pennsylvania was more closely tied to the South rather than
New England. Some even recommended that the Commonwealth should secede along
with its Southern neighbors. Once the war began, these Breckinridge Conservatives
would retain their sympathies toward the South, obstruct the Lincoln administration‟s war
policies, and urge an end to the hostilities, sometimes acting with treasonous design.
These individuals would compose the Peace Democratic or Copperhead wing of the
party.
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Among this group‟s leading figures were some of the most loyal Buchanan and
Breckinridge adherents and outspoken foes of abolitionism and the Republican party.
Philadelphian William B. Reed, for instance, who most recently served as minister to
China, had campaigned actively for Buchanan in 1856, considering him “the most
congenial candidate to national men” and decrying that abolitionism had “intoxicated the
brain” of many Northerners.39 During the 1860 campaign, Reed supported Breckinridge
as the candidate to “conduce to our social and political well-being, and to our material
interests.”40 In that same speech, Reed separated himself from the Breckinridge
Moderates by siding with the South in the sectionalism controversy and voicing hostility
toward the abolitionist radicalism that he believed was seizing the North. “[I]n the
seventy years of the Union…what wrong [has] South Carolina ever [done] to
Pennsylvania?” Reed asked. “The South has never stolen any of our property from us.
It generally befriends us. When the North or the Northwest tries to take away our poor
little Mint or Naval Asylum, Southern men vote with us.”41 Because of the North‟s
“vexatious, irritating, agitating fanaticism,” Reed concluded that “Pennsylvania‟s true
interests, if she only knew them, do not lie in that direction, but in the South and
Southwest, from which Republicanism, and Lincolnism, and Abolitionism, if triumphant,
will forever divide us.”42
Reed‟s views matched those of another Philadelphia aristocrat, the influential
attorney and campaigner Charles Ingersoll. In the aftermath of the John Brown raid on
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Harper‟s Ferry in December 1859, Ingersoll spoke at a Philadelphia rally and advocated
that abolitionists be prohibited from delivering public speeches because of the
sectionalizing and treasonous nature of their content.43 During the 1860 campaign,
Ingersoll urged that concerning the slavery expansion controversy “the Democratic North
must yield every inch of the ground” to slaveholders because of the South‟s role in
acquiring southwestern territories during the Mexican War.44 Another of Pennsylvania‟s
Breckinridge Conservatives was Robert Tyler, the Virginia-born son of President John
Tyler, who as early as 1850 had expressed that “salvation” for the South could only be
found “in one line of policy, terrible as it may appear, and that is secession.”45 As a
native Virginian, Tyler brought to Pennsylvania his devotion to states‟ rights and limited
government. In January 1860, he apprehended that the federal government could be
“perverted into an instrument of oppression and insult to the people of Pennsylvania” and
feared that the Republican party would warp “into a military Dictatorship or despotism,
in which…the independence of each State…would be overwhelmed and subordinated by
the combined force and corruptions of armed and consolidated power.”46 State supreme
court justice George W. Woodward was one of the most important Breckinridge
Conservatives. In a letter on the secession crisis written to Attorney General Black,
Woodward demonstrated a radical desire for his native state‟s future. “As a Northern
man,” reasoned Woodward, “I cannot in justice condemn the South for withdrawing from
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the Union. I believe they have been loyal to the Union formed by the Constitution –
secession is not disloyalty to that, for that no longer exists. The North has extinguished
it….Dissuade [the South] if you can, but if you can‟t, let them go in peace. I wish
Pennsylvania could go with them. They are our brethren.”47 The Breckinridge
Conservatives seemed to sense the irreconcilable gulf between North and South better
than their Moderate counterparts. Nonetheless, if the Union were indeed in peril, they
preferred to see their native state throw its lot with a South they deemed more amenable
to their interests than their abolitionist neighbors to the North.
*

*

*

*

During the interval between Lincoln‟s election and the attack on Fort Sumter,
Pennsylvania‟s Democracy shifted almost unanimously in favor of compromise, peace,
and a policy of noncoercion toward the South. Although nearly all Democrats of the
proto-continuum preferred peace, the three major segments differed in their acquiescence
to Southern demands. Douglas Democrats continued to look to the Little Giant for
guidance. Douglas, still a powerful political figure in the Senate despite his recent
electoral defeat, attempted to straddle twin goals during the secession winter. As
historian Robert W. Johannsen explains, “[n]ot only the Union had to be restored, but the
[Democratic] party had to be rebuilt, and Douglas saw these as wholly compatible tasks.
Democracy and Union were still one in his mind.”48 Because the Republican party was a
strictly Northern political faction, Douglas saw the Democracy as the only entity that
could achieve accord between the sections. In the Senate, he worked assiduously with
William Bigler and Kentuckian John J. Crittenden to formulate a series of compromise
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amendments amenable to Southern demands for additional slaveholders‟ assurances.49
Nonetheless, Douglas retained a steely resolve to threaten coercion should the Southern
states shun compromise efforts and resort to open rebellion. “We are told that the
authority of the Government must be vindicated; that the Union must be preserved; that
rebellion must be put down,” Douglas announced to the Senate in January 1861. “I agree
to all this….No man shall go further than I to maintain the just authority of the
Government, to preserve the Union, to put down rebellion, to suppress insurrection, and
enforce the laws.”50 After Lincoln‟s inauguration in March, Douglas drifted closer
toward the new administration and appeared to desire a place in the new president‟s inner
circle. “I do not wish it to be inferred from anything I have said or omitted to say,”
Douglas explained, “that I have any political sympathy with [Lincoln‟s]
administration…but on this one question, that of preserving the Union by a peaceful
solution of our present difficulties…if I understand his true intent and meaning, I am with
him.”51 At this early stage, Douglas‟ supporters were limited because of a widespread
reluctance among Democrats to endorse an ideology very similar to the opposition
Republicans. Those adherents he did retain, however, would form the nucleus of the War
Democrats and would gain followers among the Moderates after hostilities began. Once
compromise measures had failed, they were more likely to support Lincoln‟s war policies
and tolerate the administration‟s curtailment of civil liberties.
Breckinridge supporters meanwhile toiled to set forth a coherent policy toward
the wayward South during the secession winter. Although Breckinridge Moderates and
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Conservatives were unwilling to commit to coercion should compromise measures fail,
only the Moderates were disinclined to condone the peaceable division of the Union.
Initially, the Buchanan White House struggled mightily to take a dispassionate approach
to the crisis and to defuse the extremism of Northern abolitionists and Southern fireeaters. In his fourth and final annual message to Congress on December 3, 1860,
Buchanan doled out criticisms to fanatics of both extremes. “[T]he incessant and violent
agitation of the slavery question throughout the North,” argued Buchanan, “has at length
produced its malign influence on the slaves and inspired them with vague notions of
freedom. Hence a sense of security no longer exists around the family altar.”52 Southern
radicals did not escape censure, however. Buchanan reminded Southern discontents that
“[t]he late Presidential election…has been held in strict conformity with its express
provisions. How, then, can the result justify a revolution to destroy this very
Constitution?....The stern duty of administering the vast and complicated concerns of this
Government affords in itself a guaranty that [Lincoln] will not attempt any violation of a
clear constitutional right.”53 Attorney General Black further developed the Moderates‟
stance in the looming secession crisis. His legal opinion on secession simultaneously
prohibited the constitutional right to secede while forbidding the federal government to
intervene in the protection of public property within a state that was not under attack.
Black advised Buchanan that he could resort to the use of the militia to enforce federal
laws but only with “strict subordination to the civil authority, since it is only in the aid of
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the latter [the civil authority] that the former [the militia] can act at all.”54 Indeed,
Buchanan and Black walked a fine constitutional line in order to retain a tenuous peace
until Lincoln‟s inauguration.
Meanwhile, conservative Pennsylvanians engaged in a series of peace rallies
throughout the state during the winter and called upon leading Democrats to use their
oratory to quell the growing sectional resentment. Philadelphia mayor Alexander Henry
called for an assembly of conservative-minded citizens to meet at Independence Square
on December 13 to address the crisis and discuss means by which to dissuade
Southerners from their destructive aims. Under a banner reading “Concession before
Secession,” an impressive gathering “numbering tens of thousands” congregated around
Independence Hall to hear an array of political luminaries.55 The speakers unanimously
resolved that concessions were vital to the maintenance of the Union. Some advocated a
determination to vigorously enforce the contentious Fugitive Slave Act, while others
recommended the repeal of Pennsylvania‟s personal liberty laws. Breckinridge
Conservative George W. Woodward painted the South‟s use of slaves as “an incalculable
blessing” to the North and “an indispensable element of all our future prosperity.”56
Concerning the question of secession, Woodward insisted on peaceable separation of the
Southern states if no other course of action could be agreed upon. Because of the
poisonous “sophisms of infidels and Abolitionists,” he adduced that the South was being
driven to contemplate secession. “The law of self-defense includes rights of property as
well as of person,” he asserted, “and it appears to me that there must be a time…when
54
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slaveholders may lawfully fall back on their natural rights, and employ in defence [sic] of
their property whatever means of protection they possess or can command.”57 With this
bold assessment, Woodward combined his abhorrence of abolitionist agitation with his
conservative, states‟ rights belief that secession was legitimate and constitutional.
Although pro-Republican newspapers branded the Philadelphia Union meeting as
“craven, cringing, sycophantic, and humiliating,” conservative organs lauded the efforts
of the participants.58 “It was fit,” proclaimed the Lancaster Intelligencer, “that in this
City of Independence the initiative of that grand conservative step which, if anything
may, is to conciliate the South and restore harmony to our country.”59 More peace
meetings were held in cities across the state for several weeks after the Independence
Square gathering, indicating the pervasiveness of conciliatory sentiment. Although most
were attended by Democrats of all stripes, Breckinridge Conservatives organized at least
one meeting that demonstrated their uniquely ultraconservative views.
In response to a January 1861 rally held in support of the government‟s defense of
Fort Sumter, Breckinridge Conservatives organized a meeting at Philadelphia‟s National
Hall on January 16. Attended by about 4,000 supporters, the assembly featured keynote
speeches by some of Philadelphia‟s conservative elites. A banner reading “NO CIVIL
WAR. JUSTICE TO THE SOUTH. EQUAL RIGHTS IN THE TERRITORIES”
stretched across the stage where anti-coercionist orators like Reed, Ingersoll, and
attorneys George M. Wharton and Charles Macalester expressed their views. This
meeting differed from other peace meetings held throughout the Commonwealth because
of the speakers‟ expressed support for Pennsylvania‟s secession from the Union under
57
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certain circumstances. For instance, Reed indicated that Pennsylvania would “be always
ready to pacificate” tensions between the sections “whether she be detached [from the
Union] or not – whether she is compelled for a time to go with the North or South, or
stand by herself.”60 Wharton asserted that his native state‟s “interests are with the South
– mine are at any rate. The South and the West are our best friends and if there is to be a
breaking up, we shall have a word to say as to which we shall go with. We can‟t be
brought up by Boston and New York.”61 During the assembly, a series of resolutions
were passed demonstrating the participants‟ commitments to strict constitutional
construction, the Crittenden Compromise, the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, and
allowing slaves in all United States territories. Most radical was a resolution authored by
Reed himself:
That, in the deliberate judgment of the Democracy of Philadelphia, and, so far as
we know it, of Pennsylvania, the dissolution of the Union, by the separation of the
whole South…may release this Commonwealth to a large extent from the bonds
which now connect her with the Confederacy, except so far as for temporary
convenience she chooses to submit to them, and would authorize and require her
citizens, through a Convention, to be assembled for that purpose, to determine
with whom her lot should be cast whether with the North and East, whose
fanaticism has precipitated this misery upon us, or, with our brethren of the South,
whose wrongs we feel as our own; or whether Pennsylvania should stand by
herself, as a distinct community, ready when occasion offers to bind together the
broken Union, and resume her place of loyalty and devotion.62
Of course, sentiments expressed at the National Hall rally represented the views of only a
small minority of Pennsylvanians, and Reed‟s proposed secession convention would have
been met with overwhelming opposition by Pennsylvanians of many political stripes.
Nonetheless, the assembly indicates that Breckinridge Conservatives remained a
determined, vocal minority of Pennsylvania‟s electorate that at times refused to temper
60

Quoted in Shankman, Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement, 42.
Ibid.
62
Philadelphia Press, January 17, 1861, 3.
61

44

their radical views with the more reasonable stance proffered by Douglas Democrats and
Breckinridge Moderates. Nascent Copperheadism, however inconsequential at this stage,
had begun even before the war began.
With some Douglas Democrats perplexed and alienated by the Little Giant‟s
apparent collaboration with the Lincoln administration and Breckinridge Conservatives
too few to assume leadership of the party, Breckinridge Moderates took hold of the
Democracy and asserted their own principles in the early months of 1861. Pennsylvania
Moderates took their cue from Buchanan, who had grown more resolute since his
December message to Congress. After the resignation of several Southern cabinet
members and with the aid of his increasingly pro-coercion attorney general, Buchanan
launched a newfound determination to deal more firmly with the Southern states already
seceded or threatening to do so. In a special message delivered to Congress on January 8,
1861, Buchanan continued to assert that he had “no right to make aggressive war upon
any State” but judged that he did have the “clear and undeniable” duty “to use military
force defensively against those who resist the federal officers in the execution of their
legal functions, and against those who assail the property of the federal government.”63
In keeping with Democratic efforts at concession, Buchanan continued to advocate
slaveholders‟ rights as a conciliatory measure and urged Congress to legislate a
compromise “by letting the north have exclusive control of the territories above a certain
line, and to give southern institutions protection below that line.”64 The tone of
Buchanan‟s message suggests that Black had a hand in its creation and indicates that the
attorney general‟s increasingly vehement stand against Southern intransigence was being
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reflected by the president‟s policies. In a letter penned on January 17, Black exhibited a
drift away from the traditionally conservative and conciliatory view of a Moderate
Democrat toward a proto-War Democratic attitude. “It would undoubtedly be a great
party move as between Democrats and Black Republicans to let the latter have a civil war
of their own making,” Black surmised. “But can we avoid doing something? Is not the
business altogether beyond party considerations?....I am not in favor of war but I cannot
resist the conviction that when war is made against us a moderate self-defense is
righteous and proper.”65 Black‟s outlook epitomized the growing exasperation many
Northern conservatives felt as conciliatory proposals continued to be ignored by the
South‟s political leaders.
Most of Pennsylvania‟s Democratic politicos meanwhile continued to chart a
middle course, advocating concessionary measures toward the South and a patriotic
commitment to preserve the Union. On February 21, 1861, the Democratic State
Convention assembled at Brant‟s Hall in Harrisburg to communicate the party‟s views in
light of recent declarations of secession that brought the number of seceded states to
seven. Among those gathered at the convention were a mix of Douglas Democrats and
Breckinridge Moderates including 1860 gubernatorial contender Henry D. Foster, former
Philadelphia mayor Richard Vaux, and railroad tycoon Asa Packer. The absence of
Breckinridge Conservatives from the ranks of the delegates indicates the sect‟s numerical
insignificance and the unpopularity of their opinions at this time. The convention opened
with a speech by the Reverend John W. Nevin of Lancaster who saw in the meeting‟s
assembly “the universal conservative spirit of Pennsylvania.”66 Nevin argued what had
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been the sentiment of Moderates since the secession crisis began. Advocating continued
efforts at concession, the reverend warned that if the North “will not consent to respect
the Constitutional rights and reasonable demands of our brethren in the South – if we shut
them up to the necessity of a general separation from us as the penalty and price of
refusing to surrender basely what they conceive to be their proper, civil and political
rights – let us not then be so insane as to think of compelling them to remain with us
still.”67 Convention delegates next set forth a series of resolutions that largely matched
attitudes expressed during the peace rallies. They reaffirmed their commitment to uphold
the Fugitive Slave Act, work toward a satisfactory compromise bill, and “prevent any
attempt on the part of the Republicans in power to make any armed aggression upon the
Southern States.”68 Therefore, the Democracy largely retained a policy of moderation for
the remainder of the secession winter until the outbreak of war in April.
*

*

*

*

Between the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860 to the eve of the
attack on Fort Sumter in April 1861, the Pennsylvania Democracy remained divided in
their response to the secession crisis. The factions that developed during the 1860
campaign between Douglas and Breckinridge supporters remained after the election and
created mixed responses to the Democracy‟s attitude toward the wayward South.
Democratic reaction to secession could be loosely classified into three major categories,
all of which combined into a continuum that would materialize and mature once the Civil
War began. Fundamentally, Douglas Democrats, Breckinridge Moderates, and
Breckinridge Conservatives were the precursors to the War Democrats, Moderate
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Democrats, and Peace Democrats, respectively. During the secession crisis, the far wings
of the pre-war continuum temporarily lacked the ideological clout and political leadership
to greatly influence the bulk of the electorate. Douglas Democrats, though less likely to
give in to many Southern demands for compromise, found it difficult to endorse the Little
Giant‟s tenuous cooperation with the Lincoln administration. These individuals were still
the progeny of traditional Jacksonian beliefs that clashed with the spirit of Republican
policy. During the secession winter, Douglas Democrats struggled to establish their
identity. They stood unwilling to concede too much to the South while remaining equally
reluctant to follow Douglas himself into loose collaboration with the Republican
opposition. Although a sizeable part of the electorate, Pennsylvania‟s Douglas
Democrats also faltered during this time because they lacked a powerful, charismatic
leader within the state who could launch a political movement that encompassed both
conservatism and a firm stand against Southern radicalism.
Breckinridge Conservatives, on the other hand, had vocal, influential leaders but
lacked a large following that agreed with their ultraconservative views. The
Conservatives maintained such a fanatic hostility to abolitionism and Republican
sectionalism that they often expressed desires for Pennsylvania to reconsider its fidelity
to its Northern neighbors. Although they remained more prescient in anticipating the
irreconcilability of the secession crisis, their sympathies with the South attracted few
Pennsylvania Democrats, most of whom remained offended by the South‟s aggression to
secure slaveholders‟ rights and the region‟s anti-tariff stance. Ultimately, Breckinridge
Moderates steered the Pennsylvania Democracy during the winter of 1860-1861.
Because many of the Moderates in the state were Buchanan disciples reliant on Old
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Buck‟s patronage, they dutifully reflected the president‟s policies. The Moderates were
endowed with a host of experienced politicos, well-funded and ensconced within the state
party machine. They aimed to present themselves to their constituents as devotees of the
Union, advocates of conciliation and constitutionalism, and enemies of Northern and
Southern radicalism. Although compromise remained their modus operandi through
April 1861, some Moderates including Buchanan and Black took a barely perceptible
shift toward a proto-War Democratic stance that would manifest itself vigorously after
the Confederates‟ attack on Fort Sumter. Once war began, Democrats found themselves
forced from the middle ground mentality that had characterized most party members
during the secession crisis.
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Chapter 2: The War Democrats Ascendant, Spring 1861 – Spring 1862
The fall of Fort Sumter on April 13, 1861 galvanized widespread patriotism in
Pennsylvania and throughout the North. Diarist Sarah B. Wister of Philadelphia observed
four days after the attack that “Chestnut Street is a sight; flags large & small flaunt from
every building, the dry-goods shops have red white & blue materials draped together in
their windows, in the ribbon stores the national colors hang in long streamers, and even
[at] the book sellers place the red, white, and blue bindings [are arranged] together.”1
The Southern attack on federal property confirmed that a policy of conciliation had failed
and that war between North and South had commenced. In the weeks and months after
Fort Sumter‟s surrender, the Lincoln administration mustered the greatest degree of
bipartisan support that it would enjoy for the remainder of the war. Another Philadelphia
diarist, Sidney George Fisher, noted on April 18 that “[f]ortunately, the sentiments of the
people are so generally loyal to the government that, tho [sic] we are to have the curse of
civil war, we are not likely to suffer from the greater evil of partizan [sic] war among
ourselves.”2 In fact, a degree of “partizan war” had already begun, directed against
leading Breckinridge Conservatives who had previously sympathized with the South.
Two days after the attack on Fort Sumter, Fisher recorded that Philadelphia was “in a
state of dangerous excitement. Several well-known persons who had openly expressed
secession opinions had been assaulted in the streets….Prominent individuals known to
sympathize with the South are threatened.”3 For about a year after the Confederate
attack, Republicans and most Democrats in Pennsylvania viewed the war as just and
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demonstrated a commitment to fight. The most conservative Democrats were compelled
to remain silent during this period, for fear of abuse from a near-united populace intent on
subjugating Southern rebels. From April 1861 through Spring 1862, Pennsylvania‟s
Democracy shifted decisively toward the War Democratic wing of the continuum,
sweeping many Moderates into that camp and temporarily suppressing the Peace
Democrats‟ pernicious antiwar sentiments.
Initial outrage to the attack on Fort Sumter manifested itself in violence against
Southern sympathizers in Philadelphia, the bastion of Breckinridge Conservatives. On
April 15, a large mob gathered, intent on exacting revenge against those Democrats who
had once expressed fondness for the South. “Thousands assembled furious at the news of
the surrender,” recorded Wister, “& swearing revenge on all disunionists or disaffected.
They marched through the streets their numbers swelling as they went, & visited the
houses, stores & offices of some of the leading Loco Focos who of course have been
especially odious in the last few days.”4 Among the first victims was editor Henry Brent,
whose pro-secessionist newspaper, The Palmetto Flag, had recently begun publication.
The mob gathered at the printing office and threatened to demolish the establishment
unless Brent agreed to display the American flag as a gesture of loyalty. Brent complied
and Mayor Henry arrived to quell the disturbance, beseeching the crowd “to stand by
your flag and protect it at all hazards; but in doing so remember the rights due your
fellow citizens and their private property.”5 The Palmetto Flag suspended publication
forthwith. In the next few days, mobs also visited the homes of leading peace advocates
and demanded appropriate displays of fidelity to the Union. Among those targeted was
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William B. Reed, who was away at court when the mob arrived. In his absence, a black
servant procured an American flag and waved it in front of the crowd. Major General
Robert Patterson, a hero of the Mexican War and owner of sugar and cotton plantations in
Louisiana, was also targeted. Patterson enthusiastically displayed the Stars and Stripes
and announced his willingness to lead the mob into battle. Patriotic Philadelphians were
especially incensed at the continued presence of the Southern-born Robert Tyler in their
city. On April 17, a crowd gathered at Independence Square demanding Tyler‟s
lynching. In fear for his life, Tyler asked Mayor Henry for police protection but
eventually fled to Richmond where he was appointed Register of the Southern
Confederacy.6 As a result of the mob violence in the city, “Philadelphians critical of the
war were careful not to express their views in public.”7 Through intimidation, the Peace
Democratic wing of the continuum was effectively silenced.
Newspaper reports of the events in Philadelphia naturally reflected the political
bias of the editor. Forney‟s Philadelphia Press, which was fast becoming the proLincoln organ in the Commonwealth, lauded the actions of the mobs. Forney extolled
Philadelphians‟ sentiments of “strong love of the Union and its associations which has
been seated in the popular heart, and which threatens, now that the Union has been
menaced and its flag insulted, to vent itself in deeds of mutiny and rage upon all who
have winked at treason or encouraged secession.”8 The Press happily reported that
“[w]hat appals [sic] the Secessionists most is…the fearful unity of the people of the Free
States. The[y] expected discord and dissention they had been taught to believe by the
Tylers and the William B. Reeds, and the George M. Whartons….Even the Breckinridge
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men are compelled, to save their reputation…to exhibit the most ardent devotion for the
country.”9 Democratic and conciliation-minded newspapers lamented the recent events
and cautioned against mob violence. The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin warned the
rowdies that “the innocent were quite as likely to suffer as the guilty” and that “[t]he
cause of the Union is damaged rather than strengthened by [such] acts of lawlessness.”10
On May 7, the Lancaster Intelligencer reported “an outrageous attack” directed at
Democratic Senator James Bayard of Delaware as he and his family returned to their
Philadelphia home after concluding a business trip in New Orleans. A mob, suspecting
Bayard was colluding with Confederates, surrounded the senator‟s coach and blasted him
with epithets until the police dispersed the crowd. The Intelligencer decried that “no man
is safe either in his person or property; and in all such cases of violence the strong arm of
the law ought to be stretched forth in defence [sic] of the citizen, and to severely punish
the guilty offender against peace and good order.”11 Although the Democratic press in
the Commonwealth remained protective of assailed politicos and opposed to violence
against suspected Peace Democrats, few continued to advocate moderation toward the
wayward South or a peaceful separation of the Union.
In the days after the attack on Fort Sumter, no Democrat more vehemently
supported military action against the South than Stephen A. Douglas. Although he had
worked earnestly for compromise during the secession winter, he wholeheartedly
supported Lincoln‟s war policy so long as it remained bounded by constitutional
measures. The president arranged a meeting with Douglas on April 14, at which the men
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determined principal strategic locations in the North and discussed Lincoln‟s proposed
call for volunteers to suppress the rebellion.12 Douglas released a statement to the press
concerning his discussion with the president which verified Douglas‟ commitment to a
Republican-led war policy. The Associated Press published the content of the report,
which stated that Douglas “was unalterably opposed to the Administration in all its
political issues, [but] he was prepared to fully sustain the President in the exercise of all
his constitutional functions to preserve the Union, maintain the Government, and defend
the Federal Capital….The Capital was in danger, and must be defended at all hazards,
and at any expense of men and money.”13 Because Douglas still commanded a
significant majority of Pennsylvania‟s Democrats, it is reasonable that most of his
followers “had lined up, quickly and in the face of all promises to the contrary, side by
side with Lincoln and the „Black Republicans.‟”14 Douglas, in fact, made it even more
difficult to remain a Democratic bystander during the crisis. Upon a return to Illinois,
Douglas was invited to speak at the National Hall in Chicago on May 1 where he laid
down the gauntlet to all Northern Democrats. “The conspiracy is now known,”
announced Douglas. “Armies have been raised, war is levied to accomplish it. There are
only two sides to the question. Every man must be for the United States or against them.
There can be no neutrals in this war; only patriots or traitors.”15 In 1861, nothing but
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wholehearted support for the fledgling war effort could save a Democrat from charges of
treason.
The budding War Democratic cause suffered a setback with the premature death
of Stephen A. Douglas on June 3, 1861. The Little Giant, perhaps at the apex of his
influence, succumbed to typhoid fever, exacerbated by a lifetime of cigar smoking and
hard drinking. Newspapers of all political stripes lamented his loss. Forney‟s Press
acknowledged that Douglas was “the recognized exponent of an immense portion of his
countrymen” who “ignored all mere partisan considerations, and promptly stepped
forward to encourage and support the Administration in the energetic measures which
were absolutely necessary to rescue the Government from destruction.”16 Forney, a
Douglas Democrat-turned-Republican, also noted the unlikelihood of Democratic
resurgence with the loss of Douglas. “[I]t is, of course, evident,” the Press averred, “that
Stephen A. Douglas was the representative of the only relic of the old Democratic party
which, in the free States, could possibly have regained political power and vitality.”17
Even publications that would later emerge as leading Copperhead organs noted Douglas‟
loss with sorrow and recognized him as a unifying figure between the Democracy and the
ruling Republicans. The Democratic Watchman [Bellefonte] noted that “[i]n the troubles
that beset the country…Mr. Douglas was the earnest friend of the Constitution and the
Union.”18 The Republican Compiler [Gettysburg] reported that his death “caused
emotions of sadness throughout the whole country” and that Douglas should be
remembered as “a statesman and a patriot” akin to the likes of “Webster, Jackson, [and]
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Clay.”19 The ultraconservative Huntingdon Globe acknowledged Douglas as a man who
“was looked up to with more confidence as having it in his heart and in his power to
assist to a greater extent than any other in bringing back to our distracted country a
speedy, happy and permanent peace.”20 One month after Douglas‟ death, Forney
delivered a eulogy to his former chief in Washington. Lauding Douglas‟ “wonderful
versatility, [and] the vast amount of labor he performed,” Forney urged his listeners to
follow the spirit of Douglas‟ recent bipartisanship by “no longer [being] deceived by
wicked and ambitious men. Remember that every appeal to party against the
Government is an argument intended to demoralize the energies of the present Executive
and his ministers.”21 Forney used the occasion of the senator‟s death to encourage
Democrats to back the efforts of the Lincoln administration.
For its part, the Lincoln administration recognized the value in appointing
Pennsylvania Democrats to positions of high rank in the fledgling armies being created to
suppress the rebellion during the spring and summer of 1861. Although this practice did
not guarantee the appointment of competent commanders, it did seal a bond between War
Democrats and Republicans. Upon Lincoln‟s first call for troops on April 15, Robert
Patterson made good on his pledge to lead troops against the South. He was appointed
major general of Pennsylvania Volunteers and assigned to command the Department of
Pennsylvania. At that time, Patterson was seventy-one years old and lacked the verve he
had exhibited during the Mexican War. In his sole Civil War campaign, Patterson failed
19
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to act promptly in capturing the arsenal town of Harper‟s Ferry, Virginia, freeing
Confederates under General Joseph Johnston to reinforce beleaguered rebels at Manassas,
resulting in a Union defeat at the First Battle of Bull Run on July 21, 1861. Patterson was
severely censured for his ineptitude, honorably discharged, and mustered out of service
later that month.22 William Buel Franklin, a young engineer who graduated first in his
class at West Point, was in charge of constructing the Capitol dome at the time hostilities
broke out. He was commissioned colonel of the 12th U.S. Infantry Regulars on May 14,
and appointed brigadier general of volunteers three days later.23 Despite expressing antiRepublican comments as the war continued, Franklin would serve through the duration of
the war capably, but not spectacularly. Perhaps the finest Pennsylvania Democrat-soldier
was Winfield Scott Hancock, of Norristown. Serving in California when the war broke
out, Hancock returned east and was appointed brigadier general of volunteers in
September 1861. Through the war, Hancock displayed brilliant leadership in many of the
Army of the Potomac‟s most desperate battles. During his military service, Hancock
wisely refrained from expressing his political opinions, though he emerged in the postwar
years as the Democratic candidate in the 1880 presidential campaign.
Certainly the most influential Pennsylvania Democrat early in the war was
George B. McClellan. Born in Philadelphia in 1826, McClellan enjoyed a brilliant
antebellum career as a military engineer. Resigning from the army in 1857, he became
chief engineer to the Illinois Central Railroad at which time he became an ardent disciple
of Stephen Douglas. During the 1858 Illinois senatorial race that pitted Douglas against
Lincoln, McClellan gave Douglas his private railway car in which to campaign and
22
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criticized the Republican‟s oratorical style as “rather a mass of anecdotes than of
arguments.”24 When war broke out, McClellan accepted an offer from Ohio‟s
Republican governor, William Dennison, Jr., to take command of the state‟s volunteers
on April 23. McClellan commanded enough trust that just “three weeks later, such was
[McClellan‟s] élan, efficiency in organization, capability, and personal magnetism, that
President Lincoln, who had never seen him, was impelled to appoint him major general in
the Regular Army, where he was outranked only by the aged and infirm General-in-Chief
Winfield Scott.”25 During the spring and summer of 1861, McClellan‟s first campaign
was in western Virginia where he used his forces to occupy this mostly loyal region.
Although the operation was largely a success, McClellan exhibited his conservative bent
in a proclamation he issued to the people of western Virginia on May 26. In it, he
revealed his accommodation with slavery:
Notwithstanding all that has been said by the traitors to induce you to believe that
our advent among you will be signalized by interference with your slaves,
understand one thing clearly – not only will we abstain from all such interference,
but we will, on the contrary, with an iron hand, crush any attempt at insurrection
on their part. Now that we are in your midst, I call upon you to fly to arms and
support the General Government.26
Although this proclamation‟s stand on slavery essentially followed the Lincoln
administration‟s policy at this stage of the war, it emphasized two important sentiments
that most War Democrats shared. First, War Democrats had no interest in slavery‟s
abolition and preferred to sustain it in areas where it existed in order to compel the
rebellious states back into the Union. Second, War Democrats favored a war limited in
24
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scope; that is, a war that did little to interfere with Southern noncombatants. Although
participation by War Democrats in the military proved vital to a Republican-War
Democrat accord, their conservatism and anti-abolitionism would later prove contrary to
the Lincoln administration‟s war policies.
Republicans in Pennsylvania assuredly sensed the potential to absorb War
Democrats into their ranks during the summer of 1861. To do so, however, would
require the party to moderate its more radical views on slavery and war policy to appeal
to a wider conservative base. Moreover, the Republicans would have to continue to shed
their name in favor of the “Union party” appellation that drew greater numbers of War
Democrats. Historian Christopher Dell argues that “[t]he Union party movement in
Pennsylvania was inaugurated by Forney,” with his July 3 eulogy for Douglas.27 As a
result of his pro-Union, anti-Peace Democrat remarks, Forney was able to merge his
followers with those of the recently installed administration of Republican governor
Andrew Curtin. Former Philadelphia mayor and Douglas devotee Richard Vaux prepared
a lecture delivered on July 4, setting forth the basic sentiments of the War Democratic
philosophy. “To-day secession is claimed to be the inherent right of the States,”
explained Vaux. “The people are preparing to settle this question forever. They are
about to interpret the Constitution. This time it will be done with the ceremonial of
battle, blood, victory, and retributive justice on treason….The Constitution will be
preserved, and this will be accomplished by the people, interpreting what is a
constitutional government of constitutional governments.”28 War Democrats largely
matched the attitudes of most Republicans in the early stages of war before questions of
27
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emancipation and suspension of civil liberties came to the fore. Union conventions
composed of conservative Republicans and War Democrats met periodically to advance
acceptable candidates for the upcoming 1861 elections. Nonetheless, no charismatic
leader emerged among Pennsylvania‟s Unionist conservatives. This fact, along with
military setbacks and alleged abuse of civil liberties, would ultimately hinder the
movement and allow a Peace Democratic resurgence to build toward the end of the year.
*

*

*

*

The First Battle of Bull Run on July 21, 1861 created much commotion among all
Pennsylvanians struggling to grasp the particulars of the clash. News of the battle, as
would be the case for all battles throughout the war, was jumbled as it reached the
Commonwealth. Nonetheless, citizens soon learned the result was an ill omen for the
Union cause. Sarah Butler Wister recorded in her diary a day after the battle that “[t]he
whole town [Philadelphia] was in consternation: the riddle of the retreats in Virginia has
been solved at last. We have had an overwhelming defeat at Manassas Junction.”29 On
July 23, Sidney George Fisher noted the realization that “everyone is impressed with the
conviction that the war is a very stern and serious reality.”30 Although the Union defeat
was shocking to most, war weariness had not yet surfaced and patriotic sentiment still
resonated strong, even among Democratic organs. The Huntingdon Globe reported that
“[t]ens of thousands of our brave soldiers will fall before Washington can be taken.
Hundreds of thousands yet at home will take up arms to save the Capitol from falling into
the hands of the rebels.”31 Agitation, however, was directed at Philadelphia Democrat
Robert Patterson, whose lackadaisical generalship was largely viewed as a deciding
29
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factor in the Federals‟ defeat. Wister wrote on July 27 that “[t]he feeling with regard to
Patterson is so strong in town that his house had to be guarded on Monday night [July
22], & there will be a very strong force posted there tonight also, as the mob declare they
will burn him out despite mayor & police.”32 Philadelphians likely associated Patterson‟s
battlefield incompetence with his suspect loyalties that had been questioned by the mobs
the previous April. Despite the astonishing victory by the Confederates, Bull Run
ultimately had done little to encourage Peace Democratic sentiment in Pennsylvania. As
historian Jennifer L. Weber explains, “the battle had little effect on the national morale,”
which compelled budding Copperheadism to remain, for the time being, under wraps.33
Although battlefield setbacks did not yet inspire wholesale Democratic opposition to the
war, Republican attacks on civil liberties nurtured a nascent Copperhead response during
the closing months of 1861.
*

*

*

*

On August 19, 1861, Sarah B. Wister recorded a frantic entry in her diary. “Just
at 10 o‟clock,” she wrote, “the door bell rang & to my unutterable amazement my cousin
Alfred came in, came to tell me that at 4 in the afternoon Father had been arrested by the
U.S. Marshall on a special order from [Secretary of War Simon] Cameron, & taken to
New York by the 6 o‟clock line to be placed in Ft. Hamilton[, New York].”34 Wister‟s
father was the notorious Southern sympathizer, Pierce Butler. Butler, a native of South
Carolina, had just returned to Philadelphia after visiting family in the South. As a
Breckinridge Conservative and a virulent pro-secessionist, Butler‟s sentiments appalled
most Philadelphians. His enemies had spread the rumor that Butler had already accepted
32
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a commission in the Confederate army and had returned to Philadelphia to purchase arms
for the South. These rumors, along with Butler‟s known opposition to the war, resulted
in his arrest. He was held at Ft. Hamilton for over a month, although nothing
incriminating was found in his personal papers. For the rest of the war, Butler remained a
Southern sympathizer, but kept his personal feelings on the war largely to himself. This
event was rooted in the Lincoln administration‟s disregard of the Supreme Court‟s ruling
on the Ex parte Merryman case, delivered three months before. Chief Justice Roger
Taney decreed that the president had no power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus nor
to arrest and detain a noncombatant without due cause. Lincoln ignored the ruling, and
continued to deny the writ periodically for the rest of the war. In his July 4 war message
to Congress, Lincoln famously asked, “are all the laws but one to go unexecuted and the
Government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated?”35 Many Democrats, who had
traditionally been the jealous guardians of constitutional rights, bristled at the thought of
civil liberty usurpations like the Butler arrest.
Democrats also recoiled at the recent attacks made on Pennsylvania‟s antiadministration newspapers. Suppression of Democratic organs occurred across the state
by angry mobs still in the throes of war fever. Besides the April attack on Philadelphia‟s
Palmetto Flag, rowdies targeted the Beaver Western Star in May and the Easton Sentinel
and Argus in August. The attacks tended to rouse Democrats who supported the
conservative editors‟ right to free speech. “[T]he mob assaults on Democratic newspaper
offices,” explains Christopher Dell, “had the appearance of a Republican plot to wreck
the Democratic party by violent means. On that basis a great many Democrats became
ardently opposed to the wartime suppression of any Democratic paper by any means,
35

OR, vol. 17, pt. 1, 315.

62

legal or illegal, peaceful or violent….Instead of demoralizing the Peace press the
Unionist hooligans had raised it to the level of martyrdom.”36 The situation became more
heated when government officials assumed responsibility for the newspaper suppressions.
In West Chester, an alleged gang of spiteful Republicans stormed the print shop of the
particularly defiant Jeffersonian on August 19. What made the incident particularly
noteworthy however, was the appearance four days later of a United States marshal and
his deputies who closed the office and seized the printing press “upon authority of the
President of the United States.”37 The paper‟s editor, John Hodgson, demanded that the
property be returned, at which point authorities demanded he sign a loyalty pledge.
Hodgson presumably replied, “I would rather die than give any pledge…to get the
property back.”38 The affair was taken up in court in October, at which Hodgson selected
Peace Democrat William B. Reed to serve as his attorney. The court determined that the
Jeffersonian did not abet the Confederacy in any way and opted to restore Hodgson‟s
property. Ultimately, the government‟s involvement in Pierce Butler‟s arbitrary arrest
and the temporary suppression of John Hodgson‟s newspaper engendered at least two
reactions by the Pennsylvania Democracy. First, Peace Democrats, though largely
restrained in 1861, were vocal enough to encourage Unionists to control their influence
through curtailment of civil liberties. Second, the government‟s involvement in these
events helped nurture a burgeoning peace movement that would emerge in full force the
following year. Newspapermen like Hodgson and public figures like Reed would only
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have to bide their time a little longer to attract a larger following no longer willing to
brook the costly war effort and the suspension of civil liberties.
The year 1861 was the least crucial of Pennsylvania‟s four wartime election years.
Still, all of the state‟s legislators and one-third of its senators were up for election.
Despite the continued war fever from which Republicans benefited nationally, the
Republican-War Democrat alliance in Pennsylvania proved an awkward arrangement.
Union party conventions were held throughout the state in the months prior to the
October election. These conservative-led Union conventions oftentimes did not agree to
endorse all proposed candidates, particularly those deemed too radical for the War
Democrat delegates. Furthermore, Pennsylvania Republicans were particularly impeded
by their party‟s controversial decision to repeal a tonnage tax that had long been imposed
on the Pennsylvania Railroad. Democrats seized the tax repeal as a campaign issue and
argued that the lost revenue would burden common workers with new taxes.39 As it
turned out, the tax repeal and the inability of Republicans and War Democrats to unify
over their slate of candidates allowed straight-Democratic candidates to carry the October
elections. Although the election results did not result in a landslide Democratic victory,
the party‟s relative success was unusual given the continued popularity of the Lincoln
administration‟s war effort. Diarist Sidney George Fisher presented a perceptive analysis
of the Democrats‟ triumph. The poor Republican performance did not, in his view,
“show that the people are opposed to the war. On the contrary, all parties profess equal
zeal on that point. The war is popular, the passions of the masses are enlisted in it, and
the [Democratic] party leaders, finding that they could not resist the current, immediately
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determined to swim with it, if possible into power.”40 The Democratic victories,
therefore, should be attributed to the Republicans‟ unpopular stance on a key economic
issue, their inability to fully gel with War Democrats, and a continuation of
Pennsylvania‟s strong, conservative tendencies. Straight-Democratic candidates pledged
a commitment to the war, bringing with them Moderates and any Peace Democrats who
could stomach voting for a nominally pro-war candidate. Peace Democrats thus had not
yet infiltrated the ranks of Pennsylvania‟s party machinery as they would in successive
election years.41
*

*

*

*

During the 1860-1861 secession winter, Pennsylvania‟s Breckinridge Moderates
had led the party because of their restrained attitudes toward the South and their
prominent place within the Buchanan political machine. After the attack on Fort Sumter
and the subsequent war fervor that arose, however, the Moderates relinquished their
power to the War Democrats. This occurred for two major reasons. First, Pennsylvania‟s
Moderate Democratic leaders lost their positions of influence after Republicans assumed
control of the prominent offices in the nation during the early months of 1861. Most
importantly, James Buchanan left office on March 4, 1861 and looked forward to retiring
from the political spotlight. Famously, Buchanan was reported to have told his successor
Lincoln that “if you are as happy in entering the White House as I shall feel on returning
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to Wheatland [Buchanan‟s estate], you are a happy man indeed.”42 The man best suited
to guide Pennsylvania‟s Moderate Democrats had no interest in taking up the role,
preferring instead to manage his estate and defend the conduct of his administration. As
Buchanan‟s Secretary of State, Moderate Jeremiah S. Black similarly left office in March
and never again took a significant public post for the rest of his life. Once a candidate for
chief justice of the Supreme Court, Black was compelled to settle on the comparatively
trivial post of Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions from 1861 to 1862. Another
Breckinridge Moderate and Buchanan confidant, Senator William Bigler, was forced out
of his seat by Republican Edgar Cowan. Although Bigler would campaign for
Democratic candidates through the duration of the war, he too never sought public office
nor took on a leading role in Pennsylvania‟s Democracy. The Moderate leadership that
had run the Buchanan administration during the secession crisis and comprised his state
political machine would never have much influence after Old Buck left the White House.
The second reason for the Moderates‟ loss of influence during this period was
simply the untenable nature of advocating a middle course during the height of war
fervor. During the secession winter, Breckinridge Moderates could proudly point to their
efforts to maintain the Union through compromise and concession. With the Confederate
attack on Fort Sumter, however, the vast majority of Northerners demanded military
action to subdue the rebellion. To preach conciliation to a people who had assailed
federal property was deemed treasonous and could result in verbal or physical abuse by
unruly mobs. Therefore Moderate Democrats, during the first year or so of the war, were
compelled to either exhibit a bipartisan show of patriotism with the War Democrats or
remain silent and inconspicuous with the Peace Democrats. Buchanan, for his part, shed
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all conciliatory feelings he had once displayed as president and fell firmly into line
behind the Lincoln administration. In a September 1861 letter addressed to Union
meeting committee members of Chester and Lancaster Counties, Buchanan gave his
“solemn & earnest appeal to my countrymen…to volunteer for the war & join the many
thousands of brave & patriotic volunteers who are already in the field. This is the
moment for action, - prompt, energetic, & united action, & not for the discussion of
Peace Propositions.”43 Furthermore, Buchanan expressed his commitment to the
Republican administration, encouraging his followers “to support the President with all
the men & means at the command of the Country in a vigorous and successful
prosecution of the war.”44 The following February, Buchanan distanced himself further
from the Peace Democrats in another letter in which he stated that “the idea of a
recognition of [the Southern states‟] independence, & a consequent dissolution of the
Confederacy which has rendered us prosperous & happy in peace & triumphant &
glorious in war cannot be entertained for a moment. This would…destroy the prestige &
character of our Country throughout the world.”45 Black, who continued to lean toward
the War Democrats, nonetheless warned Buchanan not to sanction Lincoln‟s efforts so
stridently. “Your endorsement of Lincoln‟s policy,” Black cautioned, “will be a very
serious drawback upon the defense of your own.”46 Black‟s support for the war remained
conditional, particularly when states‟ rights appeared threatened. As Black biographer
William Brigance explains, “[d]eclaring war upon States, [Black] felt, was in complete
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violation of the Constitution. Individuals in the Southern States were responsible for the
insurrection – and force should be applied upon individuals as such.”47 Thus,
Pennsylvania‟s Moderate Democratic leadership largely sided with War Democrats in
advocating military action to suppress the rebellion. Nonetheless, the degree of their
support for the Republican war policy varied according to one‟s commitment to
traditional Democratic principles. This support would wane as the war continued and
additional conservative values came under attack.
*

*

*

*

The Democratic continuum that developed during the secession winter of 18601861 underwent profound changes after hostilities began in April 1861. The Moderate
Democrats were forced from their temporizing role and compelled to choose between the
extreme wings of the party‟s spectrum, the War faction or the Peace faction. The Peace
Democrats, who had been a small but vocal minority prior to Fort Sumter, retained their
sympathies for the South but curtailed their raucous agitation. Angry mobs of
Republicans and Democrats alike employed their rabid patriotism to silence treasonous
sentiments and demanded shows of loyalty from those with suspect sentiments. Some,
like Robert Patterson, could only prove their fidelity to the Union by joining the war
effort. Others, like William Reed and Henry Brent, offered token displays of allegiance
until public sentiment shifted enough for them to continue their Copperhead agitation.
Still others, including Robert Tyler, were hounded enough to leave the state altogether for
the young Confederacy that they so strongly sympathized with in the first place. Mob
rule gave way to outright government interference later that year, as the Lincoln
administration deemed the silencing of strident opponents to be worth the cost of
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restricting civil liberties. Pierce Butler and John Hodgson, for example, were the victims
of arbitrary arrest and free speech suppression, respectively. Although most Democrats
in the early months of the war tolerated the silencing of extremist Peace agitators, the
further curtailment of civil liberty would foster a Peace Democratic resurgence when the
Union war effort faltered in 1862 and early 1863. Peace Democrats, therefore, remained
devoted to their opposition to the war, but bided their time in expressing their sentiments
for the first year or so after the attack on Fort Sumter.
On the opposite wing of the Democracy‟s continuum, Pennsylvania‟s War
Democrats wrested control of the party machinery. Most Pennsylvanians, including the
majority of the state‟s Democratic electorate, were incensed at the Southerners‟ attack on
federal property. These individuals followed the lead of Stephen A. Douglas in
condemning the rebellion and putting aside partisan differences in the face of national
crisis. The War Democrats were “celebrated…for their ability to equate the Lincoln
administration with the needs of the hour” and agreed that military action was required to
suppress the insurrection and restore the Union.48 The Lincoln administration recognized
the value in installing Democrats in positions of power, granting Pennsylvania
conservatives such as Robert Patterson, William Franklin, Winfield Hancock, and George
McClellan important military commissions. Nonetheless, Pennsylvania‟s War Democrats
had difficulty using their political clout to control the party. The death of Douglas and
the absence of a strong leader to take up the cause of the War Democrats left this wing of
the continuum searching for direction. The tenuous War Democrat-Republican alliance
that developed under the banner of the Union party never fully adhered around a set of
core principles that all could share. As traditional conservative principles eroded with the
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suppression of civil liberties and war aims broadened to include emancipation, many
initial War Democrats soured toward cooperation with the Republicans and would drift
toward the center of the party spectrum in 1862.
The Moderate Democratic philosophy which commanded ideological control of
the party before the attack on Fort Sumter largely evaporated when hostilities
commenced. The Douglas ultimatum which demanded that all Northerners choose
between the role of “patriots or traitors” was used as a rallying cry to flush out Southern
sympathizers. Mob violence and the threat of government arrest were enough for most
Moderates to flock to the War Democrats and leave behind, albeit temporarily, notions of
peace, conciliation, and reunion. The retirement of James Buchanan and the ouster from
office of a number of important prewar Pennsylvania Moderates also aided in the
dispersal of Moderate sentiment for the first several months of the war. Buchanan
himself came out strongly for the Lincoln administration‟s war plans, probably out of
both genuine concern for the Union‟s preservation and a desire to rehabilitate his image
after his contentious term in office. Other Moderates supported the war with conditions.
Because Southerners had slighted efforts at compromise, Moderates were at first willing
to see a more hard-line approach to bring the rebels back into the Union. As casualties
and expenses continued to mount and traditional conservative principles were violated in
1862 and beyond, these conditional War Democrats reinstated the middle segment of the
continuum and rehabilitated their efforts to conciliate and restore the Union under lenient
terms. As the war bogged down after Spring 1862 and the Lincoln administration
employed more radical measures to defeat the Confederacy, more and more Pennsylvania
Democrats began to assert their own ideas on how best to bring the conflict to a close.
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Chapter 3: The Peace Democracy Revealed, Spring 1862 – Summer 1863
On July 22, 1862, President Abraham Lincoln convened his entire cabinet to
discuss a momentous shift in war policy. To his secretaries, Lincoln recited a draft of his
proposed emancipation proclamation which authorized that “as Commander-in-Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States,” he would on January 1, 1863 declare “all
persons held as slaves within any state or states, wherein the constitutional authority of
the United States shall not then be practically recognized, submitted to, and
maintained,…forever…free.”1 Nearly the entire cabinet gave their support to the policy,
though some with certain conditions. Secretary of State William Seward, for example,
urged Lincoln to withhold promulgation of the proposal until after a Union military
victory, a recommendation to which the president consented. Postmaster General
Montgomery Blair, however, denounced the proclamation in no uncertain terms. Blair,
who began his political career as a Democrat, was among the most conservative of
Lincoln‟s secretaries and recognized the incongruence of the proclamation with Northern
conservatives‟ war aims. He anticipated the Democratic backlash that would result with
a Republican policy shift to emancipate the Confederacy‟s slaves. Furthermore, Blair
realized that the proclamation would have serious repercussions for the upcoming
midterm elections. Therefore, the postmaster general “deprecated the policy, on the
ground that it would cost the Administration the fall elections.”2 Blair‟s reservations
proved well-founded as evidenced by the reaction of Pennsylvania‟s Democracy to the
administration‟s swing toward the radicals. Whereas the 1861 Democrats largely
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supported a war effort to preserve the Union, by Spring 1862 the combination of military
setbacks, continued suppression of civil liberties, and a new Republican motivation to
abolish slavery prompted a more vocal Democratic opposition. War Democrats lost
control of the Commonwealth‟s party machinery to Conditional Moderates, who in turn
were increasingly influenced by the Peace Democrats‟ condemnations of the Lincoln
administration‟s policies. From the Spring 1862 military campaigns to the Battle of
Gettysburg in July 1863, the Peace Democrats reached the pinnacle of their power in the
state, distinguishing Pennsylvania as one of the most conservative and obstructionist
states in the North.
Charles Ingersoll led the Peace Democrats‟ reemergence in the early months of
1862. With Pennsylvania conservatives growing increasingly restless over the
unsuccessful military campaigning and agitated with the Lincoln administration‟s
oppressive suspension of personal liberties, Ingersoll broke the Copperheads‟ silence
with his controversial tract, A Letter to a Friend in a Slave State, published in March.
Central to Ingersoll‟s arguments was his belief in the inability of the Federal armies to
truly subjugate the Southern people and instill Union spirit there through use of force. He
noted the vastness of the Southern territory over which to conquer and wryly stated that
“neither Julius Caesar nor Napoleon ever performed such a feat, and, if they could be
brought to Washington to advise with Mr. Lincoln, would assure him it was not
possible.”3 Exhibiting a degree of Copperhead defeatism, Ingersoll asked, “[d]o we
entertain of our own blood so poor an opinion, as for a moment to suppose we could ever
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beat into the Union the people of the South?”4 The pamphlet also included a scathing
critique on emancipation. Although not officially a war aim of the Lincoln
administration at that time, Ingersoll likely prophesied the federal government‟s growing
affinity for more radical Republican measures. With emancipation, Ingersoll argued,
“four millions of negroes, now slaves, should be freed and added to five hundred
thousand already free negroes that are among us….[T]hese unhappy beings, as the
inferior and degraded race…will miserably decay, by slow degrees, in the course of ages
of oppression, or be more suddenly, but not more inhumanly, butchered in a war of
races.”5 In his tract, Ingersoll also denigrated the war record of the Republicans and
boosted Democratic electoral successes. “To be in favor of the Union is one thing,” he
elucidated, “to be in favor of the Union and the Constitution is another. What these men
[Republicans, particularly abolitionists] want is to keep the Union and break up the
Constitution.”6 On the other hand, Democrats, Ingersoll argued, traditionally
administered “[i]nstinctively opposed to over-governing, they, upon the whole, ruled
judiciously, the let-alone policy prevailing.”7 Therefore, the tract continued, “the
Democratic party, which carried the State at the last election, and will sweep it at the
next, will insist on an earnest and persistent effort…to restore the Union by measures of
conciliation, you may be sure.”8 After nearly a year in hibernation, leaders of the Peace
Democracy gradually reemerged, espousing their obstructionist views on emancipation,
bipartisanship, and the military subjugation of the Confederacy. Their resurgent antiwar
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dialogue coincided with a Democratic revival, both in Pennsylvania state politics and
among the Commonwealth‟s Democrats in Washington.
In the United States House of Representatives, two Pennsylvania congressmen
emerged as leaders in a conservative resurgence bent on reasserting the preservation of
the Union as the sole war aim. Representative Hendrick B. Wright of Wilkes-Barre was
a solid War Democrat who lauded President Lincoln for his “patriotic heart” and vowed
to remain a supporter of the administration so long as the war was waged “upon the sole
issue upon which it was inaugurated” – the preservation of the Union.9 When radicals in
Congress began to advance abolition as a proposed war measure, however, Wright
responded on January 20, 1862 in typical conservative fashion. “I am not an…advocate
of slavery,” Wright averred, “but I am one of those who are willing to take the
Constitution as our fathers gave it to us.”10 Wright continued:
[T]his war is not waged upon our part in any spirit of oppression or purpose to
overthrow or interfere with the rights or established institutions of the southern
States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to
preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States
unimpaired; and that, as soon as these objects are accomplished, the war ought to
cease….It was not to be a war of conquest. It was not to be a war of subjugation.
No; it was to be a war to put down this rebellion and to suppress this
insurrection.11
As emancipation began to surface as a Republican war aim in 1862, the War DemocratRepublican accord began to break apart. Willing to tolerate military setbacks and some
limits on civil liberty suspension for the sake of the Union‟s preservation, many of
Pennsylvania‟s War Democrats were adamantly opposed to the radical Republicans‟ twin
goals of Union and emancipation.
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Charles J. Biddle, another of Pennsylvania‟s House leaders, began the war as
commander of the state‟s famed “Bucktail Regiment” until he campaigned for and was
elected to a vacant, Philadelphia-based congressional seat during Summer 1861.
Although described by diarist Sidney George Fisher as “a man of high character &
ability,” Fisher went on to record that Biddle was “very southern in his sympathies,
opposed to this war &, tho [sic] now serving in the army, very far from sympathizing
with the purposes of the government.”12 Indeed, despite his brief military stint, Biddle
was a Moderate Democrat whose qualified support for the war excluded not just
emancipation, but also suspension of civil liberties. “A party that can silence opposition
and muzzle the press,” Biddle cautioned, “is the worst kind of tyrant.”13 In a speech
delivered in the House on March 6, 1862, Congressman Biddle asserted his belief in the
Democracy‟s capacity to restore the antebellum status quo and reverse the Republicans‟
attempt to engender radical change such as emancipation. “[T]he rise of the Democratic
party in this country,” he explained, “was the people‟s protest against the concentration
of power in the Federal Government. Now, let some party rise; call it the Democratic
party – call it, if you will, „the white man‟s party‟ – which shall protest against these
schemes for black armies and States held as subject provinces.”14 Biddle continued in a
quintessentially conservative vein, “I would leave to my children the Union that our
fathers left to us. Born and bred on the soil of the State, whose proudest title is to be „the
Keystone of the Federal arch,‟ I do not wish to see a new St. Domingo on her southern

12

White, Diary of Fisher, 100. Entry dated June 24, 1861.
Quoted in Shankman, Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement, 83.
14
Speech of Charles J. Biddle in the U.S. House, Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd session
(March 7, 1862), 1112. Among other proposals proffered by radical Republican congressmen were plans
to enlist African-Americans into the armies and revert the Southern states to territorial status upon their
subjugation – two proposals deemed anathema to nearly all Democrats.
13

75

border. These are my sentiments as a Pennsylvanian and a white man.”15 In succeeding
months, Biddle would go on to oppose various congressional antislavery measures
including the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Act (March 1862), the abolishment of slavery
in the District of Columbia (April), and the Second Confiscation Act (July 1862). Thus,
Biddle represented “the new, militant anti-Lincoln congressmen” who stood somewhere
between the War and Peace factions of the Democracy, only offering their conditional
support for the war effort in 1862.16
Besides a resurgent conservative offensive in Congress, Pennsylvania‟s
Democrats could cheerfully point to a factious Republican division that would hurt the
latter party‟s fortunes in elections held later that year. United States Senator Edgar
Cowan, a Republican in office since March 1861, exhibited reservations about war policy
once the emancipation issue was introduced in Congress. In a speech delivered on April
30, 1862, Cowan voiced sentiments similar to Democratic Congressmen Wright and
Biddle. He argued that Southerners “have rebelled upon the belief that we intended to
correct it [slavery]; and we are here to show them they are wrong, to try to get them back,
to restore the Union, to restore the Constitution and the laws, and to punish those who
have incited them to rebellion.”17 Cowan continued with a degree of defeatism akin to
the most conservative of Democrats:
[I]f…emancipation is to be made the prime end and purpose of this war, the war
itself will fail inevitably, just because as soon as the people of the South
understand and know certainly that that is the end and purpose of the war, they are
a unit against us; and I say that no people united, in a country of the size they
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occupy, with the numbers they have, and the spirit with which we have reason to
believe they will carry on the war, can ever be conquered. It is impossible.18
Senator Cowan‟s conservative bent undoubtedly irritated mainstream Republican
congressmen and the Republican press in Pennsylvania. Even before he delivered this
speech in the Senate, the Pittsburgh Gazette grumbled that “[t]he powerful Republican
majority of this section of the State supposed they had in Mr. Cowan a true and able
exponent of Republican principles, one who would retrieve the tarnished honor of the
State, and redeem it from the disgrace inflicted by such men as Bigler and Buchanan.”19
A definitive conservative reaction among Pennsylvania‟s officials in Washington thus
materialized once emancipation was discussed as a potential war aim. In the
Commonwealth, the Democratic continuum shifted even more fiercely away from
bipartisan, pro-war sentiments that had characterized 1861 state politics and gave waxing
power to Conditional Moderates and even Peace advocates.
For the Pennsylvania Democracy, there was much at stake in the upcoming
elections of October 1862. Not only were there the usual state offices to fill, but also all
twenty-four seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. More importantly, Democrats
saw the opportunity to combat the increasingly radical bent that Republicans were
pursuing in Congress and the White House. The limited war aims pursued by the Lincoln
administration in 1861 were expanding frighteningly for Democrats, most of whom could
no longer maintain the tenuous accord with their political opposition in a bipartisan spirit
of unity. A series of measures instituted by Congress and sustained by Lincoln during the
first half of 1862 proved distasteful to conservatives because of their presumed threat to
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white supremacy and interference with established patterns of race relations and social
structure. In his gradual turn towards emancipation as a war aim, Lincoln proposed as
early as March the idea of compensated emancipation for those states willing to
relinquish their slaves. With the president‟s endorsement, Congress passed a resolution
the following month, “[t]hat the United States ought to cooperate with any State which
may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used
by such State in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private,
produced by such change of system.”20 On April 16, Lincoln signed into law an act
abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia, providing immediate emancipation and
compensation to loyal slaveholders. In June, Lincoln approved bills designed to abolish
slavery in the federal territories and to recognize the black-majority republics of Haiti and
Liberia. On July 17, the Second Confiscation Act and the Militia Act took effect, freeing
slaves of persons engaged in rebellion against the Union and providing for freed blacks‟
employment in military service. Five days later, Lincoln assembled his cabinet to discuss
his draft of an emancipation proclamation which, it was decided, would be issued after a
Union military victory. With a new tone of intolerance against the institution of slavery,
Lincoln wrote privately, “[t]his government cannot much longer play a game in which it
stakes all, and its enemies stake nothing. Those enemies must understand that they
cannot experiment for ten years trying to destroy the government, and if they fail still
come back into the Union unhurt.”21 It was in this atmosphere of increasing radicalism

20

The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year 1862, vol. 2 (New
York: D. Appleton, 1869), 788.
21
Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed., Abraham Lincoln: Speeches, Letters, and Miscellaneous Writings,
Presidential Messages and Proclamations, vol. 2, Speeches and Writings, 1859 – 1865 (New York: Library
of America, 1989), 347. Quote from Lincoln letter to August Belmont written July 31, 1862.

78

toward abolition that Pennsylvania‟s Democrats planned their election campaign to halt
the Republicans‟ expansion of war aims.
The 1862 Democratic State Convention convened at Harrisburg on Independence
Day. In the face of the recent Republican measures favoring emancipation, delegates to
the convention met with a unity of purpose that healed the breach that had once divided
Douglas and Breckinridge supporters. The Bellefonte Democratic Watchman noted that
the convention “was entirely harmonious throughout the whole session.”22 Delegates
elected Francis W. Hughes as chairman of the body. Hughes, a renowned lawyer, former
state senator, and Democratic political boss of Schuylkill County, was a Breckinridge
Conservative during the secession winter who later adopted Moderate tendencies after the
war began. During the course of the convention, Democrats issued a series of resolutions
that set forth their qualified support for the war and indicated a shift away from accord
with Republican war aims. Although the delegates resolved to “pledge our hearty and
unqualified support to the Federal Government in the energetic prosecution of the
existing war,” they also determined “[t]hat the only object of the Democratic party is the
restoration of this Union as it was, and the preservation of the Constitution as it is.”23 No
longer would Pennsylvania‟s Democracy acquiesce to the Lincoln administration‟s
handling of the war, nor accept the leadership of the War wing of the party. The state‟s
Democrats now voiced their disapproval of the war‟s progress and the sweeping social
changes it wrought. Furthermore, they propagated the notion that the Democracy could
better bring the war to a close by stopping Republican policy. The delegates swiped at
the suspension of free speech, free press, and the writ of habeas corpus, warning that
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these actions were “most dangerous to civil liberty, and should be resisted at the ballot
box by every freeman in the land.”24 The most strident resolution pertained to the federal
government‟s meddling with established race relations and involvement in the cause of
emancipation:
Resolved, That this is a government of white men, and was established
exclusively for the white race, and that the negro race are not entitled to, and
ought not to be, admitted to political or social equality with the white race, but
that it is our duty to treat them with kindness and consideration as an inferior and
dependent race; that the right of the several States to determine the position and
duties of the race is a sovereign right; and the pledges of the Constitution require
us as loyal citizens not to interfere wherewith.25
The Democratic resolutions deliberately said nothing, at this point, favoring conciliatory
gestures toward the South. At this early stage of the war, Union military setbacks were
not so insufferable to warrant calls for negotiated peace as would be the case in later
months. Also, the delegates likely hoped to attract sufficient War Democrats and proslavery Unionists who favored the military subjugation of the South, but withheld support
for emancipation. An examination of the 1862 state party resolutions indicates that the
convention was firmly in the hands of Moderates who supported the war with conditions;
was not influenced or controlled by Peace Democrats as the party would be at other times
during the war; and was interested in reclaiming War Democrats from the RepublicanUnionist fold.
For their part, Pennsylvania‟s Republicans also vied for the continued support of
War Democrats and other pro-Union conservatives. Meeting under the banner of the
“People‟s” or “National Union” party, delegates to the convention assembled at
Harrisburg on July 17. As chairman of the People‟s State Committee, Alexander K.
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McClure called the convention together in an effort “to unite in sustaining the National
Administration…to preserve the Union of our fathers.”26 Pointedly, McClure conveyed a
conservative message that Democrats might accept by appealing to a Union based on the
antebellum status quo.27 In their resolutions, the People‟s party delegates expressed their
“confidence in the honesty, capacity, and patriotism of President Lincoln” and “cordially
approve[d] of the administration of Andrew G. Curtin” and their efforts to suppress the
rebellion.28 Furthermore, the delegates offered their thanks to the soldiers in arms against
the Confederacy and denigrated those presumed domestic traitors who aimed to engender
the permanent division of the Union. Notably, none of the resolutions weighed in on the
recent congressional legislation on emancipation nor was any attempt made to define the
war aims of the Republican party. Apparently content that the state‟s radical Republicans
would adhere to the People‟s party no matter how conservative the convention‟s
message, delegates offered a series of subdued resolutions in the hope of maintaining the
loyalty of War Democrats and pro-slavery Unionists. However, as Stanton Ling Davis
explains, “[t]o many conservatives…the [Republican] resolutions seemed indefinite and
evasive, and the Democratic arguments more logical.”29 Ultimately, the Democrats were
the recognized representatives of conservatism and those voters who shared a desire for
limited war aims increasingly sided with them during the 1862 campaign.
Republicans were also hampered by military setbacks during the spring and
summer which eroded public support for the party‟s handling of the war. After months of
irresolution as general-in-chief of the Union armies, General George B. McClellan,
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darling of the Democratic party, was removed from that command in March 1862 but
retained control of the Army of the Potomac, the primary Union army in the East. The
following month, McClellan‟s army commenced the Peninsula Campaign, a military
operation designed to capture the Confederate capital of Richmond from the east.
Although the campaign began favorably for the North, McClellan‟s indecisive command
halted the Union advance just short of its objective. Early in July, the Army of the
Potomac was in retreat from its tenuous position, demoralizing Northern soldiers and
civilians alike. What doubts Lincoln already harbored about McClellan‟s aptitude for
command were exacerbated by the general‟s defiance. In a letter to Lincoln dated July 7,
McClellan penned his misgivings about the administration‟s increasingly radical handling
of the war:
This Rebellion has assumed the character of a war; as such it should be regarded,
and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian
civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any
State, in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against
armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property,
political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible
abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment.30
McClellan‟s Democratic conservatism and desire for limited war aims clashed
with the Lincoln administration‟s gradual movement to incorporate emancipation as a
stipulation for Union victory. Further military embarrassment accompanied the Union
defeat of General John Pope‟s Army of Virginia at the Second Battle of Bull Run on
August 29-30. Incidentally, the war enthusiasm that had marked the early months of the
war waned considerably by 1862. The controversial Militia Act which had marked the
first step toward black enlistment in the military, also stipulated for the drafting of
30
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300,000 additional troops for the war effort. Predictably, Union military reverses and
unpopular federal legislation was a boon for Pennsylvania‟s Democratic midterm election
candidates.
As a result of the difficulties faced by the Lincoln administration and
congressional Republicans, Pennsylvania‟s Democracy sensed the opportunity to secure
sweeping gains in the upcoming election.

In a show of defiance to the Lincoln

administration‟s radical course toward emancipation, Chairman Francis W. Hughes of the
Democratic State Central Committee wrote a public letter to Secretary of State William
Seward on August 11. Hughes claimed he expressed “the sentiments of no less than three
hundred thousand of the men of Pennsylvania” concerning the qualms all conservatives
held.31 Although Hughes believed that there were no other “men in the whole
country…more devoted [to] patriotism and loyalty,” the prospect of abolition would
shake the commitment of all Northerners to the suppression of the rebellion.32
Furthermore, Hughes hoped to “stimulate” Seward “or serve [him] in any degree to
promote a policy on the part of the Administration of President Lincoln to put down the
demon of Abolitionism.”33 Secretary Seward responded cordially and affirmed his “full
confidence in the sincerity of the devotion to the Union” Hughes and the Democracy
exhibited.34 However, Seward responded with a tacit approval for the course of the
administration and cautioned Hughes “that this nation is now engaged, not in a political
canvass between opposing parties, about questions of civil administration, but in a civil
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war, carried on by opposing armies on an issue of national life or death.”35 Whatever
concessions Hughes hoped to achieve from the federal government, he realized that only
Democratic victory at the polls would engender a return to conservatism.
The Democracy‟s campaigners aimed to do just that and organized a large rally in
Philadelphia‟s Independence Square on August 23. Hughes opened the meeting by
criticizing Republican war policy and the continued suspension of civil liberties by the
Lincoln administration. “[A] war of conquest or subjugation [of the South],” Hughes
cautioned, “means eternal disunion. It means anarchy and despotism.”36 Democratic
officers at the rally adopted a series of resolutions similar to those espoused at the party‟s
state convention. The officials denounced the continuation of sectional politics which
“lay at the foundation of our troubles. The existence of the Nation depends upon their
extermination. These sectional parties are known as Abolitionists and Secessionists, and,
together, they constitute the enemies of the Republic.”37 Although the majority of the
rally‟s sentiments expressed loyalty and at least qualified support for the war, the
invitation granted to Charles Ingersoll to speak gave the event a tinge of opprobrium.
Ingersoll‟s remarks were customarily vitriolic and solidified his status as the state‟s
leading Copperhead. “I want to know,” mused Ingersoll, “whether any Government that
ever exercised so much power has…with 700,000 men in the field, ever accomplished
results so insignificant?”38 Ingersoll continued:
[W]hat has been the whole object of the war hitherto? To free the nigger! Now,
has there been any other object? – and if they could accomplish that object, where
should we be? If those four millions of negroes were turned loose into the
35
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Northern and Southern States together, where, gentlemen, would you and I be?
Are we to adopt them? Marry them? In what manner are those negroes to be
disposed of?....Those poor negroes whom the Abolitionists love much less than
you and I do – those poor negroes would have their throats cut in a war of races,
and that would be the end of this scheme of the Abolitionists.39
Perhaps the most subversive of Ingersoll‟s scathing remarks were charges of
malfeasance against the Lincoln administration. “I say further, fellow-citizens,” he
harangued, “that a more corrupt Government than that which now governs us never was
in the United States, and has been seldom seen in any European part of the world. It is
necessary to go to the older regions of Asia to find as much corruption as exists in this
Government of Mr. Lincoln.”40 Certainly, Ingersoll‟s comments went beyond the tenor
of the rally which proved to be much more moderate and haltingly pro-war. As diarist
Sidney George Fisher remarked, the rally was “not extravagant in [its] tone and neither
were the speeches, except that of Chas. Ingersoll. He was extremely violent, far beyond
the general feeling of the assembly.”41 However, the mere presence of Ingersoll among
the orators that day implied that the Peace Democrats had a presence within the party
mainstream and that the party‟s officials still reached out to and desired the electoral
support of those Democrats who shared Ingersoll‟s Copperhead views.
Fully aware of the support Democrats were enjoying in the months leading up to
the midterm election, Republicans countered with their own strategies. Most
controversial was the arrest of Charles Ingersoll two days after delivering his speech at
Independence Square. The arrest was made under an order issued by the War
Department on August 8 that permitted the detainment of “any person who, by act,
speech, or writing, tended to discourage enlistments, „give aid and comfort to the enemy,‟
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or commit any other kind of disloyal acts.”42 Unfortunately for the Republicans,
Ingersoll deftly appealed to a Democratic judge, John Cadwalader, who hastily ordered a
writ of habeas corpus. Evidently, authorities in Washington were interested in washing
their hands of the public relations fiasco and dropped the charges against Ingersoll just a
week after his arrest. Thus, the plan to silence Ingersoll backfired and only strengthened
the Democracy.
Republican attacks on Democratic Chairman Hughes were only marginally more
successful. Because of his identity as an 1860 Breckinridge Conservative, Hughes‟s
loyalty already met with skepticism from his detractors. Although his recent orations fit
the tone of a Conditional Moderate, Republicans sought out incriminating evidence of his
once pro-Southern leanings. What they found was a damning resolution penned by
Hughes prior to the February 1861 Democratic State Convention, which had never been
revealed to the delegates:
Should…causes hitherto resisted by the Democracy of the country, rend asunder
the bonds that bind together these states; and should the fifteen slaveholding
states, claiming to be driven by the necessity of mutual protection against the
effect of such causes, successfully establish another confederacy; - then
Pennsylvania must regard her relation to the facts which circumstances beyond
our control have produced. She cannot then refuse to perceive that she must
either take her place in some Northern fragment of a once glorious Union, and
rest content to be shorn of the greater part of her manufacturing industry…to hold
a secondary and helpless relation to the North-Eastern States….Or she may, if a
member of the New Confederacy, become the great manufacturing workshop for
a people now consuming annually $300,000,000 worth of products….That it will
be the right and duty of her citizens to consult their own best interests in a
position so momentous, and decide between the lawful alternatives.43
The resolution‟s sentiments resembled proposals offered by Ingersoll, Reed, and
other notorious Breckinridge Conservatives prior to the attack on Fort Sumter.
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Nonetheless, Hughes promptly took responsibility for the resolution and admitted that
after consulting with fellow politicos prior to the February 1861 convention, he had opted
to refrain from presenting the measure to the Democratic delegates. The Republican
press seized the incident as an election issue and hounded the Democrats for their
decision to select Hughes as a party leader. Furthermore, Republicans discovered that
two of Hughes‟s nephews had enlisted in the Confederate army while residing in North
Carolina, further denigrating the Democratic chairman‟s image. “The treasonable views
of this man are and have long been well known, yet he is retained as the leader of the
party in this State,” noted the Pittsburgh Gazette. “[I]f the mass of his party were loyal
men, they would not keep him in the position he occupies.”44
Pennsylvania‟s midterm elections were held on October 14, 1862. Voters went to
the polls less than one month after Confederate General Robert E. Lee‟s first invasion of
the North, the Battle of Antietam, and the issuance of Lincoln‟s preliminary
Emancipation Proclamation – three events that further reinforced the great cost of the war
and the radical changes it was rendering. As anticipated, the Democracy scored
significant triumphs. The two state offices up for election both went to Democrats.45 In
the state‟s lower assembly, fifty-four Democrats were elected compared with the
Republican-Unionists‟ forty-six. In the state senate, where only twelve of the thirty-three
senate seats were up for election, Unionists won eight seats to the Democrats four and
retained an overall majority of twenty-one to twelve. However, in joint session of the
state house and senate, the Democrats held a slim one vote majority which would prove
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crucial in the upcoming election for U.S. senator the following January. In the
congressional battle, Republicans and Democrats divided evenly, each party sending
twelve of its own to Washington. The Democracy that had been struggling since the
Lecompton fiasco to present a united front finally seemed to have healed old wounds and
looked toward a return to its traditional dominance. “[W]e return thanks to a superior
Power,” gushed the Lancaster Intelligencer, “that the Democracy throughout the State
have given the monster of Abolitionism a death-wound, and we may now hope that
President Lincoln will re-consider his course, take counsel from the warning the people
of…Pennsylvania…have given him through the ballot-box, and retrace his steps as
quickly as possible until he finds his feet again planted firmly on the platform of the
Constitution.”46 The Gettysburg Republican Compiler beamed that “the freemen of
Pennsylvania, by an overwhelming vote, have recorded their verdict against the Abolition
traitors. – The boot is on the other leg now, and the term traitor is applied where it
properly belongs.”47 Indeed, the Democracy had cause, at long last, to celebrate a
resumption of conservative tradition in the state.
Since early 1862, Pennsylvania‟s Democratic party had moved toward
reconciliation within its ranks. War Democrats were no longer certain supporters of the
Lincoln administration when the expansion of war aims came to embrace emancipation.
Republicans aimed to reaffirm the War Democrats‟ allegiance with conservative platform
planks that ignored the question of abolition. But mainstream Democrats more often than
not succeeded in convincing the War Democrats of the radical designs of the opposition.
Peace Democrats meanwhile emerged from hiding once dissent for the war was again
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tolerated. Although they did not seize the party machinery, they were welcome to work
within it and rally their followers to back candidates selected for office during the
midterm election. The Moderate Democrats had firm control of the party in 1862 and
articulated their continued support for the suppression of the rebellion, but now
emphasized certain conditions. The Lincoln administration‟s mishandling of military
campaigning, continued suppression of civil liberties, and newfound espousal for
abolition prompted the Moderates to declare their loyalty to the federal government but
opposition to its Republican management. As Joel Silbey explains, “the strong force of
traditional institutions and perspectives forced the factions of the [Democratic] party, rent
by old wounds, back together and ultimately led them into a position of political
partisanship which all but a small minority of Democrats accepted – because this was
their accustomed stance and they were comfortable in it and understood it.”48 Fortified
by the party‟s resurgence, the Peace Democrats worked to gain control of the state party
structure through the winter of 1862-63.
The success of the Democrats in the October elections manifested a renewed
determination on the part of the state‟s Peace Democrats to disseminate their views. As
dissatisfaction with the war‟s prosecution mounted, Copperhead sentiments became more
tolerated, if not embraced. After a long hiatus from the public limelight, William B.
Reed reemerged to proffer his views of the war with the November 1862 publication of
his A Statement and Vindication of Certain Political Opinions. “[E]very day dissipates
some theory of conquest or submission,” Reed lamented, “widens the awful chasm that
separates us from our brethren of the South, and renders more probable the stupendous
shame of European intervention, - not merely recognition, but active military
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interposition, which at once settles the contest to our ignominy, and adds bitterness to the
cup of degradation.”49 Although many Democrats shared this particular worry
concerning the complete conquest of the Confederacy, Reed‟s preference was radically
defeatist. “[I]f the choice be between the continuance of the war, with its attendant
suffering and demoralization, certain miseries and uncertain results, and a recognition of
the Southern Confederacy, I am in favor of Recognition, - of course making the abolition
party responsible for this dread necessity. The blood of the Union is on them.”50 To
objectify this outcome, Reed proposed a solution that soon amounted to a political maxim
of the Peace Democracy in the coming months, and became an attractive idea for
increasing numbers of Moderate Democrats. He recommended a “National Convention”
to “deliberate on matters of common concern” in the hope of achieving “new Federal
relations.”51 Of course, such a solution would recognize the failure of the war effort, and
to some, the failure of the American experiment in democracy. But to Reed and other
Peace Democrats, this scenario was preferable to the continued sacrifices and radical
social changes wrought by the war.
In the meantime, Charles Ingersoll‟s short term in custody did little to diminish
his antiwar sentiments after the midterm elections. After the disastrous Union defeat at
Fredericksburg on December 13, Sidney George Fisher recorded in his diary that he
“[m]et Charles Ingersoll in the street. He expressed such exultation and delight at the
defeat of the Union army and his language was so violent & extravagant, that I was
disgusted. He is imbued with narrowest partizan [sic] passions & is wholly insensible to
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argument, and incapable of any but the most petty views of the situation of the
country.”52 Ingersoll‟s behavior was representative of a small, but growing number of
Democrats who believed that further Confederate victories would hasten the
Democracy‟s restoration to political power which would in turn bring the war to a prompt
close.53 To circulate this message, Ingersoll, Reed, and a group of conservative
Philadelphia elites organized a social club “for mutual aid in the promotion,
dissemination, and defence [sic] of the pure principles of Democracy.”54 Designated the
Central Democratic Club, it was established on January 8, 1863 – just one week after the
Emancipation Proclamation took effect and on the anniversary of Andrew Jackson‟s
victory at New Orleans. Although the club would have little bearing on state politics, its
mere existence hints at the growing affinity for the Peace Democrats‟ agenda and a
change in public perception of antiwar sentiments.
The grievances of the Central Democratic Club did not differ so much from
previous resolutions adopted by Moderates of the Democratic State Convention. For
example, the Club objected to the federal government‟s centralization, the effort to
broaden war aims to include emancipation, and the Lincoln administration‟s suppression
of free speech, free press, and the writ of habeas corpus. However, the tone of the club
members‟ agitation was far more vitriolic and outright subversive in nature. Among the
propositions of the club was the assertion “[t]hat in the State of Pennsylvania all power is
inherent in the WHITE PEOPLE, and that our Government is founded on THEIR
authority, and that THEY have at all times the unalienable and indefeasible right to alter,
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reform and abolish their Government in such manner as they may think proper.”55 More
extreme was the club‟s contention that under certain circumstances, citizens could defy
legislation of the federal government – particularly that of the radical Republicans and
the Lincoln administration. The resolution stated:
That the people of the State of Pennsylvania, under its organic law, cannot be
rightfully required to support or approve any political party, or the conduct of any
officers of Government – executive, legislative, or judicial – who wilfully [sic]
violate or disregard the requirements of the Constitution of the United States, and
the cardinal doctrines of self-government and State Sovereignty, as the same are
recognized and limited in the letter and spirit of the Federal and State
Constitutions.56
Within the walls of its headquarters in Philadelphia, the Central Democratic Club
provided a forum for some of the most dissident rhetoric uttered at any time during the
war, as Pennsylvania Copperheads displayed as much fervor as their counterparts in the
more traditional “butternut” regions of the Midwest. As president of the Club, Charles
Ingersoll opened the inaugural meeting with a speech. “The North is pro-slavery,” he
asserted. “Through the voice of its people in their recent Democratic elections, it has
pronounced for the protection of slavery, and of the protection of the gentlemen of the
South in their human property….I look on negro property as being sacred as any other
property, and I sympathize with the South in their desire to preserve it.”57 In a brazenly
obstructionist tone, Ingersoll further recommended that the Democratic-led state house
“should…refuse supplies [for the war effort]. If I were a member of the House of
Representatives at Harrisburg, I would say, until you give us a bill to call a [conciliatory]
convention of the people of Pennsylvania we will give no money; we will withhold
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supplies.”58 Sidney George Fisher, who was not a supporter of the Club but monitored
the substance of its meetings, recorded on March 19 that Ingersoll “proposes, should any
more „arbitrary arrests‟ be made, that the government of Pennsylvania should seize
officers of the federal government & hold them as hostages till the prisoners are released.
Such are the extravagant, revolutionary plans of the Democrats, who profess to respect
the Constitution.”59 Other members of the club were equally dissident as Ingersoll. At a
February 3 meeting, Reverend Chauncey C. Burr audaciously announced that “Abraham
Lincoln is a greater traitor than Jefferson Davis. What has Jeff Davis done? He has
merely infringed upon our territorial jurisdiction. He has not struck at the
Constitution.”60 With less agitation, but certainly as much defeatism, William B. Reed
addressed the club on March 28: “I deplore and condemn the war and believe coercion to
have been a mistake from the beginning, and pray, and hope and urge the necessity of
Peace, and, if possible, „Reconcilation‟: but Peace, even if the bond of sympathy be, as I
fear it is, irreparably broken.”61 Although few Democrats were so vocal as the members
of the Central Democratic Club, their ability to profess such subversive rhetoric over the
course of several months indicates Pennsylvania‟s disillusionment with the war and a
growing tolerance for Copperhead agitation. Although the Copperheads did not seize the
state party machinery outright in early 1863, Harrisburg‟s Democrats were certainly
shifting their sympathies toward peace.
As Philadelphia‟s Copperheads were rousing antiwar sentiment in their social
circle, Pennsylvania‟s Democratic politicos were flexing their restored might against
58
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Republican-Unionists. The 1862 election had given the Democrats a slim one-vote
majority in joint session of the state house and senate. This gave the party a virtual lock
on electing a U.S. senator to succeed Republican David Wilmot in January 1863, barring
any unexpected defections. Selection of an appropriate Democratic candidate would be
essential to ensure a unified party vote. Francis W. Hughes was considered a leading
contender since his selection as state party chairman; however, the recent revelations of
his ultraconservative past had made his nomination inauspicious. Democrats
subsequently turned to Charles Rollins Buckalew, a War Democrat during the early
months of the conflict and more recently a Conditional Moderate who stood firmly for
the suppression of the rebellion while criticizing the Emancipation Proclamation.
Buckalew, a lawyer from Columbia County, distinguished himself with his “thoroughly
honest, able and wise leadership” in the state senate during the 1850s and had most
recently served as Buchanan‟s minister to Ecuador.62 Republicans meanwhile sought to
win converts from the slim Democratic majority and ultimately settled on Simon
Cameron, Lincoln‟s recently deposed secretary of war. Cameron was known to employ
corrupt dealings to secure political advantage, and evidence suggests that bribes were
offered to Democratic legislators to switch their votes to him.63 Devoted conservatives
caught wind of the scheme and some “were inflamed to revolutionary action, and
meetings were held in Philadelphia where it was openly declared that no Democratic
member of the Legislature should be permitted to escape from the hall of the house alive
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if he cast his vote for Cameron.”64 Whether through devotion to party or threat of
physical violence, the Democrats maintained their partisan sympathies and elected
Buckalew with the one-vote majority on January 13, 1863, the closest election for senator
in the history of the Pennsylvania legislature.65 The state Democracy was jubilant over
another example of conservative forces recovering the federal government. The Luzerne
Union celebrated “the loyal, Constitution-loving masses of the old Keystone [that] have
at last triumphed in the election of a [D]emocrat who will contribute all in his power to
bring back the old ship of State safely to her moorings.”66 Soon after his election,
Buckalew professed his views on the war, which had a decidedly pro-peace tone. He
“propose[d] to secure [the Confederacy‟s] cooperation in restoring the Union by a policy
of conciliation, and by the example of a return by our own government to the true
Constitutional rule, uninfluenced by fanatical passion and regardful of all State and
individual rights as established by our fathers.”67 The proponents of peace could now
cheerfully point to a fellow conservative in state office.
In response to continuing military frustrations, the Emancipation Proclamation,
and an unpopular conscription law enacted on March 3, 1863, the Democratic majority in
the state house passed a series of resolutions that censured Republican policy and
represented a steady shift toward open advocacy of peace. These resolutions were passed
on April 13 as a result of the nation‟s onslaught “by an armed rebellion on one side,
which is being met by the sword, and on the other by unconstitutional acts of Congress,
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and startling usurpation of power by the Executive.”68 Most revolting to the legislators
was the Emancipation Proclamation, which upset traditional conservative notions of
property and race. “[T]his General Assembly,” pronounced the resolution, “enters its
solemn protest against the Proclamation of the President…by which he assumes to
emancipate slaves in certain States, holding the same to be unwise, unconstitutional, and
void.”69 More startling was the house members‟ approval of a proposition espoused by
some of the most ardent Peace Democrats:
[T]his General Assembly deem it proper further to declare that it, together with all
the truly loyal people of the State, would hail with pleasure and delight any
manifestation of a desire on the part of the seceded States to return to their
allegiance to the Government of the Union, and would in such an event, cordially
and earnestly co-operate with them in the restoration of peace, and the
procurement of such proper guarantees as would give security to all their interests
and rights.70
Of course, these sentiments only took the form of resolutions and were not drawn
up as legislation; nor did the Republican-majority state senate pass the resolutions.
Nonetheless, Democratic dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the war had by early
1863 combined many Moderate politicians with the state‟s Copperhead elements in a
denunciation of the war‟s course. An immediate turn of military fortunes was critical to
sustain the Republican war effort, particularly with the 1863 gubernatorial and the 1864
presidential elections looming. The conservative resurgence seemed even more
unyielding with Lee‟s heretofore invincible army threatening to invade the Keystone
State.
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From early 1862 to the eve of the Battle of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania‟s
Democratic continuum endured the most drastic shift of the entire war. The War
Democrats, who had once allied with Republican-Unionists in a combined effort to
suppress the rebellion, balked at the thought of a war to emancipate Southern slaves.
Erstwhile War Democrats like Representatives Hendrick Wright and Charles Biddle
could brook temporary suspension of civil liberties and some military setbacks, but a war
designed to upset the traditional social structure and conservative notions of slave
property proved too radical to tolerate. Many of these War Democrats became
Conditional Moderates, still supporting the military subjugation of the South, but fighting
incessantly to restore the limited war aims that had defined the Lincoln administration‟s
plans in 1861. Peace Democrats, on the other hand, reveled in the agitation created by
the federal government‟s turn toward emancipation. As conservatives across the state
reacted unfavorably to the expanded war aims, the Copperheads‟ dire warnings now took
on relevance as military defeats and perceived government usurpation sapped enthusiasm
for war. Although Ingersoll, Reed, and their peers never took public office during the
war, their views met with support from a larger number of Democrats and even came to
be adopted to a degree by party members in Harrisburg.
Moderate Democrats, who more often than not leaned toward the pro-war end of
the spectrum during the early months of the war, shifted overwhelmingly toward peace
by the eve of the Battle of Gettysburg. Although they had always viewed the suppression
of free speech, free press, and the writ of habeas corpus as unconstitutional, they had
often given the Lincoln administration tacit approval when it came to preserving the
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Union through subjugation of the Confederacy. Once they witnessed what they viewed
as a radical Republican usurpation of the North‟s war aims however, they withheld all
support for a Republican administration and fought tenaciously, and for a time
successfully, to regain control of the state and federal governments. They viewed their
success in the 1862 midterm elections as a mandate from Pennsylvania voters to stop
social change through emancipation and painted themselves as the best hope for a speedy
restoration of peace. As military failures multiplied and the Lincoln administration
persisted in its radical course, the Moderates adopted some of the views of the
Copperheads. Most strikingly, Moderates began advocating renewed efforts at
conciliation with the South through state and national conventions, a proposal advocated
by Peace Democrats since before the war. By June 1863, the war had reached a
crossroads. Another major Union defeat would likely engender an overwhelming call for
peace among Northern conservatives and discredit Republicans in all political offices.
On the other hand, a definitive military victory could halt the surging Democratic tide
and their plan to bring the war to a swift, and potentially ignominious, close. This
outcome was staked on the result of the crucial battle destined to be fought on the soils of
Pennsylvania.
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Chapter 4: The Peace Democracy Rebuffed, Summer 1863 – Spring 1864
The Summer 1863 invasion of Pennsylvania by General Robert E. Lee and his
Army of Northern Virginia marked a watershed moment in the political clout of the
Commonwealth‟s Peace Democracy. Although their ultraconservative views had
prohibited the outright seizure of their party‟s machinery, the Copperheads‟ antiwar
vitriol gained influence statewide and persuaded Conditional Moderates in Harrisburg to
consider closely their calls for peace. As the Confederates crossed the Mason-Dixon line
in June, Peace Democrats exhibited restrained jubilation at the thought of another Union
defeat that would further question the Lincoln administration‟s prosecution of the war.
As Philadelphia diarist George W. Fahnestock recorded, “[u]nhappily, so strong has
grown the feeling of opposition to the present Administration, that many men are pleased
with the prospect of invasion, carnage, blood, and smoking ruins! They walk our streets
today, radiant with joy, led on by W[illiam] B. Reed, Charlie Ingersoll, and [George]
Wharton, and a horde of old worn out Peace Democrats. Nothing would rejoice them
more than to see our whole government laid in ashes!”1 The invasion came amid the
most important election campaign of the war to that point – one that would determine the
next governor of the Commonwealth and the level of Pennsylvania‟s commitment to the
Lincoln administration‟s war policies. With their burgeoning political power,
Copperheads looked to wrest control of the party machinery, unite with war-weary
Moderates, and oust War Democrats from the party ranks. If successful at the polls, the
Peace Democracy would install an antiwar governor who could use his influence to bring
the Lincoln administration to heel and encourage the immediate cessation of hostilities.
All signs pointed to a continued Peace Democratic resurgence and the election of a
1
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Copperhead as governor. But a concerted Republican effort to unite against the forces of
antiwar conservatism, combined with an auspicious change in Union military fortunes in
the latter half of 1863 resulted in the slow decline of Pennsylvania‟s Peace Democracy,
capped by a narrow, but devastating defeat during the fall election.
The high-water mark of the Peace Democracy in Pennsylvania coincided with the
arrest of the notorious Copperhead leader and Democratic congressman Clement L.
Vallandigham of Ohio, where antiwar sentiment may have been the most strident of any
Northern state. In the southern part of the state especially, large numbers of Southernborn Democrats vehemently opposed the Lincoln administration‟s war policies,
particularly emancipation. Nicknamed the “Butternut” region of Ohio, its political
champion was Vallandigham, who was a strong advocate of states‟ rights and fervently
believed that the South had the constitutional right to secede from the Union. Citing a
“reign of terror” committed by the Lincoln administration, Vallandigham decried the
“determined purpose [by Republicans] evinced to break down the ancient, customary,
and constitutional means of opposition to the political party in power.”2 His statements
were often radical and construed as disloyal by Republicans, prompting his arrest in May
1863. In an effort to wash their hands of the controversial Copperhead, government
officials exiled Vallandigham to the Confederacy from whence he boarded a steamboat to
Canada and declared himself a Democratic candidate in the upcoming gubernatorial
election in his native state. For their part, Pennsylvania‟s Peace Democrats were
outraged by the arrest and exile of the Ohioan and organized a protest at Independence
Hall in Philadelphia on June 1, 1863. There they passed resolutions that criticized the
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Lincoln administration‟s restriction of civil liberty. Moreover, the protest meeting set the
stage for the Pennsylvania Democracy‟s upcoming state party convention.
The Democratic State Convention met in Harrisburg on June 17, 1863, amid the
disorder caused by Lee‟s apparent designs to capture the state capital. In a frenzy,
citizens began constructing earthworks around Harrisburg, and Governor Andrew Gregg
Curtin called out the state militia to defend the city. On the day of the convention, the
Philadelphia Press observed that “Harrisburg is now in a condition which borders on
commotion…and [which] run[s] over with rumor and gossip.”3 With a wry sense of
humor, the same publication reported several days later that if Confederate cavalry in the
region had been more intrepid, they “might have ridden to the top of Capitol Hill and
taken part in the deliberations of the Democratic Convention.”4 Nonetheless, Democratic
leaders paid little heed to the rebel invasion during their assembly, and drew up a slate of
candidates and resolutions they deemed appropriate to restore conservative, antiwar
principles in the Keystone State. Nonetheless the delegates present doubtlessly
recognized the importance of Lee‟s invasion to the 1863 gubernatorial campaign.
Another Confederate victory, this time on Northern soil, would likely unnerve the
majority of Pennsylvanians toward the war and better the Democrats‟ chances at securing
the governor‟s seat from the Unionists. Furthermore, the outcome of the looming battle
would decide which wing of the Democratic continuum would control the party
machinery. Peace Democrats knew that another Union defeat would make their calls for
an immediate armistice irresistible.
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The resolutions adopted at the convention concerned many of the usual
grievances that had rankled most Democrats since the early months of the war. Arbitrary
arrest, suppression of the press, suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
usurpation of the Lincoln Administration by “a small faction of ultra Abolitionists” were
all denounced as at previous conventions.5 The adoption of other resolutions, however,
substantiated the fact that the War Democrats had little clout among the delegates at this
point in the war. For instance, the Pennsylvania Democracy demonstrated its sympathy
for the plight of Congressman Vallandigham, an expression that War Democrats would
certainly not have supported: “Resolved, That we heartily thank the lion-hearted
Democracy of Ohio for the manly vindication they have given to the Constitution against
the great crime committed upon it in the arrest and deportation of Clement L.
Vallandigham, and we assure them of our cordial sympathy in the great struggle they are
making for their undoubted rights.”6 Another resolution targeted the Curtin
administration‟s acquiescence to what they deemed to be the unconstitutional measures
implemented by the federal government. “[T]he plain duty of the Chief Magistrate of the
Commonwealth,” determined the delegates, “requires him to use whatever power the law
has placed in his hands to protect the State and the people from lawless outrages, come
from whatever quarter they may, and no man is fit to be Governor…who will consent to
hold his own liberties and let the people hold theirs at the mere will of the Federal
Executive.”7 Peace Democrats also exerted their influence with a resolution that
acknowledged on one hand their “profound anxiety for [the Union‟s] fate,” but on the
other, their intent to “exercise the right to consider, discuss, ascertain and urge in
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becoming terms upon the people and the constituted authorities, whatever measures will,
in our judgment, be most likely to place and keep the whole nation together under one
Federal Government.”8 The platform adopted by the Democratic convention delegates
exhibited a pronounced peace bent that demonstrated that Conditional Moderates and
Peace Democrats in Harrisburg were much more likely to work together collaboratively
during Summer 1863 than with the War wing of the Democratic continuum.
A host of state party leaders were advanced as potential candidates for the
October gubernatorial election during the state convention. No fewer than nine
Democrats received serious consideration for the party‟s nod. Notable among these were
Henry D. Foster, the defeated 1860 gubernatorial candidate; George Cass, a Pittsburgh
rail magnate; William H. Witte, a former Congressman and War Democrat; Hiester
Clymer, a state senator and Peace Democrat; and George W. Woodward, associate justice
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Also of note was General William Buel Franklin, a
career soldier with typical War Democratic principles. During Summer 1863, Franklin
found himself without a command, likely because of both his unimpressive battle record
and his close friendship with General George B. McClellan. Pennsylvania‟s War
Democrats, however, supported him for his conservative ideology and pro-war
sympathies. In a letter to his sister, Franklin wrote, “[i]f I be nominated for Gov. of Penn.
& be elected, I believe I will still have some opportunity of doing good in this war” but
would only do so “with a platform of principles which I could fully endorse & that the
prosecution of the war is the only thing that I care much about.”9 Alexander K. McClure,
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advisor to Governor Curtin, believed that Franklin‟s selection would have been “a great
opportunity for the Democrats…as it would have emphasized the attitude of the party and
relieved it of the crushing millstone of actual or apparent disloyalty that always more or
less hindered Democratic success.”10 Still, Franklin‟s political inexperience and pro-war
attitudes proved unpopular among most Democratic leaders at the nominating
convention.
Initial balloting to determine the party‟s gubernatorial candidate pitted War
Democrat William H. Witte against Peace Democrat Hiester Clymer. Through eight
ballots, neither candidate could secure sufficient votes to win. Witte‟s name was
subsequently removed from contention and replaced with that of George W. Woodward.
On the ninth ballot, Woodward defeated Clymer by a vote of seventy-five to fifty-three.
Delegate Christopher Ward recorded in his diary that although Woodward was not the
first choice of many state politicos, there was still “much enthusiasm at the nomination of
Geo. W. Woodward for Governor.”11 Also selected by acclamation among convention
delegates was Walter H. Lowrie, who served as chief justice of the state supreme court
and was up for reelection.
Woodward was generally viewed as a man of high character and ability and a
strong candidate to wrest the governorship from the Republicans. Born in Bethany,
Wayne County, Pennsylvania on March 26, 1809, Woodward came from a family of
Pennsylvania jurists. Local schools were unable to slake his intellectual appetite, so
was seriously ill and was warned by physicians that reelection to a second term in office would likely result
in the governor‟s death. Curtin advanced Franklin‟s name as a potential successor who could garner the
votes of Republicans and Democratic Unionists alike. Curtin eventually relented and sought and secured
the nomination of the Union party in August 1863.
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young George was sent to an academy at Geneva, New York, later to become Hobart
College. He left the academy when he was nineteen and began studying law. Just two
years later, in 1830, he was admitted to Luzerne County‟s bar and quickly established a
successful practice in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. For his capable services, the
community rewarded Woodward in 1836 with a seat at the state constitutional convention
that assembled the following year. There he adopted a democratizing reform by
spearheading a movement to reduce life tenures for state judges to fifteen-year
appointments.12 Less universally acceptable was Woodward‟s proposed amendment to
bar immigrants from voting or holding public office in the state. He urged delegates to
“prevent any foreigner who may arrive in the State after the 4th of July, 1841, from
acquiring the right to vote or to hold office in the commonwealth.”13 Delegates,
especially fellow Democrats, censured Woodward‟s recommendation and he quickly
rescinded it.14 More popular was Woodward‟s support for barring the state‟s free black
population from the franchise. By a wide margin, delegates passed an amendment that
ensured that only “white freemen…shall enjoy the rights of an elector.”15 Woodward‟s
established leadership during the deliberations opened up new political opportunities for
him during the antebellum years.
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By 1841, Woodward‟s rising stature helped him secure an appointment as
president judge of Pennsylvania‟s fourth judicial district, encompassing five Democraticinclined counties in the center of the state.16 Four years later, several Democrats urged
Woodward to be considered for a vacancy in the U.S. Senate. Although he acquired the
support of the Democratic nominating caucus, another rising Democrat, Simon Cameron,
sought the post as well.17 Cameron effectively attacked Woodward‟s nativist sympathies
which helped to discredit him among Democratic voters. Because of the damage to his
reputation, enough Democrats abandoned Woodward for his rival. The judge would
suffer another disappointment just months later. In December 1845, President James K.
Polk nominated Woodward to fill an opening in the U.S. Supreme Court. Polk accurately
viewed Woodward as a fellow “old time Jeffersonian” who “maintain[ed] in their full
vigor the reserved rights of the States.”18 However, Polk‟s affinity for Woodward did not
translate to senatorial approbation. Whig senators, especially, viewed Woodward as too
polarizing a figure and deemed him a “partisan judge who tended to allow his political
opinions to influence his legal decisions.”19 After his hopes for a nationally recognized
position were dashed twice, Woodward devoted himself to his law practice for the next
seven years. A new opportunity arose in 1852 when Governor William Bigler appointed
Woodward to a fifteen-year term in the state‟s supreme court, where he was recognized
among friends as one of the ablest jurists in the state. It was in this capacity that
Woodward served when he received the Democratic party‟s gubernatorial candidacy.
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Some historians have labeled Woodward a compromise candidate between the
warring factions of the War and Peace wings of the party.20 Although Woodward
received support from both wings in the convention balloting, it is not altogether apt to
consider the judge either a Conditional Moderate or a true compromise candidate. An
examination of his wartime record indicates that his ideology more closely matched that
of the Peace wing of the party. During the secession winter, Woodward was a
Breckinridge Conservative, vehemently opposed to the sectionalizing tendencies of the
Republican party. At the Independence Square rally in December 1860, Woodward
famously struck out in favor of the South‟s right to secede when he lectured that “[t]he
law of self-defense includes rights of property as well as of person and it appears to me
that there must be a time…when slaveholders may lawfully fall back on their natural
rights, and employ in defence [sic] of their property whatever means of protection they
possess or can command.”21 Furthermore, Woodward considered Southern slavery to be
“an incalculable blessing” to the North‟s prosperity as he urged his listeners to
“remember that COTTON, the product of slave labor, has been one of the indispensable
elements of all this prosperity. More – it must be an indispensible element of all our
future prosperity.”22 So radical were Woodward‟s views during the 1860-61 winter, they
were actually in line with the sentiments of the likes of Charles Ingersoll and William B.
Reed. In a letter to his close friend Jeremiah S. Black, Woodward urged the thenattorney general that “if [the Southern states] do go out [of the Union] dont [sic] let a
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blow be struck against them….Dissuade them if you can, but if you cant [sic] let them go
in peace. I wish Pennsylvania could go with them. They are our brethren.”23
Although Woodward remained out of the public eye during the early months of
the war, he managed to use his seat on the bench to thwart Republican war policy. In
October 1861, Democrats met with a series of election defeats that some charged came as
a result of fraudulent votes cast by soldiers in the field. It was alleged that some nonPennsylvania soldiers had cast ballots in the state election.24 In May 1862, the state
supreme court ruled on the case of Chase v. Miller, which called into question the
constitutionality of soldiers voting from the field. Referring to a stipulation in the state‟s
1838 constitution which directed that a voter must reside for a period of at least ten days
before the election “in the election district where he offers to vote,” Woodward and a
majority of his associates decided that this barred the soldier vote outside the state.25
Woodward, who wrote the opinion of the court, determined that “the constitution
meant…that the voter, in propria persona, should offer his vote in an appropriate election
district, in order that his neighbours [sic] might be at hand to establish his right to vote if
it were challenged, or to challenge it if it were doubtful.”26 Republicans came to regret
the court‟s decision because soldiers tended to vote increasingly and overwhelmingly for
Republican candidates as the war continued. With his controversial ruling, Woodward
had given the Democrats a decided edge in future elections by removing a crucial sector
of the Republican vote. Peace Democrats at the state convention of 1863 undoubtedly
23
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remembered this and acknowledged Woodward‟s worthiness for the gubernatorial
candidacy.
Nevertheless, War Democrats could have found cause to support Woodward
during the balloting. If his loyalty was in question, the judge could point to two of his
five sons who enthusiastically joined the Union army in the opening days of the war.
Woodward‟s oldest son, Stanley, abandoned for a time the legal profession and took up
arms with the Third Pennsylvania and later the Forty-First Pennsylvania Volunteer
Infantry, attaining the rank of captain in the latter regiment. Among other engagements,
Stanley participated in the Antietam and Gettysburg Campaigns but emerged unscathed.27
Another son, George Abisha Woodward, joined the Second Pennsylvania Infantry. In
June 1862, he was severely wounded in combat, was captured, and sent to Libby Prison
in Richmond, Virginia. After his release, the younger Woodward returned to
Philadelphia and was cared for by his father. George Abisha recalled that during his
convalescence, his father supported the preservation of the Union but at times openly
criticized the war effort and even advocated a six-month truce, in which time the North
might seek a peace with the Confederacy.28 War Democrats were also likely attracted to
Woodward‟s personal funding for the equipping of a volunteer infantry company at the
beginning of the war. Nonetheless, Woodward‟s pro-secessionist and pro-slavery
comments, anti-Lincoln sentiments, and obstructionist judicial rulings more closely
identify him with the Peace wing of the party and refute the dubious contention that he
served as a moderate, compromise candidate. As historian Arnold Shankman definitively
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notes, “Woodward was a Copperhead. He shared the peace Democrats‟ antipathy toward
greenback currency, arbitrary arrests, the denial of the writ of habeas corpus, the
suppression of antiadministration newspapers and a federal conscription act. He hoped
that enough war critics would be elected to state and national offices to force the Lincoln
administration to reevaluate its military position.”29 Furthermore, Woodward‟s selection
by the convention delegates affirms the argument that the Peace Democracy, with the
support of war-weary Moderates, had firm control of state politics prior to the Battle of
Gettysburg. These Democrats speculated that enough of Pennsylvania‟s voters were
similarly disillusioned by the war to obviate the need for a conservative Unionist
candidate like William B. Franklin. As Erwin Stanley Bradley explains, Woodward‟s
“nomination was a deliberate move by the Democratic Party to avoid selection of a man
likely to be accepted by Unionists as a coalition candidate, and was proof of the party‟s
confidence in its ability to capture the gubernatorial prize without the aid of the War
Democrats.”30 Success likely would have been forthcoming for the Peace Democrats had
the fortunes of the Union armies not improved.
*

*

*

*

For pro-war Unionists, the June-July 1863 Confederate invasion was the most
discouraging incident in a long series of unfortunate events for the Northern cause. The
eastern-based Army of the Potomac had been thwarted again by Lee‟s Army of Northern
Virginia at Chancellorsville in May, while General Ulysses S. Grant had become bogged
down outside the city of Vicksburg, the Confederacy‟s Mississippi River citadel. On
June 29, just two days before the Battle of Gettysburg commenced, Sidney George Fisher
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logged in his diary that Philadelphia‟s “streets presented a strange aspect….There was no
excitement. The same street presented a very different scene in April 1861 when the war
broke out….War was a novelty then; it is an old story now, and the demagogues have
spread abroad the opinion that the administration is corrupt & imbecile, that it is
impossible to conquer the South & that we ought to have peace now on any terms.”31
Directly in the path of the invasion, Cassandra Morris Small of York wrote a letter to a
friend on July 8 concerning the prevalence of Copperheads in her community who
mingled freely with the marauding rebel soldiers:
I would be ashamed to tell you…[that] there are some who call themselves ladies,
who went out to see [the Confederates] there, and entertained them, but they are
sorry already, I guess – no one will visit them any more, they must form a party
among themselves – a distinct line is drawn [between Unionists and
Copperheads]. The Rebels, themselves spoke of them to some of our townsmen
and said…that „friends in an enemy‟s country are worse than traitors.‟ They said
they held them in supreme contempt.32
Unionists‟ aversion to the Peace Democrats during the Gettysburg Campaign was
centered on the notion that Copperhead subversion would only encourage the
Confederates to pursue independence with greater resolve. As Fisher explained,
Copperheads “are evidence of a divided North. Division is weakness and our weakness
is strength for the enemy.”33 This logic proved well-founded, as Lee himself recognized
the benefits of the Peace Democrats‟ obstructionism to the Southern cause. In a letter to
Confederate President Jefferson Davis, Lee wrote on June 25 that “the peace party at the
North” would “tend to repress the war feeling in the Federal States [and] will inure to our
benefit. I do not know that we can do anything to promote the pacific feeling, but our
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course ought to be so shaped as not to discourage it.”34 By Summer 1863, Peace
Democrats were prevalent enough to serve as a dangerous counterpoise to Pennsylvania‟s
Unionist sentiments both in politics and on the home front.
The threat of Lee‟s invasion on Pennsylvania soil did engender a degree of
renewed war enthusiasm among citizens of all political stripes, particularly along the
southern tier counties targeted by rebel raids. Fresh off his failed bid to secure the
Democratic gubernatorial candidacy, War Democrat William B. Franklin returned to his
hometown of York to urge enlistments to thwart the Confederate invasion. Franklin
penned an article featured in the June 23 York Gazette entitled “The Crisis – An Appeal:
A few practical reasons why the People of the Border Counties of Pennsylvania should
respond to the last call of the President for Volunteers.” He warned his fellow
Pennsylvanians that the Confederates “will destroy your property, will take away all
feeling of self-respect from you, will degrade your country, and if allowed to proceed will
make you objects of contempt & scorn to your own country and to the rest of the
world.”35 But Franklin also offered criticism of the Curtin and Lincoln administrations
by encouraging able-bodied men to “[r]epair to Harrisburg and offer yourselves in
compliance with the call of the President & your Governor, and should it afterwards
appear this attempt at invasion has been caused by those in authority to whom you have
committed the direction of affairs, you have the power of constitutionally hurling them
from the places which they have degraded, to the ignominy they will deserve.”36
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The Battle of Gettysburg, fought July 1 – 3, 1863, ended with the Army of the
Potomac‟s most stirring victory of the war. General George G. Meade, a Pennsylvaniaraised War Democrat, turned aside Lee‟s last major Northern invasion of the war with
devastating losses for the Confederacy. On Independence Day, Ulysses S. Grant finally
forced the surrender of Confederate troops at Vicksburg, opening the entirety of the
Mississippi River to Union forces. Just as the Confederacy reached its “high-water
mark” at Gettysburg just before Pickett‟s Charge, that point should also be considered the
high-water mark of Pennsylvania‟s Peace Democracy. Gettysburg and Vicksburg
demonstrated to many Northerners that the Lincoln administration‟s prosecution of the
war was finally bearing fruit and that the South could be militarily suppressed.
Contemporaries agreed that these events decided the 1863 gubernatorial campaign.
Republican Alexander K. McClure speculated that:
Had Lee‟s campaign in Pennsylvania been crowned with any important measure
of success it would have been accepted very generally in the North that the war
was likely to be indefinitely continued, with none able to foretell the final result
with any degree of certainty; but when, on the Fourth of July, 1863, General
Meade announced the retreat of Lee‟s army, and General Grant announced the
surrender of Vicksburg, the confidence of the loyal people of the country was
greatly strengthened, and the feeling was very general that the military power of
the Rebellion was broken, assuring the overthrow of the Confederacy.37
Woodward and his supporters fought on, however, and campaigned strenuously in their
bid to reestablish Democratic dominance in the state and begin a concerted effort to bring
immediate peace to the nation.
*

*

*

*

When the Democratic State Convention selected George W. Woodward as their
gubernatorial candidate, Woodward was not present. Apparently confident that he would
37
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not be chosen, the judge had left his Philadelphia home on a fishing trip. Nonetheless,
Woodward was aware of the interest some Democrats harbored for his nomination. Just
weeks before the convention, he wrote his friend and fellow Democrat, Lewis S. Coryell,
that he did not actively seek the nomination. “I have done nothing,” Woodward insisted,
“to attract public attention to myself – have rather discouraged friends from naming me.
My tastes are more judicial than executive.”38 Nonetheless, if called upon he felt dutybound to serve. “Whilst I do not seek the nomination I will not decline it,” he
determined.39 After two years of bloodshed and the further decline of Democratic
conservatism at the hands of Republican war policy, Woodward‟s convictions of limited
government and strict constitutional interpretation only hardened. He urged that a
candidate be chosen that would “stand by the few state rights that are left” and
“administer the constitution & laws as they are written.”40 If chosen as the Democratic
gubernatorial candidate, he hoped he could govern “constitution loving citizens whose
hearts were large enough to embrace the whole country, and whose heads were clear
enough to see that a centralized despotism would be the death of popular liberty.”41
After securing the Democratic candidacy, Woodward refused to resign from the
state supreme court which made it easier for him to remain detached from the frenzy of
political campaigning.42 Throughout the summer and fall campaign season, Woodward
would occasionally attend rallies, but rarely spoke to the crowds and never addressed the
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major issues of the day. There were several reasons he adopted this strategy. First,
Woodward firmly believed that active political campaigning and discussing issues of
partisan politics was beneath the dignity of his office. To a crowd of supporters,
Woodward explained that “I am one of those who think that the judicial office should be
held aloft above all partisan passions and appeals….If I should be elected your Governor,
it will then become my duty to discuss these questions, and I promise you it shall be done
at the proper time with great plainness of speech.”43 Unsurprisingly, Republican
partisans assailed his attempts to mix his judicial principles with executive ambition.
“We have great respect for our Supreme Court,” asserted the Philadelphia Press, “and we
are sorry to see one of its members aiding to drag its sacred ermine in the turbid waters of
politics. Let him retain his self-respect and retire from the bench, or decline the
nomination for Governor.”44 Second, Woodward was recognized as an able speechwriter but a colorless orator whose dispassionate manner inspired few. Instead, he relied
on friends like Jeremiah Black and other Democratic leaders like William Bigler and
William B. Reed to provide electrifying speeches to galvanize the antiwar base. Lastly,
and perhaps most revealing, was that Woodward recognized that silence would best
disguise his peace sentiments. To win the election, the party needed the support of the
War Democratic wing. If Woodward spoke plainly about his true convictions, he would
likely alienate this segment of the party. “Woodward was…a man of integrity, and it
would be difficult for him to talk about the war and disguise his peace sympathies.”45
Woodward shrewdly realized that silence would garner him the greatest number of
supporters without corrupting his Copperhead views.
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Because of his self-imposed silence, Woodward was dependent upon friends and
state political leaders to campaign for him. Another example of the campaign‟s peaceinclined bent are the identities of Woodward‟s strongest supporters and the substance of
their speeches. Among those who spoke on behalf of Woodward were two prominent
Peace Democrats, Hiester Clymer and William B. Reed. At a rally in Somerset on
August 24, 1863, Clymer announced that “if Woodward and Vallandigham were elected
Governors of Pennsylvania and Ohio, they, with [Governor Horatio] Seymour of New
York, and [Governor Joel] Parker of New Jersey, would unite in calling from the army
the troops from their respective States, for the purpose of compelling the [Lincoln]
Administration to invite a convention of the States to adjust our difficulties.”46 Although
the likelihood of any such recall may have been slim, Clymer‟s pronouncement was
radically obstructionist. Reed resumed his defeatist tone in a speech delivered at
Meadville on September 17. Although he claimed he had “no wish of [Pennsylvania]
being other than she was before this terrible convulsion came upon us – the keystone of
the great arch,” Reed also averred “that if, in the dread dispensation of
Providence….Pennsylvania, still a sovereign Commonwealth, still an organized
community, shall have power to stand by itself or to seek new companionship.”47
Because of Woodward‟s campaign reticence and dearth of personal papers, it is
impossible to determine if Woodward‟s own ideology and plans for a potential
governorship matched the desires of Peace Democrats like Clymer and Reed. However,
his past statements and judicial actions likely indicate some affinity for their proposals.
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Pennsylvania‟s Conditional Moderates also supported Woodward‟s bid for the
governorship and spoke on behalf of the judge at rallies held across the Commonwealth.
Chief among these were William Bigler and Jeremiah Black. The content of these
politicos‟ speeches indicate the shifting nature of what it meant to be a Moderate in 1863.
Although Moderates were erstwhile supporters of Lincoln‟s war policy in 1861,
continued war casualties, civil liberty suppression, and preliminary calls for Negro
participation in the military and at the polls effected a change among these Democrats.
Increasingly, their ideological commitments sounded like those of the Peace wing of the
party. At a Democratic meeting in Erie on October 6, Bigler proposed that the sectional
strife should be “referred to impartial parties to be adjusted.” Bigler further
recommended that:
An umpire should be selected….The reference I propose is to displace the radicals
of both sections [that is, abolitionists in the North and secessionists in the South],
and put the country in the hands of conservative men, who will seek only the reestablishment of the Union, and not the gratification of passion, prejudice and
hate. Our part in this work will be to displace the Administration of Mr. Lincoln,
and put in its stead one composed of men representing the conservative people of
the North, and against whom less prejudice is cherished in the South; which result
would undoubtedly be followed by the prompt overthrow of [Confederate
President Jefferson] Davis and his adherents.48
Woodward personally sought out the aid of Jeremiah Black and asked his friend
and fellow jurist, “[n]ow can‟t you convince the people of Penna. that no traitor blood
lurks in my veins? I rather think that they are the last people I shall prove unfaithful to.
Indeed I do not know to whom I would sell them if I was bent on a bargain.”49 Black
responded with a ringing endorsement which resonated with a crowd of Democratic
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supporters at a rally in Lancaster. The ex-Attorney General advocated the election of
Woodward “the Union Saver” who would do everything he could to “bring back the
Union to the condition in which it was three years ago.”50 Appealing to the racism of the
era, Black thought there was “something radically and fatally wrong in a war which has
for its object a negro proclamation inconsistent with the white man‟s constitution.”51 If
Woodward were elevated to the governorship, Black assured that “the reign of order and
law” would return to country.52 Woodward, pleased with the confirmation of his loyalty,
thanked his friend for the “noble speech” and applauded its “forceful and beautiful”
expression.53 Thus, during the campaign season, Peace Democrats and Conditional
Moderates worked together to effect the restoration of an antiwar conservative to the
governor‟s seat.
For their part, Republican-Unionists concurrently touted the solid record of their
incumbent candidate, Andrew Gregg Curtin, and smeared the reputation of George
Woodward. At the Union State Convention, held in August 1863, Curtin was nominated
overwhelmingly on the first ballot. Likely aiming at Woodward, the Republican
delegates adopted resolutions “denouncing the traitors abroad and the sympathizers at
home [and] commending the course of President Lincoln.”54 Republican reaction to the
re-nomination was overwhelmingly positive. “The people of this State love ANDREW
G. CURTIN,” proclaimed the Philadelphia Press, “and their representatives, in
convention assembled, gave expression to their love and confidence by giving him the
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gubernatorial nomination.”55 The Harrisburg Evening Telegraph advocated Curtin as
“the choice of the loyal men of Pennsylvania” and the candidate who would prevent
Pennsylvania to fall “under the control of traitors to their country and God.”56 In his first
term, Curtin had endeared himself to pro-war Pennsylvanians for supporting measures to
equip soldiers in the field and had been active in preparing a defense against Confederate
invasions of the state. Besides running a strong candidate for governor, Unionists
believed they had in Woodward an opponent susceptible to charges of disloyalty.
The Unionists were quick to dig up dirt on Justice Woodward and resurrected his
Independence Square speech to further their charges of Democratic subversion. A
Republican pamphleteer excoriated the Copperhead for his radically states‟ rights view
and grew incensed that Woodward “dared to go further. [He] affirmed that this alleged
„right‟ [to secede] might be vindicated or supported, not merely according to the laws of
war…but by „whatever means they (the South) possess or can command.‟”57 In this
instance, Woodward‟s strategy to remain silent backfired. Because Woodward “ha[d] not
deigned to speak” throughout the campaign, Forney‟s Press presumed that the
Copperhead views advanced in the Independence Square speech still formed his
principles since he had “allowed these great years to pass without exhibiting regret or
emotion for his country.”58 Republican Congressman Thaddeus Stevens of Adams
County assailed that “Woodward pronounces the course of the rebels just; and says they
are right in defending their property, and the „Heaven Ordained‟ institution of human
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bondage. Can mortal infamy be blacker?”59 Stevens further urged his constituents to “let
them [Copperhead office-seekers] never again be permitted to disgrace the commission
of their country.”60 Republican campaigners admonished those who approved of
Woodward‟s calls for peace simply because they were “tired and wearied with the
sacrifices and privations of the war….But unfortunately the Devil is never so dangerous
as when he is robed as „an angel of light.‟”61
Representative of the fears the Lincoln administration held for a Woodward
victory are a number of missives and diary entries of the President and his cabinet
members. Because Pennsylvania contributed so many troops and so much matériel to the
war effort, it was in the best interest of the administration to keep the state in Republican
hands. When asked by a Pennsylvania politician in August 1863 who was the best
candidate to support in the gubernatorial election, Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase
replied “that there seemed to me but one course to be taken, and that was to give a hearty
support to the re-election of Gov. Curtin.”62 Chase foresaw the importance of the
Pennsylvania election to the outcome of Lincoln‟s success during the presidential
election to be held the following year. In September, he warned Republican financier Jay
Cooke that “Gov. Curtin‟s reelection or defeat is now the success or defeat of the
administration of President Lincoln.”63 As Election Day approached, Navy Secretary
Gideon Welles commented that among the cabinet members “the elections in Ohio and
Pennsylvania absorb attention.” Although Welles asserted that, “no doubts have troubled
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me [as to the results],” he admitted that “the President says he feels nervous.”64 Indeed,
Lincoln must have worried about the outcome of the election and the dangers of a
Woodward victory. Just days before the election, Lincoln permitted Secretary of War
Stanton to furlough thousands of Pennsylvania soldiers from the field so they could
return home to vote. Surely, the president must have noted the irony that it was
Woodward‟s 1862 ruling against soldier voting in the field that forced their release from
the Federal armies. Temporarily weakening the army, however, was a risk Lincoln was
willing to take.65 The president recognized that Federal soldiers made up the most
trustworthy segment of Republican support.
Democratic campaigners, meanwhile, were surprisingly successful in deflecting
much of the criticism hurled Woodward‟s way by the Curtin camp. Republicans
resurrected Woodward‟s unpopular stand against immigrant voting rights. In reference to
his role in the constitutional convention of 1838, Congressman Stevens remarked that
Woodward “once attempted to deprive foreigners forever of the right to vote and hold
office; and now he asks their votes; and they are mean enough to give them. Could either
find deeper degradation?”66 This tactic backfired, however, as Governor Curtin himself
had been a member of the Know-Nothing Party in the 1850s.67 “Surely Gov. Curtin‟s
friends cannot hope that citizens of foreign birth have forgotten these recent facts,”
insisted the pro-Woodward Patriot and Union, “or believe that they can be so utterly lost

64

Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles: Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson, vol. 1
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911), 469.
65
Democrats were quick to attack Lincoln‟s furlough scheme as a dangerous ploy that would threaten
the safety of the soldiers remaining in the undermanned armies. As November was not a typically
auspicious month for battle, however, the risk was minimal.
66
Palmer and Ochoa, Papers of Stevens, 408. During the war, most European immigrants still adhered
to the Democratic Party.
67
The Know-Nothing Party was a nativist political movement of the 1850s that aimed to curb
immigration and reduce immigrant voting rights.

121

to self-respect as to vote for a candidate who assisted in marshaling the bigoted host that
a few short years ago sought their disfranchisement and abasement.”68 Democrats also
charged that Curtin had once jested that “the reason a Dutchman‟s head was so hard was
because he had two skulls.”69 Republicans thus pursued another course and revived
Woodward‟s 1860 Independence Square speech. From the speech they ridiculed
Woodward‟s belief in a biblical sanction for slavery. This tactic also failed because of
the persistent racism and continued unpopularity of Lincoln‟s policy of emancipation
among many Pennsylvania voters.
Woodward supporters continued to lament the arbitrary suppression of civil
liberties by the Lincoln administration. Fearful of the centralization of the federal
government, The Old Guard periodical promised its readers that impediments to “life,
liberty, and property of the citizen of a State” would be “heresies to which Judge
Woodward will never assent.”70 The Democratic State Committee agreed that the
election of Woodward was a necessary act toward reestablishing the nation as it was
before the war. “The overthrow of the Abolitionists at the polls,” asserted the Democrats,
“and the re-establishment of constitutional principles of the North is the first, the
indispensable step towards the restoration of the Union and the vindication of civil
liberty.”71 As election day approached, Woodward received an endorsement from an
unlikely source. General George B. McClellan, the deposed, but popular commander of
the Army of the Potomac, indicated his support for the Pennsylvania judge. After having
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had a “full conversation” with Woodward, McClellan discovered that “our views agreed.
I regard his election as Governor of Pennsylvania as called for by the interest of the
nation….I would, were it in my power, give to Judge Woodward my voice and vote.”72
State election day fell on Tuesday, October 13, 1863. Whatever gains Democrats
appeared to make during the course of their campaign, Republicans remained confident.
On that day, I. Wayne MacVeagh, now chairman of the Pennsylvania Union Committee,
reported to a nervous Lincoln, that “Woodward cannot harm us much now” and that
“everything [was] most cheering.”73 In the end, Republicans had much to be cheerful
about. By a slim margin, Governor Andrew G. Curtin was reelected for a second term.
Woodward lost the election by just 15,335 votes, 51.5% to 48.5%. The importance of the
Republican victory was acknowledged most at the White House. After hearing the good
news, Navy Secretary Welles “stopped in to see and congratulate the President, who is in
good spirits and greatly relieved from the depression of yesterday. He told me he had
more anxiety in regard to the election results…than he had in 1860 when he was
chosen.”74 The magnitude of the election was also evident by the sheer number of
Pennsylvanians who cast ballots. The total vote for the gubernatorial contest totaled
523,679, the largest number of votes cast in the history of the state to that time.75 The
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1863 election turnout was nine percent higher than the 1860 presidential election.76
Voters of both ideologies recognized the significance of their candidates‟ potential
governorship and the fate of the war effort. The election was a close, but explicit
referendum approving the Republican party‟s policies.77 Noted Civil War lawyer and
diarist George Templeton Strong recorded what many in the nation realized after
Woodward‟s defeat: “The tail of the national Copperhead is out of joint.”78
Although the Peace Democratic resurgence definitively declined after
Woodward‟s unsuccessful bid for governor, the judge had made a major impact on
Pennsylvania Civil War politics. Two important conclusions can be determined from the
1863 gubernatorial campaign. First, Woodward proved to be a more effective and
acceptable Copperhead than his Ohio counterpart, Clement L. Vallandigham. The same
day that Pennsylvania voters narrowly rejected Woodward for Curtin, Vallandigham lost
his gubernatorial campaign in a landslide to incumbent Governor David Brough. In that
election, Vallandigham lost by a margin of about 100,000 votes.79 A comparison of the
election results shows that Woodward was far more successful in advancing the
principles of Copperheadism than the Ohioan. Although both men represented the same
ideology, Woodward managed to appeal to a broader constituency. Therefore,
Woodward was the more dangerous Copperhead to the Lincoln administration and the
continuation of Republican war policy.

76

The election statistics were derived from Davis, “Pennsylvania Politics,” 313. The vote tally for
Curtin was 269,506. Woodward garnered 254,171 votes. The majority for Curtin in 1863 (15,335) was
about halved from that of 1860 (32,116).
77
Elections in the state legislature also boded ill for the Democrats. After the 1862 election, Democrats
held a slim 67-66 majority in joint session of both assemblies. After the 1863 election, however, Unionists
held a 68-65 majority.
78
Allan Nevins and Milton Halsey Thomas, eds., The Diary of George Templeton Strong: The Civil
War, 1860 – 1865 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1952), 364.
79
Klement, Limits of Dissent, 252.

124

Second, the gubernatorial campaign indicated that a strong peace sentiment
pervaded the Pennsylvania Democracy in 1863. Peace Democrats continued to advocate
radical measures to obstruct the Lincoln administration‟s war policy, some still going so
far as to encourage the peaceful separation of the Union. Moderates meanwhile grew
even cooler toward the war because of its high cost and the prospect of sweeping social
change. These Moderates who had once supported limited war aims to suppress the
rebellion now joined with Peace Democrats in a bid to end the war through armistice and
a national convention of the states. Although they remained devoted to the preservation
of the Union, their perseverance to support a war that wrought radical change
substantially waned. War Democrats, meanwhile, had little place in the 1863
Democracy. Few were fooled into thinking that George W. Woodward represented their
views and most sought refuge amid the pro-war Unionists who helped give Andrew G.
Curtin the margin of victory in the gubernatorial election. The defeat of Woodward in
October 1863 tolled the death knell of the Peace Democrats‟ influence over the state
party machinery. Although they would continue to agitate for immediate peace through
the duration of the war, their views no longer attracted most conservatives who
increasingly saw the war as winnable and the threat of social change less disturbing than
the destruction of the Union.
*

*

*

*

After their loss in the 1863 gubernatorial election, Pennsylvania Democrats
complained that Curtin had won the election through “grossly unfair means.”80 Although
there were reports of Unionists intimidating voters and casting multiple ballots,
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Democrats committed similar incidents of fraud.81 Voting schemes by both parties
seemed to counteract each other and ultimately Curtin‟s win was legitimate. Incidentally,
the fall election had proved inauspicious for the other major Democratic candidate on the
ballot, Chief Justice Walter Lowrie. Defeated for reelection by Republican Daniel
Agnew, Lowrie‟s seat ironically was filled by Woodward by virtue of his seniority on the
bench. In a desperate gambit to obstruct Republican war policy before the expiration of
Lowrie‟s term, Woodward, Lowrie, and a third conservative associate on the bench,
Justice James Thompson, aimed to rule on the contentious issue of conscription in the
case Kneedler v. Lane.82
Because voluntary enlistments in the army had declined precipitously in 1862 and
1863, Congress responded with the Conscription Act of March 3, 1863. The act provided
for the compilation of names of men eligible for the draft by a provost marshal and his
enrollment officers who would supervise conscription in each congressional district. A
draftee would be given ten days‟ notice in which time he could attempt to pay a $300
commutation fee or hire a substitute to serve in his stead. Otherwise, the draftee would
be subject to imprisonment and fine.83 Drafts would be held at the president‟s behest, the
first of which occurred in July 1863.84 Pennsylvania Democrats quickly censured the act
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as unconstitutional and viewed it as evidence of the despotic nature of Republican war
policy. The court case that arose from the conscription act pitted Provost Marshal David
M. Lane against conscript Henry S. Kneedler.85 Justice Woodward fixed September 23,
1863 as the date for the case to be heard by the full court. Counsel for the aggrieved
conscripts included leading Philadelphia Peace Democrats, including George M. Wharton
and Charles Ingersoll. However, when the case was called there was no counsel for the
defendants. This was likely a Republican ploy to depoliticize the issue in the weeks
before the crucial October elections as well as a show of “aggressive hostility to such
interference by the State judicial authority to obstruct the execution of a National law.”86
Consequently, the case was pushed back until November 9, at which point it was known
that the state court‟s political composition would favor the Republicans after the
expiration of Lowrie‟s term.
Despite Lowrie‟s defeat during the October election, he and his conservative
associates aimed to assert their peace sentiments in a last-ditch effort before the chief
justice‟s ouster from the bench. In a 3-2 decision, Lowrie, Woodward, and Thompson
ruled against the constitutionality of the conscription act. Woodward‟s opinion argued
that “[t]he great vice of the conscript law is that it is designed on the assumption that
Congress may take away, not the State rights of the citizen, but the security and
foundation of his State rights, and how long is civil liberty expected to last after the
securities of civil liberty are destroyed?”87 The decision proved short-lived. After Daniel
Agnew replaced Chief Justice Lowrie on the bench, the court took up the case again in an
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effort to remove the court injunctions placed on state conscription. On January 16, 1864,
the court ruled in a 3-2 decision to uphold the constitutionality of the conscription act. In
his dissenting opinion, Woodward asserted that the November hearing had resulted in “as
regular, fair and solemn a judgment as this court ever rendered” and insisted that the
previous verdict could not be altered despite the change in the court‟s composition.88
Nonetheless, conscription continued in the state despite desperate Peace Democratic
attempts to subvert a crucial aspect of Republican war policy. The Republican victory
over antiwar forces during the October election clearly had far-reaching implications,
including on Pennsylvania‟s most conservative branch of government.
*

*

*

*

The Pennsylvania Peace Democracy‟s best chance to assert its principles came
amid the 1863 gubernatorial campaign. Although few Copperhead subversives like
Ingersoll and Reed occupied state office during the war, their views were adopted by
Moderates in Harrisburg who increasingly favored the implementation of an armistice
and a convention of the states to bring about a reunion based solely on the supremacy of
the Constitution, not acknowledgement of emancipation. Peace Democrats managed to
have nominated George W. Woodward, one whose antiwar sympathies were evident.
Although the Peace Democrats‟ views were shared by a significant number of the
electorate prior to July 1863, major Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg
compelled Pennsylvanians to acknowledge that the war‟s end was at long last in sight and
promoted a renewed spirit of patriotism among disillusioned Unionists. The sudden
change in military fortunes came at the height of the Copperheads‟ power and severely
tested the validity of their antiwar sentiments. For the rest of the gubernatorial campaign,
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Democrats were left defending their candidate against charges of disloyalty and
advocating an increasingly less accurate assertion that the war was unwinnable. On state
election day, Republicans and War Democrats gave incumbent Governor Andrew G.
Curtin a slim majority, effectively quashing Copperheadism for the rest of the war.
Nonetheless, Moderate Democrats continued to function capably and would persist in
their efforts to unseat Republican office holders, particularly in the crucial presidential
election to be held the following year. Although the Peace Democracy had met been
mortally wounded in the aftermath of the 1863 gubernatorial election, conservatives
would again rally around Moderate leaders in months to come.
On January 19, 1864, Andrew Curtin delivered his second inaugural address. “I
need hardly renew my pledge,” the governor announced, “that during the term of office
on which I am about to enter, I will give my whole moral and official power to the
prosecution of the war, and in aiding the National Government in every effort to secure
early and complete success over our malignant foes.”89 Curtin viewed his October
election victory as a referendum on the war and intended to devote the men and resources
of his state to the federal government‟s prosecution of the war, whatever the cost in
casualties or social change. Pennsylvania‟s Unionists had succeeded in keeping the state
firmly within the Republican fold in 1863. However, none of this would matter should
Lincoln be ousted from the White House. Democrats subsequently looked to the
crucially important presidential election of November 1864 for redemption and the last
means by which to end the war, reinstate conservative traditions, and restore the Union to
the antebellum status quo.
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Chapter 5: The War Democracy’s Final Campaign, Spring 1864 – Spring 1865
The vituperative Copperhead editor of the Selinsgrove Times printed a
denunciation of President Abraham Lincoln in the weeks after the devastating
Democratic losses in the October 1863 gubernatorial election. “He is hell‟s Pandora box
brought to earth,” derided Franklin Weirick. “He is a liar, a thief, a robber, a brigand, a
pirate, a perjurer, a traitor, a coward, a hypocrite, a cheat, a trickster, a murderer, a tyrant,
an unmitigated scoundrel, and an infernal fool.”1 Philadelphia‟s Democratic organ, the
Age, circulated a similar opinion: “If the rebels, for firing at the flag, deserve to be
devastated by war, what punishment should be visited upon the President for firing into
the Constitution?”2 In a stunning show of subversive harangues, the Greensburg Argus
declared that Lincoln‟s “defeat or his death is an indispensable condition to an honorable
peace,” and called on Pennsylvanians to “suspend Old Abe – by the neck if necessary to
stop the accursed slaughter of our citizens.”3 Although the gubernatorial election of 1863
had been a demoralizing defeat for the Democracy, party members worked assiduously in
1864 to cohere around what would be the last and most important campaign of the Civil
War. The 1864 presidential election determined if Lincoln would retain the White House
or if General George B. McClellan would overthrow Republican war policy with the
Democracy‟s calls for peace and a return to the antebellum status quo. During the final
year of the conflict, the War Democracy reemerged to lead the party. Although this
segment of the Democracy received at least the tacit support of Moderates and Peace
Democrats, renewed Union victories and the disparate nature of party member ideologies
1
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obviated victory at the polls. The result would be the simultaneous dissolution of the
Southern rebellion and that of the Democratic wartime continuum.
Although Pennsylvania Democrats failed to take control of state politics through
the first three years of the war, they recognized that the installation of a Democrat in the
White House would compensate for past electoral losses and bring conservative
leadership to the most important office in the land. A Democratic victory in the
presidential election of 1864 thus could bring the desired end to the war despite the
preponderance of Republican state officials. Unfortunately for conservatives, the
divisiveness among party members was then at its most extreme. Leaders of the
Commonwealth‟s Democracy recognized the difficulty in reconciling their vast
ideological differences ahead of the presidential campaign. Peace sentiment, which had
influenced the tenor of the gubernatorial campaign, had been repudiated by the
Pennsylvania electorate in 1863 thanks to a reversal in Union military misfortunes and a
subsequent patriotic resurgence. Although Peace Democrats consequently found
themselves hamstrung within the party in 1864, they remained a veritable force even
while War Democrats gradually regained control of the Democracy. Alienation of either
wing of the party would spell disaster in the polls, as all Democrats were needed to
competitively challenge the Republicans, particularly to unseat the Lincoln
administration in the November election. Former president James Buchanan, who
remained withdrawn from active political debate throughout the war, nonetheless
weighed in on his party‟s status early in the year. A proslavery War Democrat, Buchanan
acknowledged the challenges the party faced in unifying the broad party continuum ahead
of the presidential campaign:
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So far as I can learn and observe, there will be very great difficulty in erecting a
platform on which the party can unite. It now embraces all shades of opinion,
from the prosecution of the war with as much vigor as the Republicans,
notwithstanding the violations of the Constitution, down to peace [with the
Confederate government], which means neither more nor less than recognition. I
say that this means recognition, because I entertain not the least idea that the
South would return to the Union, if we were to offer to restore them with all the
rights which belonged to them, as expounded by the Supreme Court, at the time of
their secession. Besides, I regret to say, many good Democrats in Pennsylvania
begin to be inoculated with abolition principles.4
Buchanan‟s reflections indicate the intense ideological divergence in 1864 between the
War and Peace Democratic elements of the party and the difficulty of merging their
conflicting war policy views around a presidential candidate acceptable to all. Rather
glumly, Buchanan predicted that “[f]rom present appearances, Mr. Lincoln will be reelected, unless some Republican Military Chieftain should supply his place, or our
[nation‟s] finances should break down.”5 In fact, Democrats were nearly awarded an
unexpected gift from their opponents, as Lincoln‟s re-nomination hardly proved assured.
*

*

*

*

Within his own party, Abraham Lincoln was harassed with criticisms of
ineffective leadership that threatened his reelection bid. In December 1863, Lincoln
issued his Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction which declared that a “full
pardon…with restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves” would be granted
to those rebels who took a loyalty oath.6 Furthermore, the proclamation announced that
any rebellious state where one-tenth of voters took the loyalty oath could “re-establish a
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State government” and “such shall be recognized as the true government of the State.”7
Radicals disapproved of Lincoln‟s lenient reconstruction plan and in coming months
advanced candidates amenable to a more rigorous prosecution of the war. In February
1864, a campaign to promote the candidacy of Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase
climaxed with the issuance of the so-called “Pomeroy Circular.” As an opponent of
Lincoln‟s cautious policies toward the South and slavery, Chase was promoted by
radicals as a Republican who possessed “more of the qualities needed in a President
during the next four years, than are combined in any other available candidate.”8 But
when the circular was leaked to the press, an anti-Chase backlash ensued that galvanized
support for Lincoln. On May 31, another group of disaffected radicals organized a
convention in Cleveland under the banner of the “Radical Democracy” with intent to
nominate the 1856 Republican presidential candidate, John C. Frémont. Delegates there
protested the “imbecile and vacillating policy of the present Administration in the
conduct of the war.”9 Although the convention ignominiously fizzled, it indicated some
lack of enthusiasm by Republicans for Lincoln.10
Lincoln‟s re-nomination and presidential campaigns were also hampered by
limited Union military progress during the spring and summer. General Ulysses S. Grant,
who had performed admirably in the Western Theater, was recalled to the East in March
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where he was designated general-in-chief of all Union armies. Grant initiated a complex
strategy in which five Union armies would press the Confederates simultaneously in
various parts of the South to effect the destruction of the rebel armies. For the first
several months after Grant‟s strategy commenced, none of the Union armies met with
success. In Louisiana, General Nathaniel Banks‟s Army of the Gulf was turned aside in
the so-called Red River Campaign of March – May 1864. In Virginia, armies
commanded by Generals Franz Sigel and Benjamin Butler met with humiliating defeats
in May in the Shenandoah Valley and the Virginia Peninsula, respectively. General
William T. Sherman‟s army in Georgia made significant headway in its pursuit to capture
Atlanta until the costly June 27 battle at Kennesaw Mountain which led to a siege of the
city and an effective stalemate that lasted several weeks. Grant, who oversaw the
operations of General George G. Meade‟s Army of the Potomac, suffered shocking
casualties at the Wilderness (May 5 – 7), Spotsylvania Court House (May 8 – 21), and
Cold Harbor (May 31 – June 12). Added to the war disillusionment among conservative
Northern civilians was the growing use of African-American soldiers. Although soldiers
of the United States Colored Troops (USCT) performed commendably throughout the
war, anti-emancipation advocates magnified instances when deployment of black troops
created military setbacks. For instance, at the Battle of the Crater (July 30) outside
Petersburg, Virginia, a USCT division was selected and trained to initiate an assault on
Confederate lines. At the last minute, Generals Grant and Meade agreed to replace the
division with white soldiers out of fear that a defeat of black troops would lead to
political backlash. The unprepared white troops were ultimately decimated in the battle,
leading to a flurry of anti-USCT agitation anyway. The Philadelphia Age complained:
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The truth is, the Negro mania has been as mischievous in the conduct of the war,
as it has been in and is in politics….The effect of such a Negro policy upon this
issue of the struggle cannot fail to be pernicious. If a corps commander is
suffered to thwart an important movement, cause the butchery of 10,000 men [an
exaggerated estimate of the Battle of the Crater casualties], and bring disgrace
upon the army, because Negro troops are not selected in preference to white, and
if promotion rests, not upon deeds of gallantry, but in devotion to the Negroequality dogma of a political party, then no man can tell where the demoralization
of our army will end, or what calamity the future has in store for it.11
Because the use of African-American troops advanced the notion of race equality,
conservatives of all political stripes attacked their utilization in the Union armies to stir
up racist sentiment against the Lincoln administration during the presidential campaign.
Lincoln secured re-nomination convincingly once the threat of sectarian
Republican movements was removed. Delegates to the National Union Convention in
Baltimore convened on June 7 – 8 to set the party‟s platform and ticket. Although the
convention passed itself off as a National Union affair to appeal to War Democrats, the
platform planks proved decidedly radical. Among the resolutions proffered was a
commitment “not to compromise with rebels…and to prosecute the war with the utmost
possible vigor” and to pass an “amendment to the Constitution to…terminate and forever
prohibit the existence of slavery within the limits or the jurisdiction of the United
States.”12 Furthermore, delegates announced their loyalty to Lincoln and his war
policies, “especially the Proclamation of Emancipation and the employment as Union
soldiers of men heretofore held in slavery.”13 At the Baltimore Convention, Republicans
clearly sought to detach themselves from notions of leniency toward the South and to
draw a distinct separation from Democratic war aims in the eyes of the nation‟s voters.
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When delegates turned to the selection of a presidential candidate, state after state voted
unanimously for Lincoln‟s re-nomination. Even twenty-two renegade Missouri votes for
Grant were ultimately rescinded in favor of Lincoln. In another attempt to appeal to War
Democrats, delegates selected Democrat Andrew Johnson of Tennessee as Lincoln‟s
running mate.14 With an unambiguous set of principles and virtual unanimity behind
Lincoln‟s re-nomination, Republican delegates looked toward the president‟s reelection.
The two major threats to this aim were developments on the battlefield and the tactics of
an increasingly desperate Democratic party.
*

*

*

*

In the aftermath of the devastating 1863 gubernatorial election Pennsylvania‟s
Democrats reassessed party principles and campaign tactics to reassert their vitality in
state politics. The Democratic State Convention of 1864, which assembled in
Philadelphia on March 24, proved to be an inadequate affair to broadcast this message.
The convention did, however, circulate the notion that the Peace Democracy, which had
failed to bring electoral success in 1863, was gradually being supplanted by War
Democrats. Representative of this phenomenon was the election of William H. Witte as
convention president. Witte was a solid War Democrat who had been snubbed in favor
of Copperhead George W. Woodward for the gubernatorial nomination a year earlier.
Other evidence of the War Democracy‟s ascendency were the substance of the state
party‟s platform and the convention‟s preference for the presidential candidacy.
Pointedly, none of the party resolutions explicitly favored a national peace assembly or
negotiations with the Confederacy as they had in past state conventions. Instead, the
14
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delegates resolved a vague determination “to restore the welfare and prosperity of the
American Republic” by “get[ting] rid of the present corrupt Federal
Administration…[through] a thorough organization of the time-honored Democratic
party.”15 Furthermore, the delegation pledged their support to the War Democrats‟
leading presidential contender, General George B. McClellan, who was widely viewed
throughout the North as the only man who could restore the Union without engendering
radical social change. “[A]t every mention of the name of Geo. B. McClellan,” reported
the Pittsburgh Gazette, “there was great enthusiasm.”16 The convention further resolved
that delegates vote for McClellan “as a unit” at the Chicago Convention to be held in
August.17 Although the War Democrats used the convention as a means by which to
reassert their party supremacy, the convention, perhaps to maintain unity, was hesitant to
commit to specific policies. “[A]s we have…no issues involved in the coming election
other than those which affect the welfare and liberties of our sister States equally with
ours,” read one resolution, “we leave it to our representatives in the Chicago
Convention…in embodying the sentiment of the people in a declaration of principles
acceptable to all the States.”18
Pennsylvania Democratic congressmen, meanwhile, boldly expressed their
continued opposition to Republican war policy just weeks after the president secured renomination. In a July 1864 manifesto, forty-three senators and representatives from ten
states affixed their signatures to a document entitled Congressional Address, which
cataloged the injustices and unconstitutional measures of the Lincoln administration. The
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discontents, including Senator Charles R. Buckalew and eight Pennsylvania
representatives, warned: “Let no one be deceived by the assertion, that the arbitrary and
evil acts of the Administration indicate but a temporary policy, and are founded upon
necessities which cannot long exist….Success itself in the odious policy now urged by
the Administration…could be so only at the price of the liberty of the whole country.”19
Among the grievances listed by the congressmen were typical Democratic criticisms
against federal government centralization, conscription, suspension of civil liberties, and
the uplifting of the black race. Particularly abhorrent to these men was the burgeoning
utilization of African-Americans in the Union armies. “The practical results of this
policy,” the address maintained, “are to obtain an inferior quality of troops at the highest
rate of expense [and] to impose upon the Treasury the support of an enormous number of
undisciplined and ignorant negroes.”20 The enlistment of black troops was doubtless
viewed by Democrats as a step toward equality between the races. The address sponsors
continued: “[T]he employment of blacks in the war is to be made the pretext for
extending to them the right of suffrage and also social position, and to be followed,
probably, by the organization of a considerable body of them into a standing army.”21
Democrats sought to invoke race prejudice, their strongest political card, in advance of
the presidential election.
Despite the organized opposition that continued to assail Republican war policy
during Summer 1864, the Democracy endured two major complications in August that
questioned the party‟s loyalty. First was the issue of soldier voting. Since the 1862 state
19

Charles Buckalew, et al., Congressional Address (Washington, DC, 1864), 17-18. The eight
Democratic Pennsylvania representatives included Samuel J. Randall, John D. Stiles, Sydenham E.
Ancona, Myer Strouse, Philip Johnson, Charles Denison, William H. Miller, and Alexander H. Coffroth.
20
Ibid, 13.
21
Ibid.

138

supreme court ruling, Pennsylvania‟s soldiers were unable to cast ballots outside state
lines. This decision withheld the franchise from a sizeable bloc of Republican-majority
voters. Republicans had subsequently lost the 1862 midterm elections and nearly
relinquished the governor‟s seat as a result. Unionists in Harrisburg thus took up the
issue and aimed to adopt an amendment to the state constitution that would authorize the
soldier vote outside Pennsylvania‟s borders. Not only would the proposed amendment
improve Republican electoral chances, but it also could embarrass Democrats who stood
in the way of granting the ballot to those fighting to suppress the Confederacy. Those
Democrats who blocked the amendment argued that the legislation would yield
fraudulent votes in future elections and that Democratic tickets would be withheld from
the soldiers by Republican officers and government officials. The amendment was
passed by the state assembly with little difficulty and was scheduled for a referendum by
special election on August 2. The Pennsylvania electorate overwhelmingly favored the
amendment by a vote of 200,000 to 105,000.22 The election returns indicate that a
substantial number of Democrats approved of the soldier vote, despite the ill-tidings it
would bring to the party.23
A second complication for the party that arose in August 1864 dealt with the
vexing issue of conscription. Wildly unpopular since its inception, conscription had
perpetually brought the threat of disorder through draft resistance. Because many of
these draft dodgers were antiwar Democrats, the party endured the negative stereotype as
the organization of cowardice and disloyalty. This image only hardened as a result of the
farcical “Fishingcreek Conspiracy” of Columbia County. The rural county was known as
22
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a Democratic stronghold and center for draft resistance. The area became notorious,
however, after the August 1 murder of J. Stewart Robinson, an assistant provost marshal
assigned to root out draft dodgers. Rumors circulated that a large contingent of anticonscription Democrats and deserters, numbering up to five hundred, had banded
together in the Fishingcreek Valley and constructed a fort as a means to resist
conscription and aid a Confederate invasion of the state. Starting on August 13, Union
soldiers were sent to search the area for the mythical fort. A number of arrests were
made and twenty-three men were charged and tried for organizing to resist the draft.
Through the course of the October 1864 trial of the suspected draft resisters, fifteen men
were found innocent, two confessed to the charges against them, and the rest were fined
or jailed.24 The alleged conspiracy was an embarrassment for both Unionists and
Democrats. Federal officials appeared gullible in their fears of a fort manned by draft
dodgers and heavy-handed in the arrest of anti-conscription, but otherwise benign
civilians. Democrats, on the other hand, only reinforced the notion that they were the
party of draft dodgers and Southern sympathizers. This was not a welcome image for
Democrats to exemplify on the cusp of a potentially transformative election.
Despite the challenges faced by Democrats leading up to their national
convention, Abraham Lincoln was noted by friends to be deeply depressed. War
weariness continued to mount, particularly with the June – August 1864 raid of
Confederate General Jubal A. Early that brought rebels to the gates of Washington and
resulted in the burning of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania on July 30. The president was
also discredited by the radicals in his own party, particularly those who supported the so24
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called Wade-Davis Bill. The bill, which passed Congress on July 2, proposed that a
majority of Southerners in a seceded state take a loyalty oath before re-admittance to the
Union would be considered. Lincoln pocket-vetoed the legislation on the grounds that it
was too harsh a reconstruction proposal that interfered with his more moderate “Tenpercent plan.”25 In an angry declaration, dubbed the Wade-Davis Manifesto, the bill‟s
architects warned that Lincoln “must understand that our support is of a cause and not of
a man; that the authority of Congress is paramount and must be respected…and if he
wishes our support, he must confine himself to his executive duties - to obey and execute,
not make the laws - to suppress by arms armed Rebellion, and leave political
reorganization to Congress.26 Faced with renewed military setbacks and revived schisms
within his party, Lincoln wrote a disheartened memorandum on August 23 lamenting that
“[t]his morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this
Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the
President elect, as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will
have secured his election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards.”27
Should his administration indeed be voted out of office, Lincoln thought it likely that the
Democratic president-elect he would hope to cooperate with would be the Pennsylvaniaborn general who had irked him since the early days of the war – George B. McClellan.
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*

*

*

*

After George McClellan was removed from command of the Army of the
Potomac in November 1862, rumors continued to circulate for the next two years that he
would be reassigned to some important military post. Opposition within the Lincoln
administration remained too strong, however, particularly after McClellan announced his
entrance onto the political stage as a Democrat in October 1863. Both wings of the party
petitioned the general to run for president with War or Peace principles, respectively.
Although McClellan had been a constant critic of Lincoln‟s policies of emancipation and
civil liberty suspension, the general‟s war service and empathy for the Union soldier
made most believe that he would advance a typical War Democratic ideology. These
were valuable traits for a presidential candidate as the Democracy aimed to distance itself
from the Peace Democratic bent it experimented with in 1863 and the subsequent
backlash it endured as the party of treason. As historian Joel H. Silbey explains,
McClellan “was a good Democrat who could attack the Lincoln administration for its
execution of policy without casting doubt on his own support for the ends of that
policy.”28 Nonetheless, a significant portion of the party remained determined to seek an
immediate cessation of hostilities, especially after high casualty reports continued to filter
North through Summer 1864. These Peace men were numerous enough for the
Democracy to consider their grievances and attempt to incorporate them within the party
whole. Consequently, McClellan would be compelled through the duration of the
presidential contest to walk a fine line between the divergent party wings. Peace
Democrats were thrilled and War Democrats stunned when on August 24, just days
before the Chicago Convention, McClellan informed St. Louis businessman James
28
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Harrison, “[i]f I am elected, I will recommend an immediate armistice and a call for a
convention of all the states and insist upon exhausting all and every means to secure
peace without further bloodshed.”29 Although McClellan never again uttered another
such pro-peace sentiment throughout the rest of the campaign, it showed the difficulties
he would face in representing the conflicting principles of the War and Peace Democrats.
The Democratic National Convention met in Chicago on August 29 with a
majority of War Democrats and Conditional Moderates present. Among Pennsylvania‟s
leading delegates were Moderates Francis W. Hughes and William Bigler. Bigler was
selected to deliver an opening address to the convention. Although the address urged
conciliation with the South, it did so with the typically Moderate pledge to do so through
restoration of the entire Union and with no commitment to continue the war with
abolitionist aims in mind:
[M]ore than two millions of men have been called into the field, on our side
alone, after the land has been literally drenched in fraternal blood….The men now
in authority, because of the feud which they have so long maintained with violent
and unwise men of the South, and because of a blind fanaticism about an
institution [slavery] of some of the States, in relation to which they have no duties
to perform and no responsibilities to bear, are rendered incapable of adopting the
proper means to rescue our country, - our whole country – from its present
lamentable condition….[I]t is apparent that the first indispensable step to the
accomplishment of this great work is the overthrow, by the ballot, of the present
administration, and the inauguration of another, in its stead, which shall directly
and zealously, but temperately and justly, wield all the influence and power of the
government to bring about a speedy settlement of the national troubles on the
principles of the constitution and on terms honorable and just to all sections….[A
settlement] which shall have no conditions precedent to the restoration of the
Union, but which shall diligently seek that result as the consummation of
permanent peace amongst the States and renewed fraternity amongst the people.30
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Most Democrats present at the convention desired to restore limited war aims, preserve
antebellum social relations, and consider all reconciliatory plans with the Confederacy
that could preserve the Union.
On the convention‟s second day, Democratic delegates hammered out a party
platform. Although War Democrats and Conditional Moderates favoring a continuation
of the war outnumbered the Peace Democrats, the latter group‟s cooperation was
necessary for the party‟s success. What resulted was an ineffective compromise between
the party wings that doomed the Democrats‟ subsequent campaign. Ultimately, tacit
concessions were granted by both sides that permitted Peace Democrats to lead the
structuring of the party platform and allowed War Democrats to advance McClellan as
the party‟s nominee with little opposition. The platform planks were fashioned primarily
by the North‟s most infamous Copperhead, Clement L. Vallandigham of Ohio. Although
one plank declared that the Democracy would “adhere with unswerving fidelity to the
Union under the Constitution,” Vallandigham and the Peace Democrats went too far in
the second resolution of the platform:
[T]his convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people,
that after four years of failure [emphasis mine] to restore the Union by the
experiment of war, during which, under the pretence of a military necessity, or
war power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been
disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private right alike trodden down
and the material prosperity of the country esscutially [sic] impaired, - justice,
humanity, liberty and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made
for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States,
or other peaceable means, to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peace
may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.31
To brand the war a failure was a bold denunciation of the Lincoln administration that also
inadvertently questioned the resolve of the Northern civilian and the gallantry of the
31
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Union soldier. Peace Democrats had overstepped decorum and had made it impossible
for McClellan, as a War Democrat, to embrace the platform unconditionally.
True to their word, Peace Democrats on the third day of the convention permitted
George McClellan to capture the nomination with only token resistance. McClellan
garnered enough votes over Peace Democrats like Governor Thomas H. Seymour of
Connecticut and Governor Horatio Seymour of New York to win the nomination on the
first ballot. Peace Democrats additionally received another important concession from
the War faction. For their continued loyalty, Peace Democrats were awarded the number
two spot on the ticket. Ohio Representative George H. Pendleton, a Copperhead
associate of Vallandigham, was selected by convention delegates as McClellan‟s running
mate. The selection only complicated the Democracy‟s presidential aspirations as the
party now staked its hopes on a War Democrat campaigning on a Peace Democratic
platform with a Copperhead running mate. Nonetheless, delegates of all ideological
stripes were apparently content. The party expressed its enthusiasm for McClellan: “Be
assured that those for whom we speak, were animated with the most earnest, devoted and
prayerful desire, for the salvatior [sic] of the American Union, and the preservation of the
Constitution of the United States; and that the accomplishment of these objects was the
guiding and impelling motive in every mind.”32 McClellan was now faced with the
daunting challenge of campaigning amid the disparate desires of party members and a
sudden turn in Union military fortunes.
George B. McClellan was an unabashed War Democrat whose affinity for his
comrades in arms only reinforced his belief that their sacrifices should not be in vain.
The Chicago Convention, however, had complicated McClellan‟s ability to come out
32
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forthrightly in favor of the war. Between the August 31 adjournment of the convention
and McClellan‟s acceptance of the nomination on September 8, the general painstakingly
crafted an acceptance letter he hoped would set forth his War Democratic principles
without alienating the crucial Peace advocates. Interposed between these two events was
the sudden news from General Sherman in Georgia that Atlanta had been captured.
Whereas once the Democrats‟ platform was acceptable to many conservatives, the change
in military fortunes galvanized renewed resolve to continue the war effort. As
Republican Alexander K. McClure explained, the Democratic platform “at the time of its
deliverance honestly reflected the views of nearly the entire Democratic people of the
country, and very many Republicans were profoundly apprehensive that the declaration
was only too true, but just when the convention had concluded its labors, the trained
lightning flashed the news to Washington from Sherman saying: „Atlanta is ours, and
fairly won.‟”33 The news only hastened the need for the Democrats to refute the notion
that the war was a failure and for McClellan to come out strongly in favor of the war‟s
continuation, albeit toward conservative war aims.
In his acceptance letter, McClellan unequivocally asserted the War Democratic
principle that he could not recognize Confederate independence. “The re-establishment
of the Union in all its integrity,” affirmed McClellan, “is and must continue to be the
indispensable condition to any settlement.”34 Although reunion was requisite to any
thought of peace, McClellan blatantly discarded Republican insistence upon
emancipation. McClellan continued:
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So soon as it is clear, or even probable, that our present adversaries are ready for
peace, upon the basis of Union, we should exhaust all the resources of
statesmanship practiced by civilized nations and taught by the traditions of the
American people, consistent with the honor and interests of the country, to secure
such peace, re-establish the Union, and guarantee for the future the constitutional
rights of every State. The Union is the one condition of peace – we ask no
more.35
McClellan also appealed to his dedication to his brothers in arms to advance his
unambiguously pro-war stance. “I could not look in the face of my gallant comrades of
the army and navy,” he avowed, “who have survived so many bloody battles, and tell
them that their labors and the sacrifice of so many of our slain and wounded brethren had
been in vain; that we had abandoned that Union for which we have so often periled our
lives.”36 Without outright repudiation of the Peace Democratic platform which he was
pledged to advance, McClellan went as far as he could in his acceptance letter to present
himself as a pro-war conservative who would continue the fight for the Union with the
limited aims pursued during the earliest months of the war. As historian Jennifer Weber
explains, “McClellan had to walk a fine line in accepting the nomination. If he blatantly
rejected the plank, he risked alienating the Peace Democrats….Embracing the document,
however, would drive away Unionist moderates of both parties who had been drawn to
his candidacy. McClellan‟s task would have been difficult in the best of times, but he
had to act now in the excited days after Atlanta.”37
Once the presidential campaign began in earnest, Pennsylvania‟s Democracy
worked assiduously to ensure a McClellan victory in November. The selection of
McClellan and his announcement to campaign as a pro-war candidate further emboldened
the War Democrats within the state party system. In July, Philadelphia‟s antiwar Central
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Democratic Club, which had served as a Copperhead social organization and
headquarters for propagating Peace sentiment since January 1863, fizzled. As Irwin F.
Greenberg explains, “[b]y 1864 it was painfully clear to the professionals [politicians]
that the Democratic Party‟s identification with the dissenting aristocrats of the Central
Democratic Club was hurting the party‟s chances for election victories.”38 In its stead,
War Democrats and Conditional Moderates organized the so-called Keystone Club to
advance the principles of pro-war conservatives. At its first meeting in August, club
members selected Colonel William McCandless president. McCandless, who had fought
in some of the Army of the Potomac‟s most fearsome battles, had recently relinquished
command of his Pennsylvania Reserve troops after the loss of his arm at Spotsylvania in
May.39 His selection as president was a deliberate move by pro-war Democrats to
distance themselves from the Copperhead elites who had led the Central Democratic
Club. The choice was shrewd because Republicans could hardly attack a Democratic
organization led by a war hero. Even Forney‟s Press admitted that McCandless “served
his country during three years with great courage and skill….He has made a sacrifice for
the Democratic party…and now that he has taken his course we trust that the party will
appreciate this sacrifice and reward him accordingly.”40 Although during the 1864
campaign season the Keystone Club would invite speakers of all political hues such as
War Democrat Richard Vaux, Conditional Moderate Jeremiah Black, and Peace
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Democrat Charles Ingersoll, its credibility as a loyal organization was much more secure
than that of its Copperhead predecessor.
Although Pennsylvania had no state offices to fill in 1864, the electorate did select
the usual numbers of state representatives and senators, as well as all twenty-four
congressmen. On state election day, October 11, 1864, Pennsylvanians gave the
Republican party a resounding victory, likely bolstered by the recent capture of Atlanta
and General Philip Sheridan‟s successful raid through the Shenandoah Valley. In the
state house, Unionists garnered sixty-four seats to the Democrats‟ thirty-six. Unionists
picked up three additional seats in the state senate, giving them a twenty-to-thirteen
majority. Most significantly, Lincoln‟s party won sixteen of the twenty-four
Pennsylvania seats in Congress.41 Although the election was a Democratic defeat on
paper, conservatives took heart at some of the electoral specifics. For instance,
Democrats had lost the home vote by only a slim margin of less than four hundred votes.
The soldier vote was resoundingly Unionist, but Democrats hoped that the appeal of
General McClellan among his adoring troops would shift the state‟s electoral votes to the
Democratic column in November. The conservative Republican Compiler [Gettysburg]
optimistically observed in the aftermath of the October election that Unionists “were
trembling for the future….But the most important work must yet be done. Democrats,
therefore, must not slumber….Rally, freemen, once again; put shoulder to shoulder and
move forward in solid column for McClellan and Pendleton, the Union, the Constitution
and the laws.”42 For their part, the Keystone Club organized a huge parade in
Philadelphia on October 29, composed of up to 40,000 Democrats. In an appeal to

41
42

Election statistics found in The Tribune Almanac for 1865 (New York: 1865), 54-55.
Republican Compiler [Gettysburg], October 24, 1864, 2.

149

conservatives‟ race prejudice, Democratic parade participants “carried a transparency
representing General McClellan surrounded by diverging rays of light, and the motto,
„The Day is Breaking.‟ On the reverse was a picture representing a platform on which
stood Mr. Lincoln. The platform was supported by four colored soldiers.”43
Pennsylvania‟s Democracy was indeed mobilized and enthusiastic on the eve of the
presidential election and anxious to reinstall a representative of conservatism in the White
House.
When election day finally arrived on November 8, 1864, results were so close in
the Commonwealth that it took several days for a final tabulation. At last, it became
apparent that the crucial soldier vote had carried Pennsylvania for Lincoln with a close
but comfortable margin. With the combined home and soldier votes, the president
collected 296,382 votes compared with McClellan‟s 276,316 – a margin of victory of
20,066 votes or 3.5%. Without the soldier vote, the margin of victory for Lincoln
diminished to 5,702 or just 1.1%.44 Out of sixty-six counties in the Commonwealth,
McClellan had won thirty-five, particularly in the center, southern tier, and eastern coal
regions of the state. Lincoln on the other hand had done well along the northern and
western counties, as well as the urban regions in and around Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and
Harrisburg. Although nationally, McClellan had only captured majorities in New Jersey,
Delaware, and Kentucky, Pennsylvania had nearly thrown its large electoral vote count to
the general. Had military misfortunes continued to occur up to the election, it is
reasonable to expect that the advocates of peace would have triumphed in the state.
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Instead, Democrats were predictably dismayed by the returns, particularly the soldiers‟
preference to support the president over their former commander. The Lancaster
Intelligencer ruefully noted that “[t]he past four years have been dark days in the history
of the Nation; but the four years that are to ensue will be still darker and more terrible in
their consequences….The die is cast; the Rubicon is crossed, and nothing but gloom and
suffering looms up before us as a Nation.”45 The Democratic Watchman [Bellefonte], on
the other hand, remained defiant. When its editor asked why the Republicans did not
gloat over their victory, he reasoned that voters now saw “that they have made a mistake
– that the triumph of their abolition principles is a triumph over the best interests of the
country.”46 Ultimately, the Democracy was defeated in the 1864 presidential election for
two major reasons. First, its candidate was faced with the impossible task of appealing to
a Democratic continuum with ideologies and war aims too broad to satisfy all. Second,
the Lincoln administration scored timely military victories that turned the tide of public
sentiment in its favor. No candidate, nor any segment of Pennsylvania‟s Democratic
spectrum could singlehandedly surmount these overwhelming circumstances.
*

*

*

*

What was certain in the weeks after the presidential election was that Democrats
of all stripes had been effectively marginalized for the remainder of the war. “With
Lincoln elected for another term and Sherman rolling along toward the Georgia coast [on
his famous March to the Sea],” Jennifer Weber explains, “Northerners had little question
as to the outcome of the war, and dissent faded from the public stage.”47 In January
1865, the president supported congressional reconsideration of an amendment to abolish
45

Lancaster Intelligencer, November 16, 1864, 2.
Democratic Watchman [Bellefonte], November 18, 1864, 2.
47
Weber, Copperheads, 206.
46

151

slavery, which passed on the last day of the month. Unionist newspapers were jubilant.
“[T]his black curse,” rejoiced the Village Record [Waynesboro], “the cause of so much
trouble and bloodshed, [will] be forever blotted out….Copperheads how do you feel?”48
Although few Democratic newspapers printed more than the straightforward details of
the amendment‟s passage, the Democratic Watchman [Bellefonte] remained vitriolic:
The mountain has conceived and brought forth a mouse – a contemptible,
laughable, abortion of a mouse. The abolitionized Congress, after terrible labor,
has brought forth a resolution paving the way for the alteration of the
Constitution, for abolishing slavery. Now all the company of fools or knaves who
voted for this resolution have recorded themselves as being in favor of both of the
following propositions:
1. The perpetual dissolution of this Union, by barring the last avenue left
open for the return of the southern States.
2. The destruction of the government formed by our fathers, by blotting
out the sovereignty of the States on which alone it was founded.
Stripped of all shams and lying disguises, it is simply a proposition to
revolutionise [sic], overthrow, and destroy this government…If the secessionist is
a traitor, those who voted for this resolution are double traitors.49
Interestingly, among those who did vote for the amendment were three Moderate
Democratic congressmen of Pennsylvania who hoped to separate themselves from the
increasingly anachronistic fulminations of the Peace Democracy.50 As Weber explains,
“the antipathy of the Peace Democrats toward the amendment drove moderate Democrats
to support it” in order to move the party forward and out from under the damning charges
of treason.51
The Pennsylvania Democracy was demoralized and apathetic during the closing
weeks of the war. With little fanfare, the Democratic State Central Committee met on
March 6 in Harrisburg to determine the next meeting of the Democratic State
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Convention. Because no important offices were at stake in 1865, the delegates deferred
the convention‟s assembly until June. Most Democrats meanwhile waited expectantly
along with Unionists for the conclusion of the war. However, a handful of diehard Peace
Democrats remained to voice their continued opposition. Franklin Weirick, editor of the
Selinsgrove Times, pledged in February that “the war will not and ought not to stop until
the independence of the Confederate States has been secured and acknowledged.”52 The
Philadelphia Age kept up its hostility, printing in March that the conflict was not as
others predicted “all but over. What an absurd notion; why, the war could go on for
another ten years. The South was far from exhausted. Lee was going to add a million
Negroes to his army. Peace was by no means just at hand. Six months hence, people
would see how ridiculous the concept of victory over the South was.”53 Victory would
come, however. On April 9, General Robert E. Lee surrendered his Army of Northern
Virginia at Appomattox, Virginia, effectively ending the national tragedy. For
Democrats and Unionists alike, peace was at hand. Nonetheless, the future of the nation
was uncertain and all members of the Democracy could only speculate on the frightful
changes the war had wrought.
*

*

*

*

For Pennsylvania‟s Democrats, the year 1864 witnessed the last substantial
continuum shift of the war. Peace Democrats failed to lead the party to victory during the
gubernatorial election of 1863 and increasingly lost the trust of the electorate and control
of the party. Nonetheless, these Democrats remained numerous enough to warrant
attention. To remain competitive against Unionists, Pennsylvania‟s Democratic leaders
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could not alienate the advocates of peace. This took substantive form during the party‟s
national convention at which Peace Democrats were ceded control of the platform and
the vice-presidential spot. War Democrats were the beneficiaries of this final shift in the
party‟s ideological commitment. When the war took a promising turn during the middle
and end of 1863, voters increasingly thought the conflict to be winnable and enabled prowar leaders to wrest control of the party machinery. Although the first several months of
1864 proved to be costly on the battlefield, War Democrats and their Moderate allies held
together to push native son George B. McClellan for the presidency. The shift toward the
War end of the spectrum is best evidenced by the dissolution of the Central Democratic
Club and its substitution by the Keystone Club. The Democrats‟ defeat in the state and
national elections in October and November were a result of renewed Union military
victories and the inability of Democrats along the vast party continuum to unify.
The wartime Democratic continuum broke down after Lincoln‟s reelection when
it became apparent that the war was nearly at an end and continued opposition was futile.
War Democrats and Moderates became politically apathetic and looked with increasing
enthusiasm to an end to the war, whatever the means used to achieve it. Some even
embraced the Republican proposal to abolish slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment as
a way to relieve the burden of the treason label that had so often hampered Democratic
political success during the war. Intransigent Peace Democrats, however, resisted any
accord with the dominant Unionists and continued to use their increasingly negligible
means to obstruct Republican war policy. Their continued fury appeared foolish to most
at this point, as peace under Republican terms was a certainty. The nation‟s greatest
crisis was at an end and Pennsylvania‟s conservatives would be compelled to reorganize
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the Democracy to deal with the contentious issues that would arise in a new era of
reconstruction and reunion.
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Conclusion
On April 21, 1865, the Democratic Watchman [Bellefonte], a vehemently antiRepublican newspaper established in the conservative regions of central Pennsylvania‟s
Appalachians, reported on the national tragedy that was then arresting the American
people. “An event so startling has never, perhaps, occurred in the history of our
country,” lamented the editor. “To be smitten down at such a time...when all were
hopeful in the promise of the future, naturally casts a gloom over the whole
country....What effect the death of Mr. Lincoln will have upon the future of our country,
none can tell.”1 Just five months before however, when Lincoln had secured a second
term in office, the same newspaper had bitterly branded him as a “fanatic” whose faults
included “his violated oaths, his obscene jokes and tyranical [sic] usurpations.”2 In the
days after the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln, the North‟s Republicans and
Democrats unified in a spirit unseen since the days after the attack on Fort Sumter four
years before. The death of Lincoln was only the first in a long series of events that
complicated the Pennsylvania Democracy‟s search for a postwar identity. Despite their
wartime opposition, conservatives were now faced with the drastic social changes
unleashed by the war. With the advent of peace, Pennsylvania Democrats were no longer
divided along War, Peace, or Moderate divisions. New challenges faced them and the
rest of the country as Americans North and South worked to find meaning in the years of
bloodshed and struggled to come to terms with the transformative changes that the war
had brought. Unfortunately for Pennsylvania Democrats, the Civil War had made
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impossible the opportunity to return their country to the antebellum ideals they so
cherished.
*

*

*

*

Although definitive characterizations of the individual sects of Pennsylvania‟s
wartime Democratic continuum are difficult to draw, several conclusions can be made.
The state‟s War Democrats were the followers of Stephen A. Douglas prior to the
outbreak of war. With their commitment to the Union‟s preservation and low tolerance
for Southern extremism, these party members distanced themselves from the rest of the
Democratic continuum that favored conciliation and compromise. With the advent of
war, patriotism and war enthusiasm abounded in Pennsylvania for the first year of the
conflict, permitting the War Democratic philosophy to gain supremacy. The ideological
commitments of this wing corresponded with the Lincoln administration‟s initially
limited war aims. War Democrats were tolerant of a temporary suspension of civil
liberties and remained committed to military suppression of the Confederacy despite
military setbacks and heavy casualties. However, when Republican policy shifted in
favor of emancipation, pro-war conservatives soured on the idea of collaboration with the
political opposition. As military losses mounted and the threat of racial equality loomed
large, the Peace Democracy seized control of the party machinery and led Pennsylvania
conservatives when the war was at its bleakest, just prior to the Battle of Gettysburg. The
failure of the Peace Democrats to attract enough conservatives to the idea of armistice,
negotiation, or peaceable separation during the 1863 electoral campaign allowed a War
Democratic resurgence. The growing prospect of Union success in 1864 also aided the
War Democracy in backing the candidacy of George B. McClellan, whose pledge to
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prosecute the war without commitment to emancipation resonated with pro-war
Democrats. McClellan‟s defeat in the November 1864 election resigned War Democrats
to support the war‟s denouement under Republican auspices. Ultimately, the success of
the War Democracy was inextricably linked to conservatives‟ toleration of the federal
government and its handling of the war. When Pennsylvania‟s dedication to the
Confederacy‟s suppression was at its height in 1861 and 1864, pro-war Democrats
exercised political clout. When war enthusiasm waned, as it did in 1862 and early 1863,
the War Democracy reached its nadir. Whatever their political potency throughout the
war, as Christopher Dell notes, “without [the War Democrats‟] assistance the federal
government would have been powerless to restore the Union by force of arms.”3
The Commonwealth‟s Peace Democrats coalesced around their support for
Southern Democrat John C. Breckinridge in the 1860 presidential election. Because of
their vehement racism, these Breckinridge Conservatives were firm advocates of
Southern slavery and encouraged the North‟s acquiescence to the Fugitive Slave Act and
slavery‟s expansion in the territories. Many had familial or economic ties to the South
and believed that Pennsylvania shared a closer affinity with that region than with the New
England which they viewed as the bastion of radical abolitionism. It was this view that
encouraged the most strident Peace Democrats to call for the secession of Pennsylvania
from the Union. Although their views were tolerated during the secession winter, the
Peace Democrats were harassed for their ultraconservative views after the war
commenced. For the first year of the conflict, they were subject to mob violence from
ardent Unionists and arbitrary arrest from the Lincoln administration. Only after
conservative backlash over emancipation grew could Copperheads again voice their
3
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sentiments freely. As military setbacks accumulated and popular agitation against
expanded war aims burgeoned, Peace Democrats gradually took control of the party. By
1863, Copperheads had advanced as their gubernatorial candidate a notable peace
advocate, George W. Woodward. Only a sudden turn of military fortunes during
Summer 1863 repulsed the Copperhead tide and contributed to the Democracy‟s defeat at
the polls. Because Peace Democrats had failed to bring the party electoral victory, the
War Democracy‟s credibility was restored. Nonetheless, Copperheads remained
numerous enough within the party framework that the rest of the Democratic continuum
could not afford to alienate them. During the 1864 presidential campaign, Copperheads
were assuaged when granted the number two spot on the ticket behind War Democrat
George B. McClellan. After Lincoln‟s reelection, only the Peace Democrats remained
adamantly opposed to continuing the war, causing them to look like “foolish prophets of
doom.”4 Although few Copperheads committed treason as per the Constitution, all Peace
Democrats were obstructionists whose pratings offered Confederates a glimmer of hope
long after they should have had none.
Pennsylvania‟s Moderate Democrats are the most difficult to track through the
course of the war. They were the most likely to alter their ideological commitments as
the war progressed and shift their position along the Democratic continuum. At times,
Moderates were even absorbed by one wing of the continuum or the other. During the
secession crisis, Moderates controlled Pennsylvania politics thanks to the leadership of
the Buchanan faction which controlled major state offices through the influence and
patronage of the president. They were compelled to support Buchanan‟s vice president
and Southern rights advocate, John C. Breckinridge. The Breckinridge Moderates
4
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favored conciliation with the wayward South and proposed plans to protect and guarantee
slavery through constitutional amendment and repeal of personal liberty laws. More than
the Breckinridge Conservatives, the Moderates were inclined to refute the
constitutionality of secession and maintained a greater degree of resolve to preserve the
Union. When war broke out in April 1861, the Moderate Democrats virtually vanished as
all party members were forced to choose a strict pro- or antiwar stance. Most of these
Moderates sided with the War Democrats because of their inherent belief in the sanctity
of the Union and the heretofore limited war aims of the Lincoln administration. The
emergence of the emancipation issue and Union military setbacks allowed for a threefold
party division to reemerge. Whereas War Democrats insisted on a return to limited war
aims and Peace Democrats demanded immediate peace, Moderate Democrats proposed
unrealistic plans for a national convention of the states whereby a redress of the South‟s
grievances could be achieved and the Union restored. Moderates consistently held a
naïve belief that the South would agree to reunite with the North if only proper
negotiations were attempted. In 1863, Moderate Democrats sided with Peace Democrats
in pushing the gubernatorial candidacy of the Copperhead George W. Woodward, but
allied with War Democrats in 1864 in their support for George B. McClellan for the
presidency. After the November 1864 election, Moderate Democrats recognized that the
war was nearing an end. Rather than continue futile opposition to the Lincoln
administration like the Peace Democrats, Moderates opted instead to submit with the War
Democrats to a Republican-led conclusion to the conflict. The middle course that
Moderates sought proved unsustainable amid the chaos of civil war. Moderate
Democrats more often than not shifted their views to align with either wing of the party
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continuum in order to advance their ideological interests as they stood at any particular
moment in the war.
To demonstrate the value of utilizing a Democratic continuum in a study of the
North‟s Civil War politics, it is worthwhile to trace the type and degree of ideological
evolution experienced by prominent Pennsylvania politicos mentioned in this study. For
instance, some politicians remained within a segment of the continuum through the
entirety of the war. War Democrat James Buchanan consistently supported the military
suppression of the Confederacy, while criticizing emancipation and other aspects of
radical Republican policy. Charles Ingersoll, on the other hand, remained a virulent
Peace Democrat even when Union victory was assured. Through the course of the war,
Ingersoll endured mob violence, arrest, and a loss of business in his law practice, yet
remained an ardent Copperhead and obstructionist. William Bigler remained a
quintessential Moderate Democrat through the duration of the national crisis. Compelled
to ally with War Democrats in the early months of the war, Bigler resurrected his middleof-the-road policies and advocated utilization of national peace conventions and a
temporary armistice to end the war. As these examples indicate, some Democratic
leaders maintained a static position on the party continuum throughout the war because of
a hardening or intransigence of principle.
Conversely, some Democrats altered their perceptions of the war‟s prosecution as
changes in Republican policy or military fortunes occurred. Political expendience or
simply a change in one‟s moral beliefs could also shift a Democrat along the party
continuum. Charles J. Biddle is a good example of a Democrat whose principles shifted
when emancipation became a Republican war aim. Biddle joined the army
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enthusiastically as a War Democrat in the early weeks of the war and led a regiment of
the Pennsylvania Reserves until he took a seat in the House of Representatives in late
1861. His war enthusiasm waned precipitously after Lincoln‟s emancipation proposal at
which point Biddle‟s rhetoric more closely matched that of a Moderate. In contrast,
Francis W. Hughes‟s shift along the political continuum took a different trajectory. As a
Breckinridge Conservative during the secession crisis, Hughes advocated the secession of
Pennsylvania in similar terms as other Copperhead leaders like Charles Ingersoll and
William B. Reed. By the time Hughes became the chairman of the Democratic State
Committee, however, his principles had shifted to favor a military solution to the
rebellion with limited war aims. Thus, the Democratic continuum was for some leaders a
fluid political spectrum whose segments could be transcended according to the state and
scope of the war at any given time.
Implementation of a Democratic continuum in a study of wartime Pennsylvania
politics offers the historian a number of conclusions that more fully explain the state of
conservatism on the home front. First, acknowledgement of a continuum verifies the
notion that the Democracy as a whole was not an obstructionist party when it came to the
Union‟s preservation. For the majority of the war, War and Moderate Democrats
supported the military suppression of the rebellion to preserve the Union. At particularly
bleak periods of the war, Moderates may have favored a negotiated settlement with the
South that would have restored slaveholders‟ rights, though they never advocated the
peaceable separation of the Union. Examination of the Democracy‟s views on race leads
to different conclusions, however. No segment of the party continuum fully reconciled
themselves to emancipation until the last few months of the war. In this sense, the
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Democracy may be considered a party hindering progress. Peace Democrats, it should be
noted, were the sole obstructionist segment of the party. Their insistence on the
antebellum status quo and virulent opposition to emancipation went so far as to supersede
the desire for the Union‟s preservation.
Second, the notion of a Democratic continuum helps the historian identify the
principles shared by the entire party and those shared by only one segment of the party
spectrum. Some ideological commitments, such as white supremacy and antiemancipation, were principles shared by practically the entire Democratic continuum.
The preponderance of conservative opposition to the Emancipation Proclamation or the
recruitment and use of black troops is better understood in the context of a Democratic
continuum that shares a fundamental racism across all party segments. In contrast, other
aspects of political ideology, ranging from views on civil liberties; conscription; the
Lincoln administration; cooperation with Unionists; and leniency toward the South,
varied widely among the party segments. Through utilization of the Democratic
continuum it is far easier to conceptualize the views held by individual Democrats.
Lastly, examination of a Democratic continuum modifies the assertion of Joel H.
Silbey, who claims that the Democracy was a healthy, competitive, and “respectable”
opposition to the dominant Republicans. In terms of sheer numbers, Silbey is correct that
conservatives were numerous enough to create strategic political problems for the
Republican party. But we must look at the vastness of the Democratic continuum, and
the range of ideological commitments along it, to see that widespread Democratic
cooperation was impossible to achieve, at least in Pennsylvania. It may be more apt to
consider Silbey‟s “respectable” minority a “chaotic” one instead. Because of these
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divergences of principle along the Democratic continuum, a less ideologically divided
Republican party carried most state and national elections during the war years and
dictated the prosecution of the war.
Ultimately, Pennsylvania‟s Democratic continuum is a valuable tool to better
comprehend the complexities of conservatism during the nation‟s greatest crisis.
Although nearly all Democrats shared a commitment to white supremacy, strict
constitutional construction, states‟ rights, and a decentralized federal government, other
principles are not so definitively “Democratic” when the War – Peace continuum is
broken down and analyzed over the course of the war. Personal sentiments concerning
the war changed according to the progression of events. For instance, a Union military
victory had a distinctly different effect on Democratic perception of the war than the
announcement of a new draft lottery. Circulation of a Copperhead pamphlet stimulated a
different reaction among conservatives than the propagation of a radical Republican‟s
legislative bill. Nevertheless, every political, military, economic, and social event that
occurred during the course of the Civil War is better understood in the context of the vast,
varied Democratic continuum.
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